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Abstract 
 
 
This work is an analysis of Moses Mendelssohn's contributions to aesthetic rationalism, 
a tradition that arose in 18-century Germany. Rationalists held that aesthetic experience 
is primarily explained by the perfection of the object being considered, where perfection 
is a fundamental, rational (law-governed) property. As this work shows, Mendelssohn 
was among the first to acknowledge and effectively address several significant 
objections to the rationalist theory: its seeming inability to account for pleasure 
generally, tragedy and tragic pleasure more specifically, and the sublime; and its 
apparent blindness to the claims of genius and Rousseau's ethical critique of the arts. 
Many commentators have claimed that Mendelssohn saw these issues as reasons to 
move away from aesthetic rationalism, but Mendelssohn in fact attempted to address 
each of them from within the rationalist framework. Mendelssohn’s resulting 
elaboration and defense of the rationalist tradition illustrates its resilience and lasting 
relevance. 
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 1       
Introduction 
Despite Mendelssohn’s recognition as a leading aesthetician in his own time, and 
despite the widespread esteem currently enjoyed by Mendelssohn’s contributions to 
political philosophy and philosophy of religion, his aesthetics is severely under-
researched and under-appreciated.1 No book-length work on the topic exists in English, 
and the most recent such German work is over 25 years old.2 Unfortunately, this neglect 
is wholly undeserved, based primarily on a misunderstanding of Mendelssohn’s views 
and his place in the development of aesthetics. 
This history of 18th-century German aesthetics is usually viewed as a grand 
anticipation of Kant’s Critique of Judgment, and so most commentators on Mendelssohn’s 
aesthetics are eager either to praise him by demonstrating his anticipation of Kant, or to 
damn him by pointing out “regression” into the older and supposedly obsolete 
rationalism. Braitmaier,3 Bamberger,4 Goldstein,5 Guyer,6 Vogt,7 Beck,8 and Zammito9 
                                                 
1 There are some encouraging signs of renewed interest, such as Anne Pollock’s edition of 
Mendelssohn’s Äesthetische Schriften (Hamburg: F. Meiner, 2005), and a chapter of Frederick Beiser, 
Diotima’s Children: German Aesthetic Rationalism from Leibniz to Lessing (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009). 
2 Klaus-Werner Segreff, Moses Mendelssohn und die Aufklärungsästhetik im 18. Jahrhundert (Bonn: 
Bouvier, 1984). 
3 Friedrich Braitmaier, Geschichte der poetischen Theorie und Kritik von den Diskursen der Maler bis auf 
Lessing (Frauenfeld: Huber, 1888-1889), 2:148, 164, 173. 
4 Fritz Bamberger, introduction to Moses Mendelssohn Gesammelte Schriften Jubiläumsausgabe (hereafter 
JubA) ed. F. Bamberger, et al. (Berlin, Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann, 1929-1976), 1:XLII-XLVII. 
5 Ludwig Goldstein, Moses Mendelssohn und die deutsche Ästhetik (Königsberg: Gräfe und Unzer, 1904), 
16-18, 148-153, 228-229. 
6 Paul Guyer, “18th-century German Aesthetics,” last modified 2007, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aesthetics-18th-german/. 
7 Wolfgang Vogt, Moses Mendelssohns Beschreibung der Wirklichkeit menschlichen Erkennens (Würzburg: 
Königshausen & Neumann, 2005), 189, 197, 212-215. 
 2       
represent the former attitude, while Cassirer,10 Sommer,11 and Baeumler12 represent the 
latter. As this dissertation shows, the overall approach on both sides is fundamentally 
mistaken—not just because it applies an inappropriate and anachronistic standard to 
history, but also because it obscures what is truly valuable about Mendelssohn’s 
thought. This value only becomes apparent, as I will show, when we read Mendelssohn 
not as a mere anticipation of Kant, but as one of the last and greatest defenders of 
aesthetic rationalism. 
 The tradition of aesthetic rationalism was first intimated by Leibniz in his 1684 
essay “Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas”,13 and flourished in Germany until 
the death of Lessing in 1781. The theory developed within this tradition rested on three 
fundamental theses: 
1. That aesthetic phenomena can be explained as rational phenomena. “Rational” is 
meant in a double sense: metaphysically, in the sense that the phenomena are 
taken to conform to universal laws, and psychologically, in the sense that the 
phenomena are taken to be cognizable through the faculty of reason, and at least 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 Louis White Beck, Early German Philosophy: Kant and His Predecessors (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1969), 326. 
9 John H. Zammito, The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1992), 24-25. 
10 Ernst Cassirer, Freiheit und Form: Studien zur deutschen Geistesgeschichte (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1975), 125. 
11 Robert Sommer, Grundzüge einer Geschichte der deutschen Psychologie und Aesthetik von Wolff-
Baumgarten bis Kant-Schiller (Würzburg: Stahel, 1892), 113-118. 
12 Alfred Baeumler, Das Irrationalitätsproblem in der Ästhetik und Logik des 18. Jahrhunderts bis zur Kritik 
der Urteilskraft (Halle: Niemeyer, 1923), 136. 
13 See “Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas” in G. W. Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, tr. Roger 
Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), 24. There, Leibniz claims that works of art 
please or displease due to objective, law-governed properties in them, even when these properties are 
perceived only confusedly. 
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in principle (if not in fact) capable of being explained discursively. Since 
rationalists understand the faculty of reason as the ability to perceive the 
connections among things according to universal laws, the two senses of 
“rational” are deeply interconnected, and can be traced directly back to Leibniz’s 
principle of sufficient reason and his psychology. This thesis enables aesthetic 
phenomena to be cognized and described scientifically, at least in principle. 
2. That the pleasure characteristic of aesthetic experience is primarily due to beauty, 
which has an objective basis in the perfection of the perceived object. As Wolff 
explains in his Psychologia Empirica, the common definition of the beautiful as 
“that which pleases” could only be “temporary and nominal.” In truth, he 
claimed, “Beauty consists in the perfection of a thing, insofar as it is apt to 
produce pleasure in us by its power.”14  Strictly speaking, this thesis is 
independent of (1). That is, one could hold (with the Stürmer und Dränger, for 
example)  that objective but non-rational properties make an object beautiful or 
pleasing. Or, one could hold (with Kant, for example) that the pleasingness of 
certain objects can be explained through universal principles, but that these 
principles relate to subjective psychology alone, not to any determinate 
properties of the object. Nonetheless, rationalist aestheticians held that beauty is 
objective because it depends on the rational property of perfection in the object. 
                                                 
14 Christian Wolff, Psychologia empirica (hereafter PE), div. 2, vol. 5 of Gesammelte Werke (Hildesheim: 
Olms, 1968) §§543-544. 
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Perfection is a rational property because it relates the parts of an object to the 
whole according to universal laws. 
3. That art has a legitimate and even central place in ethics and human life. 
Rationalists believe that the will is determined by the desire for perfection, and 
that the good, like beauty, is a form of perfection. Thus, they held that the 
enjoyment of beauty tends to produce in us a desire and love for the good, and 
thereby makes us more virtuous. 
Mendelssohn’s rationalist predecessors, especially Wolff, Baumgarten, and Gottsched, 
made great progress in systematizing the first two of these principles and drawing out 
their implications, aiming to develop sciences for each of the arts. Wolff developed a 
science of architecture, while Gottsched, Baumgarten and others created elaborate 
systems which aimed to do the same for other arts, especially poetry. In large part 
because they made remarkable progress in their efforts, these thinkers did little to 
defend the basic principles of aesthetic rationalism. Why bother defending the 
foundations of a program that, judging by the newly burgeoning German arts, was 
enjoying great success? 
But by the early 1750s, new ideas from within Germany and older ideas from 
outside it were beginning to put pressure on the pillars of aesthetic rationalism. Why not 
judge art simply according to the pleasure and mental activity it affords, without regard 
to any determinate objective properties? How could tragedy, considered by many to be 
the highest form of art, be explained as an instance of perfection? What about the 
sublime and works of genius, which seem to explode the bounds of rationality? And is 
 5       
art really a force for positive edification, or rather for ethical corruption? These are 
serious worries, and no one was more aware of them, or did more to address them from 
within the rationalist tradition, than Moses Mendelssohn.  
 Each chapter of this dissertation will take up one of these issues and 
Mendelssohn’s response to it: 
Pleasure. Pleasure is a general problem for rationalist aesthetics primarily because the 
competing sensualist tradition held pleasure to be non-cognitive but also decisive in 
aesthetic matters – a theory which leads quickly to a stark subjectivism. With his first 
work on aesthetics, the Briefe über die Empfindungen [Letters on the sentiments], 
Mendelssohn remedied Baumgarten’s relative neglect of pleasure in aesthetic matters. 
Yet many commentators have argued that in doing so, he moved away from rationalism 
and took a sharp, subjective/psychological turn. In the first section of this chapter, I 
analyze the Briefe über die Empfindungen, reconstructing Mendelssohn’s descriptive 
theory of pleasure and addressing the evidence that Mendelssohn moved away from 
rationalist theory. I conclude that the work is best characterized as a defense, explication, 
and (to a small but significant degree) expansion of rationalist theory – not a turn away 
from it. 
 The second section of Chapter 1 takes up the normative theory of pleasure, 
which encompasses the metaphysics of good and bad pleasure, as well as the ways in 
which they are distinguished by human beings (taste and criticism). I argue that 
Mendelssohn de-emphasized the concept of “false pleasure” which previous rationalists 
had used to ground their theories of “bad pleasure.” Instead, Mendelssohn preferred to 
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see pleasure as always related to the good and perfect, with “bad pleasure” explained as 
a failure to attend to the bad and imperfect aspects of a given object. This has important 
implications for the way in which Mendelssohn would approach aesthetic questions. On 
the relation between taste and criticism, I argue that Mendelssohn largely followed 
Baumgarten, and that he was aware of, but inadequately addressed the worry that taste 
might be radically subjective. 
 The third and final section of Chapter 1 addresses the relation between pleasure 
and the will. Many commentators have suggested that in his later writings, 
Mendelssohn began to strictly separate the faculties of cognition, pleasure, and the will, 
helping prepare the way for Kantian non-cognitivism about pleasure and the autonomy 
of the will. Against these commentators, I argue both that Mendelssohn’s thought was 
largely consistent across his entire career, and that while Mendelssohn was not as clear 
as he should have been, he was certainly no proto-Kantian about pleasure and the will. I 
conclude this chapter with a reconstruction of Mendelssohn’s final view on pleasure and 
the will. 
Art and its role in life. Mendelssohn was deeply influenced by Rousseau’s moral 
critique of culture and arts, but it is less clear what effect this influence had. Some 
commentators see Mendelssohn as a moral stickler who gave art only a narrow role in 
promoting virtue, while worrying incessantly about its possible corrupting effects. 
Others see Mendelssohn as a liberal champion of the arts who gave the production of 
beauty a central role in the virtuous life itself. In the first section of Chapter 2, I reconcile 
these competing views by showing that Mendelssohn was indeed something of an 
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austere moralist, but only for a brief period in his early career. Subsequently, through his 
conversations with Lessing and Nicolai, he began to see art as having its own essential 
role in life, and he retained this view for the rest of his life. As part of my discussion, I 
argue for a novel dating of the disputed text Briefe über Kunst. 
 The second section of Chapter 2 reviews some points in Mendelssohn’s theory of 
art that have broad significance for rationalist aesthetics. The most significant of these is 
contained in a Literaturbrief in which Mendelssohn clearly anticipates Kant’s distinction 
between art and nature. 
Tragedy. Mendelssohn’s correspondence with Lessing on tragedy is widely recognized 
as being highly significant, but the precise philosophical issues and arguments at stake 
have not been clearly described. As I show in the Chapter 3, tragedy is a threat to the 
rationalists’ psychology of pleasure, creates problems for their ethical theory of art, and 
seems not to conform to the ideal of art which Mendelssohn published around the same 
time as the correspondence. These problems arise because rationalist theory is oriented 
toward perfection, but tragedies are by their nature depictions of great imperfections. 
The correspondence, as I read it, is a collaborative working out of these issues, a project 
which Mendelssohn had partly begun on his own in the Briefe über die Empfindungen. 
After tracing its development, I reconstruct Mendelssohn’s view at the close of the 
correspondence. I conclude that this view remains squarely within the rationalist 
tradition, and that Mendelssohn did not, as several commentators have suggested, use 
tragedy as an opportunity to argue for the autonomy of art from ethical concerns. The 
remainder of the chapter addresses later developments in Mendelssohn’s view, 
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particularly his theory of “mixed sentiments.” I argue that Mendelssohn indeed moved 
toward a more subjectively-oriented theory of tragedy in his later writings, but that this 
shift occurred largely at the descriptive level. His theory about what tragedy ought to be 
remained largely unchanged from the end of his correspondence with Lessing in 1757. 
Genius. Genius, it was widely agreed, is in some sense necessary for the production of 
the greatest works of art. But what exactly is genius? Even as thinkers like Young in 
England and Hamann in Germany were arguing that genius is a kind of supernatural 
divine inspiration – with the authority of no less than Plato behind them – the concept 
was largely being neglected in rationalist circles. Mendelssohn was among the first to 
take up the challenge of bringing the genius back to earth, and explaining her powers as 
natural (if rare) phenomena, even while retaining a central role for the faculty of reason 
in the production of art. While he never wrote an independent work on the topic, 
Mendelssohn wrote three reviews of others’ theories of genius which are analyzed in 
Chapter 4. Perhaps the most interesting of these is Mendelssohn’s review of Friedrich 
Gabriel Resewitz’s Versuch über das Genie, an almost completely neglected work which 
concerns the role of reason and intellectual intuition in genius. I conclude that 
Mendelssohn was consistently wary of assigning special sui generis powers to the genius, 
and instead attempted to explain it as a natural, law-governed phenomenon. Despite the 
claims of some commentators, he made no concessions to the Sturm und Drang on this 
point. 
The sublime. In 1757, Mendelssohn published a rather conventional rationalist account 
of the sublime that explained it essentially as an unusually and unexpectedly great 
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species of beauty. Reading Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the 
Sublime and Beautiful in 1758 caused Mendelssohn to rethink his account. How could 
order and comprehensibility, which Mendelssohn took to be hallmarks of the beautiful, 
be squared with Burke’s account of the sublime as something inherently disorderly and 
incomprehensible? Many commentators argue that this question led Mendelssohn to 
move away from rationalism and embrace much of Burke’s sensualist theory, at least 
where the sublime is concerned. In Chapter 5, I analyze and reconstruct Mendelssohn’s 
published and unpublished responses to Burke. While Mendelssohn took Burke’s 
psychological observations at face value, I argue that he worked consistently to offer 
rationalist explanations of sublime phenomena. The result is an account that plausibly 
explains the sublime without straying from a broadly rationalist framework. 
While rationalist aesthetics is by no means complete or correct on every point, it 
is far from trivially false or useless, as has too often been assumed. More than anyone 
else’s, Mendelssohn’s work demonstrates the surprising resilience and explanatory 
power of this important but neglected tradition. 
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Chapter 1: Pleasure 
 The principle that pleasure is the intuition of perfection had been endorsed by 
Wolff,15 Gottsched,16 Baumgarten,17 and other German rationalists in the early part of the 
18th century, well before Mendelssohn had an inkling of their philosophy. According to 
this doctrine, pleasure purports to represent a real, rationally analyzable property of 
perceived objects – their perfection. As a result, rationalists held that one could, at least 
in principle, determine through analysis whether a particular feeling of pleasure really 
or instead only apparently had perfection as its object. Since the rationalists also explain 
beauty as perfection insofar as it is observable or sensible (i.e., capable of being 
perceived clearly but confusedly), beautiful (and apparently beautiful) objects give rise 
to a certain form of pleasure, which is susceptible to the very same analysis.18 This 
opened up a way to an objective standard of taste, in which there is a clear distinction 
between a true and false pleasure felt when considering a given sensible object. 
 These early rationalists, however, did not rigorously investigate the connection 
between the perfection of an object and the felt pleasure associated with it. Wolff’s 
argument that the observability of perfection produces the feeling of pleasure amounts 
to little more than a gesture to experience, but without anything approaching an 
adequate survey of it. Baumgarten simply assumes the principle without any argument 
                                                 
15 PE, §511. 
16 Johann Christoph Gottsched, Erste Gründe der gesammten Weltweisheit (hereafter EG) (Leipzig: 
Breitkopf, 1762), “Theoretischer Theil,” §5, 1:102. 
17 Alexander Baumgarten, Metaphysica (Halle: Hemmerde, 1779), §655. 
18 PE, §§543-544. Wolff is very clear that the production of pleasure alone does not truly make 
something beautiful, since even merely apparent beauty produces a kind of false pleasure. True beauty, 
according to Wolff, is the power of an object to produce (true) pleasure in us through its (real) perfection. 
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at all. This apparently egregious lacuna can be explained by the fundamentally practical 
orientation of both Wolff’s and Baumgarten’s aesthetics, along with their conception of 
art. Both were primarily interested in improving and refining the production and 
judgment of art, and both adhered to the traditional concept of art (ars,  techne) as human 
making in general. Wolff divides techne into “technologia,” making with the body, and 
“ars liberalium,” making with the mind. Baumgarten conceives his science of aesthetics 
as a theoria artis liberalium, which he understood in much the same way as Wolff, 
although he was somewhat more liberal in his understanding of the liberal arts (e.g. he 
includes painting and sculpture). As a result, both emphasized the rules or principles 
they held to be involved in the good construction of objects that would increase their 
perfection, and which would allow them to be judged properly. 
  For this reason, the early German rationalists did not make the feeling of 
pleasure itself a primary concern in their aesthetics, leaving it particularly vulnerable to 
two ideas originating in France. The first is Dubos’s claim in his 1719 Critical Reflections 
on Poetry, Painting and Music that a sizeable portion of human activity, including the 
beauty of many arts but also spectacles like gladiator fights, serve merely to busy the 
mind in new and interesting ways, and thereby divert one from the tedium of everyday 
life.19 The second is Batteux’s invention of the concept of fine arts in his 1746 work The 
fine arts reduced to a single principle.20 According to Batteux, the purpose of the fine arts, 
                                                 
19 See Jean-Baptiste Dubos, Critical Reflections on Poetry, Painting and Music, trans. Thomas Nugent 
(London: Nourse, 1748), 1-9. 
20 Charles Batteux, Les Beaux arts reduits a un même principe (Paris: Durand, 1746), 7. 
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which include painting, poetry, music, dance, and sculpture, is simply to please us. 
These ideas would become dominant themes in Germany by the early 1750s. 
 Both of these innovations forced questions about the connection between the 
perfection of the object and the feeling of pleasure to the fore. If pleasure consists in a 
subjective busiment of the mind, then why must fine art objects be constructed in any 
particular way? And if the artist intends a work merely to divert or please, why should 
it be judged according to an apparently alien standard of perfection (or, one might add, 
according to Batteux’s own standard of imitation)? Put another way, if there must be 
perfection in such works, it seems that it ought to consist directly in the object’s 
propensity to produce the feeling of pleasure. Or, as Mendelssohn would have his 
character Euphranor put the objection in 1755, “You say that the perfection of a thing is 
the reason why we find its representation pleasing? [It’s] the other way around… the 
pleasure which a certain object provides us is the reason that we call it perfect.”21  
 As the passage suggests, Mendelssohn took up these worries about the feeling of 
pleasure which his predecessors had left hanging. Yet according to many commentators, 
his engagement with the French tradition caused him to move away from rationalism, 
and to theorize pleasure and beauty more in merely subjective, psychological terms.22 In 
this chapter, I argue against that view. Instead, as I will show, Mendelssohn was the first 
to present the full-blown Wolffian/Baumgartian theory of pleasure and beauty as a 
                                                 
21 JubA, 1:73. 
22 Segreff, Moses Mendelssohn, 22-24; Sommer, Grundzüge, 134; Vogt, Beschreibung, 189; Frederic Will, Jr., 
“Cognition through Beauty in Moses Mendelssohn’s Early Aesthetics,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism 14.1 (1955): 100, 104; David Jan Sorkin, The Religious Enlightenment: Protestants, Jews, and 
Catholics from London to Vienna (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 206. 
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complete and effective defense against the ideas of Dubos and a narrowly hedonistic 
interpretation of Batteux. For now, I will abstract from the thornier issues of tragedy, 
genius, and the sublime. These topics are treated in subsequent chapters.  
As Mendelssohn himself explicitly admits,23 most of his thought on pleasure and 
beauty is not original. It is best understood as a new juxtaposition and refinement of 
preexisting views, whose significance lies mainly in their presentation within a new 
intellectual context. Thus one should not expect to find fundamental innovation in 
Mendelssohn’s theory of pleasure and beauty, although it does contain some important 
new elaborations beyond Wolff’s theory. 
Part 1: The descriptive theory of pleasure 
The first part of this chapter concerns Mendelssohn’s descriptive theory of the 
connection between pleasure and beauty in its objective sense. By “descriptive theory” I 
mean the psychology and related metaphysics of beauty and pleasure as they are 
actually experienced. Mendelssohn treats this subject most thoroughly in his first work 
on aesthetics, the 1755 Briefe über die Empfindungen. I consider Mendelssohn’s theory of 
good and bad pleasure, along with his view of taste, in Part 2 of this chapter. 
The Origin and Background of Mendelssohn’s Briefe 
 Johann Georg Sulzer, not Mendelssohn, was the first person to attempt to 
reconcile Wolff’s theory of pleasure with the Dubosian idea that pleasure is the 
subjective feeling of busiment and diversion. According to his 1751-1752 “Recherches 
sur l'origine des sentiments agréables et desagréables” [“Research on the origins of 
                                                 
23 JubA, 11:349. 
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pleasant and unpleasant sentiments”],24 the essence of the soul consists in the bringing 
forth or development of ideas, and it is in a state of pleasure when the flow of its ideas is 
sufficient and unimpeded.25 Following de Pouilly in claiming that we take pleasure in 
whatever exercises our faculties without exhausting them,26 Sulzer argues that those 
objects are pleasurable which are most amenable to an effortless and sufficiently 
voluminous production of ideas. Objects that obstruct the flow of ideas, on the other 
hand, are painful. Sulzer then argues that the objects most suitable for maintaining an 
easy flow of ideas are simply those having a high degree of perfection.27 “Such an object 
presents a quantity of ideas at once, which are connected together with each other 
through the tie of unity, [so] that the mind is therefore capable of developing them, and 
bringing back all the variety in this object to a single common focal point. The soul, 
perceiving this quantity of connected ideas that it can easily develop… considers the 
objects… as plunder which satisfies its essential taste, and rushes toward them full of 
desire.”28 In this way, Sulzer connects Dubos and de Pouilly’s view of pleasure as an 
                                                 
24 Johann Georg Sulzer, “Recherches sur l'origine des sentiments agréables et desagréables,” in Histoire 
de l'Academie Royale des Sciences et des Belles Lettres: Année 1751 (Berlin: Haude et Spener, 1753), 57-100; 
Année 1752 (1754), 2:350-390. Except where exact terminology is crucial, I will generally refer to 
Sulzer’s own translation of this work into German, published as “Untersuchung über den Ursprung 
der angenehmen und unangenehmen Empfindungen” in Vermischte Philosophische Schriften, trans. 
Johann Georg Sulzer with Christian Garve (Leipzig: Weidmanns, 1773), 1:1-98. 
25 The apt metaphor of “flow” is due to Alexander Altmann, Moses Mendelssohns Frühschriften zur 
Metaphysik (Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr, 1969), 96-97. 
26 Louis-Jean Lévesque de Pouilly, The Theory of Agreeable Sensations, trans. anonymous (Edinburgh: J. 
Dickson, 1766), 13, 24. The original French edition was published as Théorie des sentimens agréables 
(Geneva: Barrillot, 1747). 
27 De Pouilly had already come very close to making this claim. He wrote, “Order, symmetry, and 
proportion are agreeable, because they render it easy for the mind to comprehend, and retain the 
different parts of an object” (Agreeable Sensations, 28). He apparently lacked the distinctly Wolffian idea 
of perfection, however. 
28 Johann Georg Sulzer, Schriften, 1:38. 
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activity to Wolff’s view that pleasure relates to perfection. However, Sulzer’s 
explanation entails a rejection of Wolff’s view that pleasure is the perception of 
perfection. Rather, for Sulzer perfection occasions a certain kind of mental activity which 
is identified with pleasure. Although Sulzer was happy to make use of Wolffian 
concepts, he explicitly rejected Wolff’s explanation of pleasure along with Descartes’, 
calling them “unsatisfying.”29 
 Mendelssohn’s early outline or plan for his Briefe über die Empfindungen, labeled 
“Von dem Vergnügen,” shows that Mendelssohn originally conceived the aesthetic 
aspect of the Briefe primarily as a response to Sulzer (its ethical aspect, not treated 
directly in this dissertation, is primarily a response to Maupertuis’s Essai de morale). In 
this outline, which consists of 20 numbered points, Mendelssohn begins by accepting 
Maupertuis’s definition of the pleasant sentiment as  “a representation which we would 
rather have than not have.”30 (He does not, however, accept any of the consequences 
which Maupertuis derives from this assumption). But, as Mendelssohn goes on, Wolff 
and Descartes were no less correct to say that pleasure “arises from the consideration of 
an object as something perfect.”31 The topic of the planned work follows naturally: “how 
this [latter] doctrine can be connected with the previous explanation, or why we would 
always rather have a representation of perfection than not.”32 Already Mendelssohn’s 
intention to retain the Wolffian view is apparent. 
                                                 
29 Sulzer, Schriften, 1:11. 
30 JubA, 1:127. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
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 After summarizing Sulzer’s view in “Von dem Vergnügen” sections 6a-d, 
Mendelssohn writes that Sulzer had indeed provided one possible answer to his 
question about why the soul prefers perfection to imperfection.33 Yet, “I believe this 
explanation is neither the only one, nor one which can be applied in all particular 
cases.”34 Mendelssohn next poses two objections to Sulzer’s theory. First, he scoffs at the 
idea that even sensible pleasures can be explained through the easy production of many 
concepts. “I dare not say with the professor [Sulzer] that the pleasure in the enjoyment 
of a beautiful lady arises merely from a quantity of concepts.”35 Second, Mendelssohn 
claims that Sulzer’s view of pleasure entails a “paradoxical conclusion,” namely, that it 
“gives credit only to our weakness, in that we prefer unity in manifoldness to mere 
manifoldness. In relation to God the perfect would deserve almost no preference.” In 
other words, Mendelssohn seems to think that Sulzer’s view entails that we, and by 
extension God,36 should always prefer objects having “unity” to those that exhibit “mere 
manifoldness,” which he takes to be a mark of weakness. His own “provisional 
considerations” which follow are aimed to “resolve these difficulties.”37 
Altmann finds these objections straightforward. According to him, Mendelssohn 
rightly attacks Sulzer for excessively intellectualizing sensible pleasures, and for failing 
to notice that de Pouilly’s view that the soul takes pleasure in easiness “ultimately 
                                                 
33 Sulzer himself neither posed this question nor attempted to answer it. 
34 JubA, 1:128. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Fundamental to the rationalist tradition is the idea that God’s will and cognition differ from our own 
only in degree. This preserves continuity between our own concept of the good and God’s. 
37 JubA, 1:129. 
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suppresses” the supposed characteristic activity of the soul, “the striving of the monad 
after more distinctness of cognition.”38 But if we look a bit more closely, Mendelssohn’s 
objections become extremely puzzling. 
Regarding sensible pleasure, Mendelssohn explains in “Von dem Vergnügen” 
that sensible pleasures arise from the obscure perception of a bodily condition which 
promotes its “preservation or well-being,” i.e., its “perfect condition.”39 Going on, he 
explains the “[single] ground of the various appearances in the arousal of pleasure… 
[namely,] every object which contains a perfection provides to our understanding an 
amount of concepts by means of the manifold, and by means of the unity provides to 
our reason the opportunity to gain insight into the conception of these manifold 
concepts and the ground of their coexistence.”40 Mendelssohn claims here that sensible 
pleasure is a perception of perfection, and perfection provides us with the opportunity 
to gain insight into and develop concepts out of the thing perceived. On the surface, this 
explanation seems to be exactly the same as Sulzer’s! At the very least, his disagreement 
is not so straightforward as Altmann assumed.  
The second objection is even more curious. According to Altmann, Sulzer sees 
the unity of a perfect object as providing for easiness in the development of concepts 
from it, and Mendelssohn rejects this view.41 However, as cited above,42 Mendelssohn 
                                                 
38 Altmann, Frühschriften, 101. Bamberger, JubA, 1:XXX and Ch. A. Brandis, introduction to Moses 
Mendelssohn’s Gesammelte Schiften, ed. G. B. Mendelssohn (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1843-1845), 1:83-84 
provide only a cursory and unsatisfying analysis of Mendelssohn’s response to Sulzer. 
39 JubA, 1:130. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Altmann, Frühschriften, 103. 
42 See JubA, 1:130. 
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agrees with Sulzer that the unity of a perfect object allows one (“provides the 
opportunity”) to gain an easier insight into the arrangement of its parts. Thus, it isn’t 
clear how he can object to its providing “easiness” in Sulzer’s limited sense. Sommer 
even reads Mendelssohn as agreeing with Sulzer, intending to replace Baumgarten’s 
unity as “focal point” [Brennpunkt] with Sulzer’s unity as easiness.43 Along similar lines, 
Vogt claims that for Mendelssohn beauty consists in mere ease of thought with no 
objective basis.44 Thus the role played by “easiness” in Mendelssohn’s reply to Sulzer is 
far from clear, and left genuinely ambiguous in the text of “Von dem Vergnügen.” 
Both of these issues are worth a re-examination in light of Mendelssohn’s 
finished work. It would, however, be a mistake to understand the Briefe primarily as an 
extended discussion of the problems Mendelssohn explicitly raises in “Von dem 
Vergnügen.”45 The Briefe contain far more new and interesting material, much of which 
is best seen in contrast with an aspect of Sulzer’s work not explicitly mentioned by 
Mendelssohn in his sketch: Sulzer’s utter confusion about the relation between pleasure 
and the intellectual powers of the soul.  
Sulzer claims that all pleasures are based on the intellect,46 but he never 
adequately justifies that assertion. Remarkably, he raises the objections that the 
pleasures of wine and beautiful women seem to be counterexamples to his theory, but 
he responds inadequately, mentioning only that some people have put these bodily 
                                                 
43 Sommer, Grundzüge, 129. 
44 Vogt, Beschreibung, 186-187. 
45 Altmann comes close to suggesting this (Frühschriften, 101), although he also claims that the Briefe go 
significantly beyond what is contained in the outline. 
46 Sulzer, Schriften, 1:8. 
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pleasures aside when they become acquainted with more intellectual pleasures.47 He 
insists that even sensible pleasures must be in some sense intellectual or else they would 
leave the soul indifferent,48 but his actual explanation of sensible pleasure does not 
always involve the intellect. He seems to prefer explaining sensible pleasures 
physiologically, as objects which set the nerves into a harmonious play.49 Along the 
same lines, he claims that pleasure is ultimately a simple concept – presumably a 
minimal unit of the soul’s activity50 – but this seems strictly opposed to something 
intellectual, which must involve analysis or synthesis. Finally, he wavers incredibly on 
the question of whether intellectual or sensible pleasures are preferable for us. Although 
he does explicitly claim – citing the example of Alexander the Great of all people – that 
intellectual pleasures are superior, it is hard to see how his theory leads to this 
conclusion. Intellectual pleasures, Sulzer says, are weaker and require significant effort 
to enjoy. They are, however, less prone to excess and easier to bring to mind.51 This is 
not exactly a strong or convincing case for the superiority of the intellectual. Sulzer also 
claims that sensible pleasures only aim at our preservation while intellectual pleasures 
aim at our happiness. But he does not respond to the obvious objection that sensible 
pleasures can also make us happy. Finally, Sulzer does not leave space in his theory for a 
specific pleasure in the beautiful, but attempts to classify it now as sensible, now as 
intellectual. One of the great merits of Mendelssohn’s Briefe is that it offers a clear and 
                                                 
47 Sulzer, Schriften, 1:14-15. 
48 Sulzer, Schriften, 1:22. 
49 Sulzer, Schriften, 1:55-58. 
50 Sulzer, Schriften, 1:11. 
51 Sulzer, Schriften, 1:74-76. 
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unambiguous account of all of these important matters, all within the rationalist 
framework. 
Structure and overview of the Briefe über die Empfindungen 
 The Briefe is written as an epistolary dialog between two interlocutors, Palemon 
and Euphranor. The name “Palemon” is taken from a character in Shaftesbury’s The 
Moralists, a work which Mendelssohn held in extremely high regard. (The name is 
changed to “Theokles,” another of Shaftesbury’s characters, in the revised edition, so 
that it would better refer to the relevant parts of Shaftesbury’s dialog). Altmann 
speculates that Mendelssohn took the name “Euphranor” from an essay Meier had 
published under that name, in which beauty had been defined as a sensibly cognized 
perfection.52 More likely in my view, since both Meier’s definition of beauty and his 
essay were unremarkable, Mendelssohn (like Meier before him) simply intended the 
name to stand for the original Greek euphraino, “to delight.” This fits with Euphranor’s 
emphasis on pleasure, enjoyment and his pleasure-oriented “youthful system of 
ethics.”53 
 Mendelssohn describes Palemon as an English philosopher who leaves his 
homeland to escape the “extravagant imaginings mixed with French gallantry which are 
sold as metaphysics by many of its people.” He is willing to give up all the comforts of 
home in order to satisfy “his inclination toward rigor” and find people who “consider 
                                                 
52 Altmann, Frühschriften, 112. 
53 JubA, 1:48. 
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right thinking worthier than free thinking.”54 This, along with certain of Palemon’s 
statements which appear autobiographical,55 clearly indicates that Palemon represents 
Mendelssohn’s own views. But there is some contention in the literature about 
Euphranor’s role. On the one hand, Palemon is constantly correcting his youthful 
friend’s excessive enthusiasm in reaching sensualistic conclusions. On the other hand, 
Palemon seems to accept parts of what Euphranor says, and Euphranor is no materialist 
in the mold of Maupertuis or empiricist in the mold of Burke or Hume. This is evident 
from the fact that Euphranor holds the rationalist’s basic view that beauty is the 
confused intuition of perfection.56 On this basis, Altmann argues that Euphranor’s 
theory is not supposed to be refuted but simply encompassed within a larger theory.57 
Altmann also attributes Euphranor’s claim that sensible pleasures do not relate to 
perfection to Mendelssohn himself.58  Segreff attributes other of Euphranor’s theoretical 
claims to Mendelssohn.59 
 In my view, this is incorrect. Mendelssohn’s essay “Sendschreiben an einen 
jungen Gelehrten zu B.” published anonymously in 1756, purports to summarize the 
main argument of the Briefe and clearly indicates Euphranor as the foil.60 While Palemon 
                                                 
54 JubA, 1:43. 
55 See JubA, 1:64-65. 
56 JubA, 1:48 
57 Altmann, Frühschriften, 110. 
58 Altmann, Frühschriften, 125. 
59 Segreff, Moses Mendelssohn, 18. 
60 “There were [also] fugitive spirits who considered the human being to be more a feeling than a 
thinking creature. Such people believe that a philosopher makes the world into a grave when he seeks 
knowledge where nature has determined him only to feeling; they look at a rational person with 
pitying glances, as one looks down at a flagellant. The author [i.e. Mendelssohn himself] puts these 
thoughts in the mind of a youth (i.e., Euphranor), who seeks to make them quite apparent by means of 
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takes all of Euphranor’s observations (including general observations) about experience 
seriously, he rejects all of his  theoretical explanations – except the basic view that beauty 
is a perception of perfection.  
 Euphranor’s “initial” acceptance of the view that beauty is the perception of 
perfection shows that the Briefe is not a polemic against the sensualists and empiricists. It 
is rather intended as an elaboration of the rationalists’ view from the superficial, naïve, 
and weakly held opinions of Euphranor to the sophisticated and well-defended theory 
of Palemon. Euphranor sees all kinds of problems and exceptions to the rationalist 
theory and it is up to Palemon to show how the theory can account for these apparent 
deficiencies. Mendelssohn hopes to convince the public of the truth of the rationalist 
theory not by defending its basic premises or attacking alternative theories, but by 
showing its inner plausibility and explanatory power.  
Nowhere does Mendelssohn attempt to provide an independent argument for 
the view that pleasure is the perception of perfection. To some degree, he considered 
this proposition purely axiomatic, writing in 1761 that “this basic principle of sentiment 
is no hypothesis, but an established and unassailable truth.”61 Yet he was also clearly 
committed to the idea that it must be able to explain experience, as we will see 
throughout the dissertation. Thus Mendelssohn likely would have agreed that this 
“unassailable truth” is a theoretical posit, justified through its explanatory power. 
                                                                                                                                                 
various reasons and examples.” (JubA, 1:526, emphasis added). Mendelssohn also writes of Palemon 
that “he distinguishes himself everywhere in this work through his didactic tone” (JubA 1:527). 
61 Moses Mendelssohn, Philosophische Schriften (hereafter PS) (Berlin: Christian Friedrich Voß, 1761), 
2:18. 
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 In terms of its content, the Briefe is anything but a popular work. Its apparently  
accessible dialogic form belies a deep complexity and reliance on established doctrines 
of Wolffian and Baumgartian philosophy. Mendelssohn often uses technical terms and 
ideas from this tradition without explaining them, assuming they would be known to 
his readers. For this reason it will often be necessary to refer to the rationalist 
philosophers, especially Wolff and Baumgarten, in explaining Mendelssohn’s own 
views. 
Euphranor’s objections and Palemon’s reply 
 In his first two letters, Euphranor attacks the involvement of reason in the 
enjoyment of pleasures, particularly beauty. In general, he argues, what is needed for 
pleasure is not thinking, but passion and affect along with certain motions in the body. 
Our feeling for beauty develops by emphasizing our sensibility, not our intellect. 
Euphranor’s reasoning is based on the assumption that there is a gulf between 
reasoning, thinking, and analysis on one side and feeling on the other. Since the 
enjoyment of beauty is not merely a cold reasoning, he concludes that it must consist 
merely of feeling and bodily enjoyment. Euphranor further insists that reason is actually 
antithetical to enjoyment. Those “anatomists” who subject poetry to rules and treat their 
subjects like scientists “dissecting an insect” have “turned their feeling into a logical 
argument… We feel no more as soon as we think.”62  
This opening salvo from Euphranor brilliantly raises one of the chief questions 
considered in the work: What exactly is the psychological relation between the feeling of 
                                                 
62 JubA, 1:46-49. 
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pleasure, especially aesthetic pleasure, and reason? If we want to feel beauty, must we 
really suppress our reason and allow ourselves to be guided by emotion alone? Within 
the context described above, the question becomes: Can the Wolffian theory really 
account for the actual experience of beauty and other pleasures, or must the rationalist 
admit that pleasure is not well explained as a rational perception of perfection after all? 
 In his reply, Palemon argues that feeling is not opposed to reason, as Euphranor 
had assumed, but instead continuous with it. The argument has two parts: one 
pertaining to the cognitive faculties themselves, and the other to the way in which the 
faculties relate to beautiful objects. 
 As Palemon’s reply makes clear, Euphranor’s assumption about reason and 
feeling rests on a certain kind of error. He had admitted that beauty consists in the 
confused [undeutlich] perception of perfection. But unlike the Latin confusa, the German 
undeutlich can seem to be merely a negation of deutlich [distincta], leaving its meaning 
somewhat vague. As a result, Euphranor seemed to think that undeutlich opens the door 
to obscure (dunkel) sentiment, on which he says our pleasure in beauty and even our 
happiness depends.63 He also seems to think that undeutlich is synonymous with pure 
feeling, and is different in kind from deutlich, which lies strictly within the domain of 
reason. Palemon denies both of these last points. “The truth is certain: neither distinct 
nor fully obscure concept[s] agree with the feeling of beauty.”64 Beauty is neither 
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something fully intellectual, nor a merely bare feeling, but something clear but confused 
– something sensible – which has cognitive content even where we cannot explain it. 
Palemon’s claim that beauty is perceived confusedly must not be understood as a 
requirement that we not perceive anything distinctly. Undeniably, we immediately intuit 
many distinctions in most artistic and natural objects that we encounter. Beauty “falls 
between the bounds of complete obscurity and complete distinctness,” but in that range 
there is an infinite variation of clarity, confusion, and distinctness with respect to the 
parts of the object.65 Palemon means simply that enjoying the beautiful does not involve 
striving to analyze the object down to its fundamental elements to achieve a maximal 
degree of distinctness. He does not intend to exclude the activity of making some 
distinctions among its parts and assigning reasons for them. This activity, Palemon goes 
on to argue, is an important part of aesthetic experience. 
In the third and fourth letters, Palemon insists that both the cognition and 
creation of beauty must focus on the object as a whole, rather than on the rules for 
ordering the parts. Beautiful objects must have determinate boundaries such that the 
senses or at least the imagination can grasp them as a whole.66 In a partial show of 
affinity with Euphranor, Palemon points out that musicians are more concerned about 
the opinion of those with a practiced ear, who follow the overall melody, than those who 
merely know the rules of harmony in great detail.67 This shows that even Palemon 
                                                 
65 See the Appendix for a more detailed account of this claim. 
66 JubA, 1:50-51. 
67 JubA, 1:55. 
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considers the sensible intuition of the whole to be irreplaceable in the experience of 
beauty.68 
 But Palemon does not, like Euphranor, think that the story ends with the initial 
perception of the whole. His own analysis of aesthetic experience gives analysis and 
aesthetic rules significant roles as well. Responding to Euphranor’s claim that analysis 
destroys pleasure, Palemon counters that analysis actually enhances pleasure if related to 
the intuition in the right way. “Reason rather increases [pleasure], if one only knows to 
order the particular concepts into the appropriate shadow, so that they do not take away 
deserving light from the whole through their all-too-bright gleam.”69 Although beauty 
must initially fall to the senses without effort, we can greatly enhance our enjoyment of 
beautiful objects by subsequently contemplating their parts and the rules connecting 
them. This analysis makes subsequent perception of the whole more comprehensible 
and more enjoyable. “Through the intuition of the whole the parts will lose their bright 
colors, but they will leave behind traces which elucidate [aufklähren] the concept of the 
whole, and provide the pleasure that arises from it a greater liveliness.”70 Even though a 
distinct consideration of the rules connecting the parts does not – and should not – occur 
at the moment we enjoy the object, a prior analysis nonetheless modifies our overall 
                                                 
68 Vogt, Beschreibung, 217f, is wrong to think that Mendelssohn was the first in his tradition to give 
sense perception its own value. Mendelssohn follows Baumgarten on this point. 
69 JubA, 1:527. 
70 JubA 1:54. Vogt is therefore incorrect to claim that knowledge of rules or any greater insight into the 
object “is of no consequence” during the moment of enjoyment (190). That it is of consequence is the 
precisely the point Mendelssohn is trying to make.  
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grasp of the object in a way that makes it more enjoyable. Thus distinct contemplation 
does not destroy pleasure; rather, it prepares one for feeling it in all its fullness.71 
Importantly, distinct analysis of the parts can contribute to the confused intuition 
of the whole precisely because both the distinct analysis and the confused intuition have 
the same cognitive object: the relation of the parts to the whole according to rules. The 
intuition will be fuller and its relations grasped more clearly when those same relations 
have already been perceived more distinctly. According to Palemon, one should guard 
against being conscious of the rules or overly conscious of the component parts during 
the moment of enjoyment. Hence Palemon’s recommended method for enjoying beauty 
is a multi-step process: “choose, sense, contemplate, enjoy.” Rules are important as 
preparations for the artist, too, who ought to internalize them but not be conscious of 
them at the moment of creation, because that would distract him from the beauty of the 
whole.72 
Although Baumgarten never wrote about the contemplation of beauty in such 
psychological terms, Mendelssohn’s theory here is closely connected to Baumgarten’s 
distinction between natural and artificial aesthetics. Baumgarten recognized that 
everyone has some natural ability to perceive law-governed connections among 
complexes of determinations, even if they cannot enunciate what they perceive. In other 
words, people have a natural ability to perceive perfection clearly but confusedly.73 
However, he held that it is also possible to determine the laws of beauty distinctly 
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through analysis. This analysis, though not in itself pleasurable, would improve and 
refine our natural aesthetic sense. What Baumgarten says here about his proposed 
science of aesthetics in general, Mendelssohn applies psychologically to the individual’s 
enjoyment of beautiful objects. 
The distinction between beauty and perfection; Mendelssohn’s reply to Sulzer 
 Palemon’s task in the fifth letter is to distinguish the pleasure of beauty from 
more intellectual forms of pleasure. Along these lines, he insists that beauty must be 
distinguished objectively from what he calls “perfection.” “Now is the time to separate 
the boundaries of perfection and beauty, and show both in their true form… Beauty 
requires unity [Einheit] in the manifold… Perfection requires no unity, but instead 
agreement of the manifold.”74 This appears to be a departure from Mendelssohn’s 
rationalist predecessors, including Wolff, Baumgarten, Gottsched, and Meier, who had 
all seen beauty as the sensible form of perfection. Some commentators have argued that 
Palemon wants to make beauty “autonomous” or different in kind from the more 
intellectual perfection. According to Altmann, for example, “perfection” is strictly an 
objective property of an object that can be perceived distinctly, while beauty is a 
fundamentally different, merely subjective property.75 
There is, however, another explanation for Mendelssohn’s claim here: he is using 
the terms “unity” and “perfection” in a somewhat idiosyncratic way. Unity, according to 
Wolff, is merely an inseparability or connectedness of some determinations such that 
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they belong together as one thing.76 Unity can be essential, as in a monad, but also 
accidental, as in an aggregate or composite being. It is implausible that Mendelssohn 
would deny this very weak kind of unity to perfection. Indeed, in the text Mendelssohn 
repeatedly uses the terms “Gleichheit” [“similarity”] and “Einerley” [“uniformity”] as 
synonyms of “Einheit” [“unity”]: Palemon writes that “the similarity, the uniformity in 
the manifold is a property of beautiful objects;”77 perfection “provide[s] manifoldness, 
but no uniformity in the manifold.”78 This nonstandard usage of the term implies that 
“unity” in this text means something more akin to “similarity” and “uniformity.”  
The term “perfection,” too, is clearly not being used in the more general sense of 
“conformity of a manifold with rules of the whole.” Instead, Palemon is using the term 
in a sense taken from Leibniz’s Monadology: “Perfection is nothing but the amount of 
positive reality, in the strict sense, leaving out of account the limits or bounds in things 
which are limited.”79 Perfection in this sense abstracts from any limitation or 
imperfection, counting only the absolute amount that the manifold agrees with the 
whole (this is elsewhere identified with the degree of reality for Leibniz). Accordingly, 
Mendelssohn claims that the beauty of an organism is limited to its external, visible 
appearance, while its perfection pervades limitlessly into its internal construction, even 
to intestines and other organs that are not pleasing to the senses.80 Likewise, as 
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Mendelssohn points out, the beauty of a dwarf-tree garden is limited to the harmony of 
the visible arrangement of its parts, but the perfection of a tree is unlimited in that all of 
its (even invisible and inner) parts contribute to a common end of the whole.81 Other 
examples of the enjoyment of what Mendelssohn terms “perfection” include the 
contemplation of the world-structure and the mathematician’s confused survey of an 
entire proof as a whole, neither of which is limited by the confusion of sense.82 
The term “beauty” also acquires a more specific meaning in the Briefe. Wolff 
thought of a thing’s beauty as its power to produce pleasure in us through its perfection, 
which implies that all perceivable elements of a thing’s unity-in-variety contribute to its 
beauty. In Mendelssohn’s Briefe, however, beauty is understood as a more narrow subset 
of observable perfection, namely, “beautiful objects must present an order or a 
perfection which falls to the senses, and indeed falls to the senses without effort,”83 or 
more specifically, “nothing deserves this name [of beauty], that does not fall clearly to 
our senses all at once.”84 This is why, when explaining the pleasures of music, 
Mendelssohn considers the consonant chords as its beauty but the resolution of 
dissonance as its perfection.85 Consonance, according to Mendelssohn, consists of simple 
integer relations among vibrations and is immediately perceptible; the more complex 
dissonant tonal relations require a resolution and so cannot be immediately perceived all 
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at once.86 But both clearly have a rational basis, and both are sensed. The only difference 
is that the perfection involved in the resolution of dissonance is not sensed all at once or 
effortlessly.87 Thus, “perfection” is more intellectual than beauty only in the sense that the 
experience of perfection involves a more expansive comparison of perceptions than 
beauty. 
As a result, the actual experience of sensible objects, especially those extended in 
time, will often involve the sensing of both “beauty” and “perfection.” Beauty is merely 
the perfection that falls immediately and effortlessly to our senses, while perceiving 
“perfection” requires going beyond what is immediately apparent to our senses at one 
particular time. However, as Mendelssohn is careful to point out, “it is true that there is 
a kind of perfection connected with this beauty, for from the general plan of beauty, 
reasons can be given why the dwarf-trees [from the above example] are arranged just as 
they are.”88 
From this it is apparent that Mendelssohn is not making a sharp distinction 
between beautiful and perfect objects, nor is he denying that beauty involves perfection 
in the sense described by Wolff and Baumgarten. He is simply pointing out that there is 
a difference in degree: the harmony of beautiful objects involves more limitation, while 
                                                 
86 JubA, 1:115. The specific examples of tonal relations given by Mendelssohn are integer 
approximations of geometrically proportional intervals. Mendelssohn claims that the consonant 
intervals are 1:2 (an octave), 2:3 (approximately a perfect fifth), 3:5 (approximately a major sixth), and 
5:8 (approximately a minor sixth). The examples of dissonant intervals are 8:9 (approximately a major 
second), 8:15 (approximately a major seventh) and 45:64 (approximately the augmented fourth). 
87 Altmann, who has Mendelssohn make a sharp distinction between beauty and perfection, is puzzled 
at why Mendelssohn should consider the imitation of the passions to be a source of metaphysical 
perfection (131). According to my reading, this is simply because the imitation of the passions requires 
a relatively unlimited manifold, i.e. one extended in time. 
88 JubA, 1:60. 
 32       
the harmony of perfect objects involves less. The limitation of beauty has both a 
subjective and an objective aspect. Subjectively, it is caused by the limited powers of our 
senses, which confusedly perceive what is really manifold as something more uniform 
(e.g., a patch of color in a painting). Objectively, the beauty of an object is governed by 
laws of this sensibly perceived manifold, i.e. laws of phenomena, not laws of the 
underlying substances. In general, this limitation of beautiful phenomena, occasionally 
called “unity” but more often “uniformity” in the Briefe, reduces the amount of variety 
in the object, limiting the overall degree of perfection that can be perceived. At the same 
time, it allows what perfection there is to be grasped easily by the senses. This easiness 
makes the pleasure more accessible, but also reduces its potential intensity. 
The reason behind Mendelssohn’s somewhat puzzling use of these terms is 
revealed in a footnote to the fifth letter: “In order to excuse the author under discusion 
[Sulzer], one could perhaps say that he indicated both the uniformity and the agreement 
of the manifold with the same word ‘unity’ (‘unité’), and consequently brought beauty 
and perfection under a common name.”89 The charge is quite unfair to Sulzer, who 
consistently uses unité in the sense of “agreement,” not “uniformity.”90 Yet it is clear that 
the peculiar use of the term “unity” is taken from Mendelssohn’s reading of Sulzer, and 
he emphasizes the unlimitedness of perfection only as opposed to the limited beauty – 
not for the purpose of redefining the term. 
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All of these idiosyncratic usages are dropped in Mendelssohn’s later writings, 
including his 1757 essay on the fine arts. There he writes straightforwardly that “if the 
cognition of perfection is sensible, it is called beauty.”91 This change does not, however, 
represent a significant shift in Mendelssohn’s views,92 but a return to the standard use of 
technical terminology. Mendelssohn adopted this usage in the Briefe solely in order to 
emphasize his disagreement with Sulzer, and never intended to use it in other contexts.  
This distinction between a limited and unlimited manifold can also make sense 
of Mendelssohn’s worries about Sulzer’s views on easiness and difficulty in the 
apprehension of perfection (above). In the Briefe, Mendelssohn explains that if we insist 
perfection must be easily grasped, then our inclination toward perfection would be 
attributed to our weakness or our need for ease.93 However, argues Mendelssohn, it is 
only because a great manifold exhausts our limited cognitive powers that we require it 
to be limited in order to enjoy it. Put another way, a beautiful manifold is easy to 
comprehend precisely because it is limited. It is therefore more immediately pleasurable 
for our limited minds. More unlimited perfection, on the other hand, offers a greater and 
deeper source of pleasure for those who are  capable of understanding it. Now as we 
saw, Sulzer too held that greater and more unlimited perfections offer more pleasure for 
those capable of grasping them.94 Why then does Mendelssohn continue to make Sulzer 
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his main target of criticism on this point?95 Mendelssohn was likely in close personal 
contact with Sulzer at the time he wrote the Briefe,96 and certainly knew him extremely 
well prior to the publication of the revised 1761 edition, which retains all of this content. 
For that reason it is unlikely that Mendelssohn’s objections are based merely on 
misunderstanding. 
In fact, Mendelssohn’s complaint pertains not so much to the “easiness” of 
beauty per se, as to this easiness against the backdrop of Sulzer’s general devaluation of 
perfection. In his essay on sentiment, Sulzer sees perfection as having primarily 
instrumental value in occasioning our pleasurable contemplation.97 Further, in his 1754 
essay on perfect happiness, Sulzer had agreed with Maupertuis that “the sentiment of 
pleasure makes one happy and the sentiment of  pain makes one unhappy.”98 Taken 
together, this view denies value to perfection in itself. For if my happiness consists in 
pleasure, and my pleasure consists in easy enjoyment, then I have no reason to strive 
after greater perfection for its own sake. It is within this context that Sulzer calls 
Descartes’ and Wolff’s accounts of pleasure, which see objective perfection as valuable 
in itself, “unsatisfying.”99 On his view, perfection has only instrumental value insofar as 
it provides occasion for me to feel pleasure – but only when I am capable of grasping it. 
Easiness, on the other hand, is valuable in itself because what I find easy I enjoy, and 
enjoyment makes me happy.  
                                                 
95 JubA, 1:56-57, which is a paraphrase of Sulzer, Schriften, 1:38-39. 
96 Altmann, 109-110. 
97 Sulzer, Schriften, 1:37-39. 
98 Sulzer, Schriften, 1:324 
99 Sulzer, Schriften, 11. 
 35       
This emphasis on easiness at the expense of perfection is precisely what 
Mendelssohn wants to resist. The mere inner “enjoyment” of pleasure, as envisioned by 
Pouilly, Dubos, and now Sulzer, which strives toward nothing beyond itself, would 
undermine Mendelssohn’s rationalist view that the highest good consists in an increase 
of perfection. In the Briefe, as in “Von dem Vergnügen,” Mendelssohn’s clearest response 
to this idea appears in the form of a rather obscure theological retort: “why does the 
wise Creator, whom the thought of all possible worlds at once cannot exhaust, prefer the 
perfect to the merely manifold?”100 In other words, God in fact prefers the perfect, even 
though his infinite power of thinking would also allow him to think sheer manifoldness 
(lacking unity and perfection) with the greatest ease. Since Mendelssohn, like the other 
rationalists, held that pleasure determines the will (as discussed in Part 3 of this 
chapter), God must therefore take greater pleasure in perfection than in sheer 
manifoldness. And that implies that perfection, not easiness, is the basis of divine—and 
by implication human—pleasure. Rather than viewing pleasure as a mere enjoyment of 
easiness, Mendelssohn insists that we should see it as a source of self-improvement, 
something that prods us toward our own perfection and that of those around us.101  
In sum, Mendelssohn does not mean to reject the idea that easiness, and even 
Sulzer’s subjective play of faculties,102 play some role in pleasure. He is happy to say that 
some of the pleasure I feel while contemplating a beautiful object is due to the easy 
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exercise of my cognitive faculties.103 Instead, the disagreement concerns the priority of 
explanation: Sulzer thinks that perfection pleases simply because it allows one to easily 
develop concepts. Mendelssohn, by contrasts, holds that perfection pleases because 
pleasure is the perception of perfection, even while the easy development of concepts 
provides a secondary, reflexively oriented pleasure. According to Mendelssohn the 
perception of perfection, not easiness in the development of concepts, is the single true 
and necessary explanation of all pleasure. Even the exercise of my faculties is 
pleasurable only because it confusedly reflects my own cognitive perfection.104  
One additional point about the easiness of beauty is worth mentioning. In the 
fifth letter, Palemon claims that the feeling of sensible beauty is to be ascribed to our 
impotence. But in the fourth letter, he had written that pleasure separated from bodily 
feeling depends on the positive power of the soul.105 Since the experience of beauty is no 
mere bodily feeling, this suggests that pleasure in beauty does depend on the positive 
power of our soul. These apparently contradictory claims can be  reconciled by 
recognizing that both are true in different senses. That we take pleasure in a limited 
manifold at all is due to the limitation of cognitive powers, and hence to our impotence. 
But, at the same time, the pleasure that we get out of these objects nonetheless depends 
on the degree of insight that we have into them. “The representation of the parts just as 
their agreement is grounded in the positive power of our soul, [and] both require an 
                                                 
103 JubA, 1:58, 1:60. 
104 The idea that we are pleased by our own cognitive perfection was standard in Wolff, but Wolff 
associated this pleasure with the discovery of truth, not with the mere exercise of faculties (PE, §§532, 
536). 
105 JubA, 1:56 
 37       
exertion and striving of this original power.”106 Beauty for Mendelssohn is a balancing 
act: it should contain as much variety and perfection as possible, and we perceive this 
through our active cognitive powers. But it must also take into account our limitations, 
so that there is not so much variety that we fail to perceive the perfection at all.107 
The sui generis character of sense perception and the experience of beauty 
 Despite the affinity Mendelssohn acknowledges between sense and intellect, 
there is one respect in which sense perceptions are undeniably sui generis: their specific 
character as we experience them. No description of a rainbow, however complete, could 
exactly replace the experience of actually seeing one. The intuitive and confused nature 
of sense is irreplaceable, and exactly what the confusion adds does not seem amenable 
to any rational analysis. Leibniz recognized this unique quality of confusion in his 
“Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas,” writing that in the confusion of sense 
our mind “fashions some new thing for itself.”108 Mendelssohn accepted this view. In a 
fragment entitled “Die Verwandtschaft des Schönen und Guten” [“The relation between 
the beautiful and the good”] written in a few years after the Briefe, he explains: 
With every sensible feeling a sea of concepts flows into our soul. The soul thinks 
when it perceives some of these concepts distinctly; and it senses, as soon as it 
abandons itself to the impression and grasps all of them at once. The elements 
are just the same whether we grasp them with reason or with the senses, and a 
sensible sentiment is nothing other than the perception of endlessly many effects 
and counter-effects, which are not distinguished in and for themselves by the 
distinct concepts of the understanding. But since they present themselves to the 
soul at once, they produce an effect which is entirely different from the effect of 
single concepts of the understanding, and for that reason are called phenomena. 
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The concepts of the understanding relate to sensible sentiment as some tone of a 
string to the roar of the sea, or as the voice of an audibly speaking man to the 
noise and the hollow murmurings of a collected people. For from the mixture of 
many concepts a composite appearance arises, which is fully distinguished from 
the elements from which they arise, just as some two bodies, which come 
together produce a third which shows entirely different sensible properties as 
those from which it is composed…. 
 
The musical triad is, as known, at bottom nothing but a sensible perception of a 
certain relation. But what we sense in hearing the triad is far distinguished from 
the consideration of some relation, for here the sentiments have reproduced 
themselves through all nerves and have become appearance. Just so arouses a 
regular statue entirely different sentiments than the relations from which it is 
composed; and we even sense moral virtue differently than we grasp it with 
reason.109  
 
Even though confused perception contains the same content as distinct 
perception, it just feels different from both distinct perception and from other kinds of 
confused perception. Consequently, each sense modality has its own, unique, and 
irreducibly specific character. Does it follow in aesthetics that each sense modality 
would have its own characteristic kind of beauty, so that these beauties differ in kind 
from each other as well as from the distinct perception of perfection?  
The importance Mendelssohn gave this question even in the Briefe is apparent 
from his lengthy discussion there about the possibility of a color piano (expanded in the 
second edition).110 This device, first conceived by Louis Bertrand Castel and further 
developed by Johann Gottlob Krüger, was supposed to provide the same beauties to 
sight that the piano provides to hearing. Sulzer had denied the possibility of such a 
“music of color,” even though he admitted that there was a perfect physical 
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correspondence between color and tone.111 The sense of sight, Sulzer thinks, is just 
characteristically weaker and less prone to stirring up strong passions than the sense of 
hearing.  
Against this, Mendelssohn  points out that the development of a music of color is 
still in its infancy. We do not yet know how to represent the passions through colors, as 
we do through tones, and we do not yet know the rules for combining color with 
magnitude, as we do for tone and volume. He goes on to suggest several ways in which 
progress might be made toward these goals with the help of Hogarth’s theory of the 
serpentine line.112 “Perhaps this invention could also provide a way of expressing 
human passions in a color-melody.”113 Mendelssohn goes on to express some new 
concerns about the possibility of a music of color, which run as follows: First, we can 
distinguish more colors than tones in a single moment. Next, the eye retains colors over 
time, so that we mix recently past colors with present in different and unexpected ways. 
Finally, the colors would have to be presented more slowly than tones because we are 
not accustomed to having this sort of content represented visually. Mendelssohn 
certainly acknowledges that there are significant differences between the sense 
modalities. Yet he also insists in this section that the differences are explainable, i.e. 
reducible to the quantities of determinations and the degree of confusion characteristic 
of the perception. As a result, there is no essential barrier to the representation of the 
same content through different sense modalities, although there may be contingent 
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physiological features which makes some perceptual content more appropriate for one 
sense modality than another. 
 In sum, Mendelssohn downplayed the specific character of each sense modality 
as strongly as possible in aesthetics. Each sense indeed has sui generis qualities, but 
nothing about our aesthetic experience, he argues, irreducibly depends on these 
peculiarities. Instead, everything depends on the knowledge of appropriate principles, 
along with various quantitative differences in the sensible content: which aspects of the 
perception are clear or obscure and to what degree, which aspects are divided into 
space, and which into time, etc. He would adopt a similar approach in explaining the 
particular arts (discussed further in Chapter 2). 
Bodily pleasure 
 Wolff’s account of pleasure emphasizes its cognitive aspect to such a degree that 
it often seems to neglect the feeling of pleasure. From the account of pleasure in his 
Psychologia Empirica, one wonders if he thinks that experiencing pleasure is any different 
from experiencing the color green. In addition, Wolff insists that pleasure just is the 
intuition of perfection,114 but he often writes about it as it were something produced by 
such an intuition – without, however, elaborating on what this might be.115 This 
ambiguity left a wide opening for materialists to attack the rationalists’ entire analysis of 
pleasure. For example, La Mettrie argued in his 1748 L’homme machine that since 
everyone agrees pleasure is always accompanied by bodily effects akin to a mild “fever” 
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or “seething,” we should admit that the pleasure just is the totality of these physical 
effects.116 
Euphranor’s claims that bodily pleasure117 is a kind of seething of the blood and 
excitation of the bodily organs stems from this sort of thinking.118 Although Euphranor 
focuses on bodily pleasures like those of drink and sex, he had also insisted that a 
“seething of the blood” was required for all pleasure, including that of beauty (JubA 1, 
49). This, it seemed to him, made the perception of perfection or any other mental act 
superfluous.  
 In “Von dem Vergnügen,” Mendelssohn had rejected Sulzer’s attempted 
explanation of bodily pleasure on the grounds that we do not develop “a multitude of 
concepts” out of the objects involved in such pleasures. But this does not mean, as 
Altmann argues, that he accepted Euphranor’s claim that these pleasures do not rest on 
any perfection.119 Palemon could not be any more explicit when he claims, in direct 
response to Euphranor on the very issue,  that “All pleasure is grounded in the 
representation of a perfection.”120. Mendelssohn’s response to Sulzer is not to deny the 
role of perfection in sensible pleasure, but rather to shift the object of bodily pleasure 
away from whatever occasions the pleasure (e.g. the bottle of wine) and to the subject’s 
body. This perfection in the body is perceived “obscurely,” and has nothing to do with 
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developing ideas from the object associated with the pleasure. In this way Mendelssohn 
involves both the body and the mind in bodily pleasure: certain motions occur in the 
body which increase its perfection, and the mind perceives this perfection obscurely, 
filling it with pleasure. Evidently, even in “Von dem Vergnügen” the complaint had not 
been that Sulzer overly intellectualized bodily pleasure, but that he had mistaken its 
object. 
 Thus far, Mendelssohn’s view about bodily pleasure is not particularly original. 
It is almost identical to Wolff’s, who explains in his Psychologia Empirica, “If we refer any 
sensations to the perfection of our status, we perceive pleasure from them.”121 He 
provides the following example: “Infants, while they drink the milk of the mother, 
observe the removal of hunger and thirst, troubling sensations, and are calmed [by 
noticing] that it is good for their body. Hence a notion of the perfection of their status 
arises, which is joined with the sweet milk, so that through confused notions they are 
accustomed to refer the perfection of their status to the sweet milk.”122 So, according to 
Wolff, the infant does not notice any perfection in the milk itself. Instead, it notices the 
improved state or perfection of its own body, and then refers or associates that more 
perfect state to the milk, which it has recently consumed. Wolff does not say explicitly 
that the perception is obscure, but as his example involves an infant with paltry 
cognitive powers, it is likely that he would have agreed. 
                                                 
121 PE, §550. 
122 Ibid. 
 43       
 Karl W. Jerusalem, best known today as the suicide victim who inspired Goethe’s 
Werner, is also the author of the only contemporaneous critique of Mendelssohn’s theory 
of bodily pleasure.123 Jerusalem argues that an obscure perception cannot explain bodily 
pleasure: Since the perception is obscure, we are not conscious of the “harmonious 
tension of nerves” or the other specific motions which actually constitute the body’s 
perfection.124 We only become aware of the improved condition of the body through the 
feeling of pleasure itself.125 And, “what is only a consequence [viz., the improved 
condition of body] cannot explain the cause, consequently the obscure representation of 
perfection of the body also cannot be the cause of the pleasure [Vergnügens] which 
arises from bodily pleasure [sinnlichen Lust].”126  
According to Altmann and Lessing,127  Mendelssohn did not “escape” this 
objection until he expanded his view of bodily pleasure in the 1771 edition of the 
Rhapsodie. There, Mendelssohn admits that he should not have considered the soul to be 
a mere spectator of the body’s increased perfection during the enjoyment of bodily 
pleasure.128 Due to the mind-body harmony (discussed further below), the perfection of 
the mind increases along with that of the body, so that the soul can enjoy its own 
improved state as well. But Jerusalem’s objection hinges on the obscurity of the 
representation of improvement, not its object. Presumably, if the mind perceives the 
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improvement of the body obscurely, it would also  perceive the resulting improvement 
in its own degree of perfection obscurely. Therefore it is hard to see how this addition to 
Mendelssohn’s view is relevant to Jerusalem’s criticism at all. 
Fortunately, Mendelssohn had ample resources to respond even in the 1755 
edition. Jerusalem’s argument has two fatal flaws. First, it confuses the epistemic with 
the metaphysical. While it may be true that we can only become aware of our subtly 
improved condition through the feeling of pleasure (an epistemic point), it does not 
follow at all that this feeling is not in fact caused by an improved condition of the body (a 
metaphysical point). Second, there is no distinction between the obscure perception of 
the body’s perfection and the feeling of pleasure. They are one and the same. There is no 
reason to think that Mendelssohn meant only to explain the cause of bodily pleasure, 
rather than its essence.  
The involvement of bodily pleasure in beauty and intellectual pleasure 
 Although his general theory of bodily pleasure itself is not new, one of 
Mendelssohn’s most significant contributions to the rationalist theory of pleasure is his 
success in explaining the felt aspect of pleasure in general, including the mental 
pleasures of beauty and the intellect. Mendelssohn begins by arguing that “In the 
organic construction of the body, things can exchange determinations so that cause and 
effect are mutual.”129 There is in particular, he goes on, a strongly pronounced harmony 
between the mind, brain, and body, such that if a certain bodily motion puts the brain 
into a certain state which brings with it a certain perception, then that perception would 
                                                 
129 JubA, 1:89. 
 45       
tend to bring with it the same motion in the brain and in the body. He concludes,  “If it 
is true that every bodily pleasure, every improved condition of the body fills the soul 
with the sensible representation of a perfection, then conversely every sensible 
representation of a perfection must draw after itself a well-being of the body, or a kind 
of bodily pleasure.”130 Every perfection enjoyed by the soul through its representation is 
reflected in the body as an improvement of its state. This improvement is then sensed by 
the mind, producing a bodily pleasure. 
Therefore, it follows according to natural law that every perceptual and 
intellectual pleasure would be accompanied by affect, Mendelssohn’s term for the bodily 
effects of originally mental pleasures. Affect includes the “seething” of the blood and 
other motions of the limbs, and our subsequent perception of this more active, perfect 
state. Mendelssohn explains that affect “expresses itself through  the same effects as 
bodily pleasure, but they are distinguished from each other in their causes. The latter 
begins in the limbs through the effect of external objects, and spreads from there to the 
brain. Affect, on the other hand, arises in the brain itself [i.e. from the perception].”131 
Because the expression of affect is the same as that of bodily pleasure, they can only be 
distinguished through an analysis of the feeling and its causes, and not through the 
mere intensity of feeling.  
Following a Platonic parable, Mendelssohn suggests that human beings have 
been partly “compensated” for being robbed of the pleasure of having more distinct 
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representations with the gift of this bodily affect. But only partly: “The soul would be 
delighted with greater ecstasy, if its concepts of perfection were fully distinct.” Although 
the idea of compensation may seem quaint, the passage does nicely illustrate 
Mendelssohn’s commitment to rationalism.132 
 Mendelssohn’s overall psychology of pleasure can be summed up as follows. All 
pleasure is identified with the intuition of perfection. That intuition either 1) contains a 
relatively unlimited perfect manifold, perceived clearly but confusedly; 2) contains a 
relatively limited perfect manifold, perceived clearly but confusedly; or 3) has one’s body 
as its object, and is perceived obscurely. The first is intellectual pleasure, or pleasure in 
“perfection.” The second is the pleasure of beauty. And the third is bodily pleasure. All 
sorts of pleasures have a bodily component due to the mutually connected nature of the 
mind and the body. As a result, the first two kinds of pleasure, although they are distinct 
from the third, are always accompanied by bodily affect.  
While this last point closed a critical gap in Wolff’s theory, Mendelssohn left a 
significant lacuna of his own. In the Briefe there appears to be scant acknowledgement of 
subjective pleasure, the pleasure we take in our own (especially cognitive) perfection. 
Mendelssohn does acknowledge the role of the easy production of ideas in Sulzer’s 
sense, but does not emphasize it. And even in his example of the mathematician’s 
intellectual pleasure,133 the emphasis is more on pleasure obtained from the proof itself 
(perceived confusedly) than the mental ability required to complete it. This is surprising, 
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because Wolff had consistently emphasized the role of subjective pleasure, particularly 
with regard to intellectual pleasures.134 Mendelssohn would rediscover subjective 
pleasure in his correspondence on tragedy with Lessing (see Chapter 3). 
Part 2: The normative theory of pleasure 
The metaphysics of good and bad pleasure 
 
According to the rationalist tradition, to have an intuition of perfection is to 
perceive an object as perfect, a mental act which involves an implicit and immediate 
judgment. The feeling of pleasure involved in such a judgment may be true or false: true 
if the object in some sense really is perfect, and false if it merely appears to be perfect.135 
Importantly, when we have a “false pleasure,” we are not wrong that we are having a 
certain feeling. Rather, we are wrong about the cognitive content of the feeling: our 
implicit judgment about the object is wrong. We get a similar feeling of pleasure 
whether or not the object really is perfect, so long as it appears to be. This view implies 
that we can get pleasure in imperfection simply by virtue of having falsely judged a 
thing to be perfect.  
The distinction between true and false pleasure grounds a distinction between 
good and bad pleasures. A true pleasure is good because its object really is perfection, 
and perfection (suitably and variously qualified) is identified with the highest good; 
while a false pleasure is bad because its object is not really perfection, and therefore does 
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not contribute to the highest good.136 Mendelssohn himself explains that if pleasure is 
ontologically prior to perfection (so that false pleasure is an empty concept), then the 
“epicurean system” which makes the feeling of pleasure into the highest good would be 
vindicated.137 By explaining pleasure as something that relates cognitively to a more 
fundamentally normative aspect of the world, rationalists gave pleasure an important 
role to play in the highest good without making it into the highest good. 
This general view leaves open what exactly goes wrong when we make a false 
intuitive judgment about perfection. Unfortunately, the early rationalists tended to be 
somewhat vague on this important point. Wolff suggests that the error can be caused by 
a faulty conception of the good: “Suppose one has an incorrect concept of the rules of a 
good speech. If he now listens to a speech that agrees with all of these rules, then he has, 
according to his opinion, a cognition of the perfection of the speech. For this reason he 
feels pleasure at it; thus his pleasure arises out of a false opinion [Wahne] of the 
perfection.”138 Gottsched explains that false pleasure arises when an “agreement of the 
manifold according to well-grounded rules… only appears to be present, as long as one 
judges according to confused representations of the senses and the imagination.”139 His 
example, “a face can appear beautiful in the distance that is full of blotches and scars 
[when seen] close-up”140 suggests that the error may be caused by a lack or distortion of 
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information, perhaps akin to a perceptual illusion. Both Wolff and Gottsched agree that 
one can feel pleasure at something, or an aspect of a thing, that is actually imperfect. 
Remarkably, Mendelssohn does not seem to share this view about false 
pleasures. In the Briefe über die Empfindungen, he explains that a poison which produces a 
temporary feeling of pleasure does so not because the person drinking it has falsely 
judged the poison to be good for him, but because the poison really has (temporarily) 
improved the condition of his body.141 “The false view of the pleasure-seeker,” 
Mendelssohn explains, is that “he does not listen to the earnestly warning voice of the 
future. The present is a Siren, which lulls him with its deadly sweetness.”142 In another 
important example, Mendelssohn explains that the ancient Romans took pleasure in 
brutal gladiator fights not because they falsely judged them to perfect, but because they 
were able to suppress the feeling of pity in order to focus on the skill of the combatants, 
which is a real perfection.143  
So, rather than treating these cases as applications of false conceptions of the 
good or as illusions, Mendelssohn explains them through a deficiency of attention. The 
person who has taken the poison notices only present feeling of well-being in his body, 
and pays insufficient attention to the future harm which will follow. The Roman 
spectator notices only the skill of combatants and the vicarious thrill of victory, paying 
insufficient attention to the suffering and injustice involved. In both of Mendelssohn’s 
examples, although the imperfection objectively outweighs the perfection, the perfection 
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seems greater to the subject because it is perceived more clearly. In the first case, the 
perfection perceived more clearly because the person cannot perceive the future ills 
except very obscurely; and in the latter case, the Romans had accustomed themselves to 
ignoring the suffering of others so that they do not perceive the imperfection clearly. 
Either way, the subject perceives the perfection as dominant, so that they feel pleasure.   
Mendelssohn makes his attention-centric account of bad pleasure explicit in the 
1761 edition of the Briefe, adding the following to the passage about the Roman 
gladiators: 
The imperfect, considered as imperfect, cannot possibly be pleasant. But since nothing 
can be absolutely imperfect, but in all cases good is mixed with evil, one can get in the 
habit of abstracting from evil, and turning one’s attention to the good that is connected 
with it. One calls this a spoiled taste, and there is no abomination in the world for which 
we could not find a kind of taste in this way.144 
 
Mendelssohn’s theory of good and bad pleasure carries with it a new theoretical 
commitment: under his scheme, every instance of pleasure must have some real—not 
merely apparent—perfection at its ground. This, in turn, had two practical consequences 
for his aesthetics in general. First, it would bar theorists from assuming that a pleasure is 
“false” and bad simply because they could not immediately provide a distinct 
explanation of the underlying perfection, a temptation to which Wolff and Gottsched 
were especially susceptible. On Mendelssohn’s view, analysts of pleasure must instead 
presume that pleasure is always based on some underlying perfection. If they want to 
criticize the pleasure, they must give an explanation for why the feeling involves a 
deficiency of attention to some greater imperfection. Following this requirement, in later 
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chapters we will see Mendelssohn go to great lengths to attempt to explain the more 
difficult cases of pleasure, especially tragedy and the sublime.  Second, Mendelssohn’s 
view allows for a more constructive form of criticism because it has to try to identify 
what is good and perfect in all forms of pleasure, even where overall imperfection and 
evil predominate.  
A few further observations about this development are worth mentioning. First, 
Mendelssohn’s theory is in no way a radical departure from earlier rationalist 
psychology. The “faculty of attention” had been described by Wolff and its role in 
various mental processes, including abstraction, sensible judgment, and invention was 
particularly emphasized by Baumgarten. In fact, Baumgarten’s psychology contains the 
entire foundation of Mendelssohn’s idea,145 although he did not actually reach 
Mendelssohn’s view.146 So, rather than treading completely new ground, Mendelssohn 
made innovative use of preexisting theory.  
Second, Mendelssohn’s view is no more or less normative than the earlier view. 
Both theories offer a description of pleasure in general as well as a description of how 
pleasure might variously relate to the perfection and imperfection of objects. And in 
both theories, this latter distinction is supposed to provide normative ground for a 
distinction between good and bad pleasure, which was in turn connected with a theory of 
the will (discussed in Part 3 of this chapter). 
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Third, Mendelssohn’s different approach to this issue explains why he only 
rarely uses the terms “true” and “false” pleasure (and never in his published works). 
Even when we take pleasure in something largely imperfect, the feeling still relates to 
something perfect in it, so calling the feeling “false” can be misleading. Pleasure always 
truly relates to the perfect and the good in a thing, but we can be mistaken about the 
amount of evil connected with it. 
Judgments about good and bad pleasure: taste and criticism 
In the rationalist tradition, taste is the ability to distinguish between the perfect 
and the imperfect through sense, or confused cognition. Because taste is sensible, it 
works immediately and manifests itself as felt pleasure or displeasure. Since pleasure is 
an intuitive and confused cognition, taste is distinguished from the ability to judge 
perfection through distinct or discursive analysis. This latter use of intellect to discover 
the perfection or imperfection of aesthetic objects is criticism.147 Rationalists differed 
about exactly how taste and criticism relate to each other, and this has led to some 
confusion, which I will attempt to clear up in this section. 
Many commentators believe that there is a deep tension in Wolff and Gottsched’s 
view of taste. For, while both insist that taste is a sensible faculty, they also make claims 
which might seem to indicate they think taste is really intellectual in some deep sense. In 
other words, they are thought to have confused taste and criticism. Braitmaier writes, for 
example, that “the [Wolffian] school teaches and wrongly demands an entirely general 
raising of the lower confused faculties to the level of higher distinct cognition, and so 
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also for aesthetic sentiment.”148 Beiser suggests that Gottsched’s view of taste involves a 
deep tension, writing that his theory’s “conclusion contradicts its starting point. It begins 
with the thesis that taste belongs to sensibility… and it ends with the thesis that taste 
belongs to the understanding… To resolve this tension, Gottsched has to make one 
controversial assumption: that the confused representations of sensibility are ultimately 
reducible in principle… to the distinct representations of the understanding.”149 Yet, 
Beiser argues, this assumption is implausible, so the tension is irresolvable.150 Both 
Braitmaier and Beiser also believe that this problem was only corrected in the works of 
Baumgarten and Mendelssohn, while others, especially Cassirer,151 think these later 
rationalists too remained excessively intellectualistic. 
In my view, while there is certainly something excessively intellectualistic about 
Wolff and Gottsched’s view of taste, it is not well-explained as a general tension or 
confusion of sensible taste with intellectual criticism. Rather, the intellectualism arises 
naturally and internally from the early rationalists’ perspective on art in combination 
with their limited, pre-Baumgartenian view of sensibility. The purpose of this section is 
to clarify the meaning of this early “intellectualism” about taste, and to explain how 
Mendelssohn thought about and contributed to this issue. In general, it is important to 
remember that the rationalists universally held that intellect and sense are both forms of 
reason, and that both faculties ultimately have the same object. So, there is no 
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incoherence or contradiction in the claim that criticism and taste ought to agree – the 
question, to a large extent, is how they ought to be made to agree. The most important 
relevant developments centered around the following related questions: 
1. In practice, how prescriptive is criticism in matters of taste?  
 
Wolff and Gottsched thought that criticism should be extremely prescriptive to 
taste. However, even these philosophers did not believe that intellectual criticism is the 
only arbiter of taste. They could not have held that, because they (especially Gottsched, 
who wrote far more than Wolff on this topic) did not attempt to derive the principles of 
taste entirely a priori. Gottsched, especially, makes extensive use of examples in the 
development of his theory. To the extent that his principles are abstracted from these 
examples, he allows that taste can operate properly independent of distinct criticism.152 
Indeed, the strong powers Wolff and Gottsched assign to criticism for ruling over taste 
are a direct consequence of their broader view about intellect and sense. Lacking 
Baumgarten’s concepts of extensive clarity and sensible perfection, they held that 
sensibility is nothing more than a confused and weak intellectual capacity. Thus, a 
sensible judgment of taste is a confused judgment about the very same conformity to 
principles which the critic judges distinctly. As a result, any principles of art discovered 
by criticism would automatically bear directly on questions of taste. In the end, 
according to Wolff and Gottsched, while taste can produce accurate judgments, it will 
generally not do as good a job as the intellect in judging any particular object. 
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By contrast, Baumgarten’s theory gave the senses a positive role that is 
irreplaceable by intellect for finite beings. While intellect aims solely at intensive clarity, 
the sensible perfection of beauty involves a wide extent of agreement among a thing’s 
determinations. For finite beings with limited intellects, then, sensible perfection is 
inherently better grasped by sense, which aims at extensive clarity at the expense of some 
intensive clarity. Since the human intellect cannot even grasp many of the sensible 
principles involved in beauty, its role in prescribing principles to taste became greatly 
diminished. Rather than discovering distinctly the very same principles which sense 
judges confusedly, in Baumgarten’s scheme criticism describes, connects, and 
systematizes inherently sensible principles. The complexity of these sensible principles 
made the subsequent prescription of critical principles to aesthetic judgment a far more 
uncertain matter of interpretation. In sum, Baumgarten held that: 
a) Distinct knowledge of principles governing perfection is relevant to 
taste only when these principles are also sensible; 
b) Our human senses are inherently better than our intellect at judging 
the sensible perfection contained in sufficiently extensively clear 
representations. 
 
This does not, however, entail that a more powerful mind could not make valid and 
prescriptive intellectual criticisms of human taste. In fact such a mind would certainly have 
this capability, but since we do not have this mind to consult, we need to make do with 
the cognitive powers that we have. Mendelssohn agrees fully with Baumgarten on this 
issue. He writes that in matters of beauty “taste must reprimand reason,”153 but in the 
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same essay makes clear that taste perceives nothing except rational principles, 
confusedly.154 
  2. How much does the exercise of criticism impact the exercise of taste?  
 
Wolff and Gottsched were extremely optimistic about the psychological effect 
that critical reflection could have on the feelings of pleasure and displeasure. Not only 
did they think that a distinct perception of perfection would increase the pleasure felt at 
the corresponding confused perception, but they also held that distinctly recognizing the 
imperfection of a thing would eliminate or greatly reduce the pleasure one felt in 
sensing it. Gottsched is most explicit about this, writing, “All our pleasure disappears 
when we learn to see the error in a supposed beauty.”155 Baumgarten is, unfortunately, 
silent on this issue. 
Mendelssohn did not entirely share the view of the early rationalists. He 
certainly believed that a distinct, analytical perception of perfection could have an 
enhancing effect, increasing the pleasure felt at the corresponding intuitive confused 
perception. This was, of course, one of the central claims of the Briefe über die 
Empfindungen (especially the third and fourth letters). But at the same time, he was very 
skeptical of the corrective use of the intellect. This comes out in his early defense of his 
argument against suicide, in which he admits that intellectual considerations would not 
convince people who feel the need to end their lives.156 And in a later essay (discussed 
further below), Mendelssohn writes, “Bring out, for a certain person who loves the 
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grotesque, and finds no taste in the sublimity of an Apollo, a thousand rational grounds, 
and just as many authorities that Apollo is excellent, and you will bring him to silence – 
perhaps to imitation – but not convert him.”157 The reason for this is that pleasure is 
sensible (confused) and sensible cognitions generally contain far more material (notae) 
than a corresponding distinct cogntion. This greater amount of material makes sensible 
cognitions generally more pleasurable and motivating than intellectual cognitions, even 
if we have a distinct awareness of some imperfection in them. Mendelssohn codifies this 
point in the Rhapsodie, but he had first suggested it in a letter to Lessing of January 
1757.158 
3. In the case of beauty, to what extent should intellectual criticism investigate the 
object, and to what extent the emotions and mental activity produced in the 
subject by the object?  
 
Wolff and Gottsched saw criticism as being concerned primarily with the object 
being considered, not with the emotions produced in the subject. This was, in part, a 
consequence of their doctrine of true and false pleasures, which lacked an account of 
how subjective features other than false beliefs about the object might affect judgments 
about perfection. Another factor was the minimal role the early rationalists assigned to 
the senses. Since on their view the human intellect can discover everything relevant to 
taste, and intellect perceives things as they are, not merely as they appear to be, there 
was little reason to worry about the nature of our confused perception. This is not to say 
that Wolff and Gottsched were completely unconcerned with sentiment and emotion, 
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only that it was not the primary target of their critical analysis. They thought that if they 
established principles of taste with respect to art objects through criticism, then the 
subjective emotional aspects would take care of themselves. 
In Baumgarten’s aesthetics, the sensible cognition of the object became just as 
important to the analysis of aesthetic experience as the object itself. Mendelssohn, of 
course, was always deeply concerned with the subjective aspect of aesthetic experience – 
this is why he is so interested in the feeling of pleasure in his first work on aesthetics, 
and in many other emotions in his later writings.  
In sum, it would be misleading to say that for early rationalists, intellect and 
criticism are the only arbiters of taste, while the later rationalists rejected this view. In 
fact, no rationalists held that intellect is the only arbiter of taste, while all held that 
intellect is, at least in principle, the ultimate arbiter of taste. Wolff and Gottsched, the 
earlier rationalists, were much more optimistic that human beings could actually attain 
distinct knowledge of these ultimate standards, and their theories developed 
accordingly. Later rationalists like Baumgarten and Mendelssohn were in this respect 
much more modest, but they still held that true standards of taste could be known 
distinctly in principle, even if this knowledge could never actually be attained by human 
beings. 
The later rationalists’ emphasis on subjective feeling and response is a more 
significant difference. However, it is important to see that this subjectivity is nothing 
radically sui generis, but simply a recognition that people cognize different aspects of 
sensible objects with different degrees of clarity, and differences in overall knowledge 
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among individuals produce great variation in associative effects. Emphatically, this does 
not mean that no rational grounds whatsoever can be given for some judgments of taste. 
Rather, it means these rational grounds must in part be conditioned by the particular 
limitations on each subject’s cognitive powers (which in turn depends on the subject’s 
particular character, history, and experiences). Consequently, there is no single, 
unconditional, and universally valid standard of taste. Even if (per hypothesi) we knew 
the ultimate standard of taste with perfect distinctness, it would still have an irreducibly 
subject-dependent element. That Mendelssohn held this view is apparent in the Briefe, 
both from his example of the Roman gladiators with their corrupted taste and from this 
more general claim about differences in cognitive powers:  “Beings endowed with 
sharper senses must find a disgusting uniformity in our beauties, and what exhausts us 
[because it is too complex] can give them pleasure.”159 
Now, given that sensible objects are extremely complex and can be viewed in an 
infinite number of different ways, and given the great diversity among cultures and 
individuals, does it follow that the later rationalist aesthetics led, in essence, to radical 
subjectivism in matters of taste? To his great credit, Mendelssohn eventually recognized 
this issue and offered a response. It appears in a late commentary on Lavater’s 1772 Von 
der Physiognomik:  
In general all sensible cognition has a nondeceptive subjective truth; and since 
this is also valid of beauty, it can be concluded with certainty that the object, 
which produces this subjective appearance, must also possess the required 
properties, at least in relation to this subject. The most extravagant taste has some 
ground in the object. Things have various sides from which they can be 
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considered. It depends on habit, practice, inborn and developed ability, 
inclinations, mental properties, and the angles and folds of the soul, to where the 
attention draws itself in the viewing of an object, and to which sides it is to stick. 
And the shadows and light of the object conform to this perspective, and also our 
judgments about its beauty or ugliness… [beauties160] must necessarily be 
changeable according to time, space, climate, education, nutrition, religion, and 
form of government… 
 
…In fact, only I alone can say which appearance is appropriate to my capabilities 
and engages without tiring them. Rational grounds and authority can do nothing 
here against inner conviction.  
 
But what? Are all critiques in vain, all rules groundless, all reasons [offered] in 
matters of taste merely prattle? Anything but! Among all kinds of taste a single 
one must be the most beneficial for the perfection and happiness of human 
beings. This will be the true, right taste, which all people must strive to achieve. 
And insofar as man, at least indirectly, has some power even over the mixture of 
his capabilities, and can give them training and direction according to pleasure; it 
also stands in his power to approach this single true taste more or less, and to 
form his sentiment of beauty as it is most appropriate to his vocation 
[Bestimmung] and to the purpose of his existence. 
 
This is the high office of the critic. It should show us: 1. which taste is the best, 
that is, according to the highest principle, which sentiment of beauty is most 
beneficial and appropriate to the true destiny of men, to the purpose of his being; 
2. How we should form and direct our powers and abilities, insofar as it is up to 
us, in order to be blessed with this taste.”161 
 
For Mendelssohn, then, the highest standard of taste, as well the role of the critic, 
is ethical, and must aim at promoting the highest human good  Does the endorsement of 
such a “highest principle” imply that Mendelssohn believes in an absolutely universal 
standard of taste after all? Although his phrasing is perhaps not ideal, there is no direct 
implication that “what promotes human perfection” must be independent of individual 
and cultural differences. He is only committed to the more plausible, if no less 
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contentious idea that there is something essentially common to all human nature which 
determines the best taste, as conditioned by the more specific properties of individual 
cultures and human beings. Unfortunately, Mendelssohn is all-too-terse about giving 
content to this ethical standard: 
But which taste is most beneficial to the vocation of man? Undoubtedly that 
according to which one can feel the frightful, sublime, bold, and naïve in their 
full strength without being distracted by disgusting and ridiculous associated 
concepts; but in other cases, where a collision162 is avoidable, one is also practiced 
in delighting in the fine and civilized. The more one approaches this ideal, the 
more perfect and more correct is our taste.163 
 
Mendelssohn’s emphasis on the frightful and bold in this passage is somewhat 
surprising, but the view is so sketchy that it is hard to draw any definite conclusions 
from it. Certainly, Mendelssohn should have engaged more thoroughly with this 
important issue. 
Part 3: Mendelssohn on pleasure, beauty, and the will 
During the early part of his philosophical career, Mendelssohn held the Platonic 
and traditional rationalist view that beauty, like other pleasures, contributes to virtue by 
producing a love and desire for perfection in us, at least when our choice of pleasure is 
guided by reason.164 But how exactly did he see pleasure and beauty as relating to the 
will? In the first two editions of Briefe über die Empfindungen (1755 and 1761), 
Mendelssohn explains in the sixth letter that “pleasure… differs from the will only in 
degree… even the will posits an underlying good, the advancement of our perfection, 
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without which our choice would remain eternally undetermined. Only through the 
intensity of striving [Verlangens] is the object of pleasure distinguished from the object 
of the will.” Pleasure and the will involve the same “essential elements which are 
inseparable from both,” namely: 
 1) “a consideration of the object, of its manifold parts, and their connection” 
 2) “a [subsequent] judgment that this object is good” 
 3) “a [subsequent] desire [Verlangen], or the judgment that I would rather have 
than not have this representation”.165  
 
Mendelssohn had previously posited these same elements of willing in his sketch for the 
Briefe, “Von dem Vergnügen.”166 Ordinarily, we do not experience these “steps” 
distinctly, but we can learn to recognize them in our own experience, Mendelssohn 
explains. The context makes clear that the “good” of the second element includes the 
specific perfection of beauty. The third element is meant to connect Maupertuis’ 
definition of pleasure as “a representation I would rather have than not have”167 to the 
rationalists’ idea of conatus, the striving after perfection. On Mendelssohn’s view, 
pleasure is akin to a preference for a representation. When the preference becomes 
sufficiently strong, it transitions into an effective desire that leads to action – specifically, 
it would seem, the continuation of the pleasurable representation.  
This theory accords with the standard rationalist view that pleasure is the 
transition, by degrees, between perceiving and willing.168 Crucially, it allows the 
experience of beauty to contribute directly to the desire for the good. For, since beauty is 
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a form of perfection, and the perception of beauty gives us pleasure, the feeling of 
beauty is not different, but simply lesser, than the desire for the objectively and 
distinctly known good. As a result, experiencing beauty instills in us a desire for the 
good in general. 
 In two of his late writings, Mendelssohn does posit a division of the faculties into 
cognition, sentiment (also called the “faculty of approval,”) and desire (or will). No 
other piece of Mendelssohn’s philosophy is more frequently viewed as an anticipation of 
the Kantian system.169 Prima facie, Mendelssohn’s division does seem to be proto-
Kantian, because Kant held that pleasure and displeasure are non-cognitive,170 and that 
the will is governed by its own laws independent of pleasure and displeasure. 
Commentators who see in Mendelssohn an anticipation of Kant are apparently 
convinced by this surface similarity. Beiser, on the other hand, argues that Mendelssohn 
never really gave up the traditional view despite the new categorization, which he 
argues is merely nominal or instrumental.171  
In Part 3 of this chapter, I trace the development of Mendelssohn’s thought about 
pleasure and the will, explaining the motivation and significance behind Mendelssohn’s 
division of faculties. I show that there is ultimately a deep tension and even ambiguity 
in Mendelssohn’s thinking on these issues, but also a deep continuity with his earliest 
thought. In the end, while the texts are genuinely murky on important points, 
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Mendelssohn was certainly no proto-Kantian and most likely never gave up the core of 
the traditional rationalist view about pleasure and desire.  
Refinements to the view, 1757 to 1771 
 It turns out that the view described in the 1755 Briefe is overly simplistic, and  
Mendelssohn accordingly refined his theory several times. First, he noticed the 
importance of the manner in which the perfection in an object is perceived. In a fragment 
titled “Von der Herrschaft über die Neigungen,” which was attached to a January 1757 
letter to Lessing as part of their correspondence on tragedy, Mendelssohn writes, “The 
more good is contained in a representation, the more distinctly we perceive the good, 
and the less time is required [to perceive it], then the greater is the desire, and the more 
pleasant the enjoyment.”172 This explains how it is possible for us to take more pleasure 
in and prefer a representation X that is objectively less perfect than another 
representation Y: we may prefer X if we perceive its perfection more distinctly or more 
quickly, even if it contains less perfection than Y objectively (ibid.). Mendelssohn 
published this refined theory of enjoyment and motivation in his Rhapsodie of 1761. 
 In this context another of Karl W. Jerusalem’s objections against Mendelssohn’s 
theory of pleasure is worth mentioning. Jerusalem writes, “The soul cannot take 
something to be a perfection according to obscure concepts at the same time it takes it to 
be an imperfection according to distinct concepts. The obscure representations cease as 
soon as the soul clarifies its concepts to distinctness; the pleasure… must therefore 
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nececssarily disappear as soon as the soul distinctly cognizes that [the bodily condition] 
will destroy it, or make it less perfect. Experience, however, teaches the opposite.”173  
Yet according to Mendelssohn’s 1757 account, a confused cognition of a thing’s 
perfection can certainly outweigh a distinct cognition of its imperfection, provided either 
that the confused cognition contains more good or works more quickly. In fact this 
would not be uncommon, for a more distinct cognition will generally be more abstract 
(due to human cognitive limitation), meaning it contains less content, and it would also 
often occur more slowly, since the mind must work through a lengthier chain of 
reasoning. For example, when considering whether to smoke a cigarette I may think 
distinctly and abstractly that cigarettes in general are bad for health, and perhaps think 
through the consequences of this to my own future well-being. But at the same time, I 
consider the pleasure I expect to get from this particular cigarette much more 
immediately, concretely and fully, with more vivid imagination, even anticipating the 
bodily pleasure it will provide. This can certainly outweigh the more distinct and 
abstract negative considerations which course slowly through my mind. 
In the same correspondence in which Mendelssohn developed this refinement, 
Lessing also convinced him that we can feel pleasure through the reflexive perception of 
our own powers (a perfection of our subject). In this way it is possible feel a subjective 
pleasure even at the perception of imperfect objects. Mendelssohn includes, but does not 
emphasize this point in his discussion of mixed sentiments in the 1761 Rhapsodie (see 
Chapter 3 for further discussion). In that work, Mendelssohn continues to insist on a 
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continuity between pleasure and desire: “Concerning the pleasurable sentiment, it is an 
effect of perfection, a gift of heaven, which is inseparable from the cognition and the 
choice of the good; even it can be analyzed and resolved into the original drive toward 
perfection.”174 This is a natural extension of Mendelssohn’s original theory: we can strive 
for representations of our own perfection just as we strive to represent the perfections of 
objects outside of us. 
Deeper doubts about this view first appeared in the 1771 edition of Philosophische 
Schriften, in which Mendelssohn included a brief set of comments on the earlier edition. 
The first comment is: 
P. 28: ‘[We learn from experience] that the soul would rather have a 
representation of perfection than not have it, and the representation [of an 
imperfection], etc.’ False! The disinclination does not always pertain to not-
having the representation, but also often to the disapproval of the object. The 
imperfection is objectively evil and arouses disapproval, but subjectively, as 
representation, [it is] a praedicatum ponens [an expression of reality or 
perfection] and therefore good…175 
 
Mendelssohn provides two examples in the opening of the revised Rhapsodie. First, if a 
loved one suffers, we do not wish to be unaware of the suffering, but instead desire to 
remove the cause of the suffering. Second, Mendelssohn recycles his bloody battle 
example from the first edition, pointing out that “even the wise” wish to view the scene 
of carnage if it has already happened. Both examples show (in somewhat different ways) 
that we may prefer to have than not to have an unpleasant, imperfect representation, 
because the object of our “disinclination” or revulsion in these cases is not the 
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representation, but the state of affairs represented. In a way, this analysis is a natural 
consequence of the subjective/objective distinction that Mendelssohn had accepted with 
respect to pleasure in 1757. But it raises a new question: does Mendelssohn now think 
that the will comes apart from pleasure, simply because (as the first example shows) we 
can desire to have even an unpleasant representation? 
 The second comment seems addressed to that very question: 
P. 48. 49. Pleasure should not have been compared with the will. The former is an 
inner consciousness that a representation A improves our condition; the will on 
the other hand [is] a striving of the soul to make this representation actual. 
Pleasure is at it were a favorable judgment of the soul about its actual condition; 
the will on the other hand is a striving of the soul to make this condition actual. 
Desire, of which pleasure is accustomed to be accompanied, does not belong 
essentially to the enjoyment of pleasure [zum Genusse des Vergnügens].176 
 
In this passage, Mendelssohn clearly repudiates his earlier claim that desire or the will 
differs from pleasure only in degree. They have, after all, different objects: the object of 
pleasure is a representation of perfection, while the object of desire is the actualization of 
such a representation.177  
 This is certainly a significant new development in Mendelssohn’s thought, but it 
is not a radical change. While Mendelssohn eliminates the claim from 1761 edition of the 
sixth letter of the Briefe, “the object of pleasure is only distinguished from the object of 
will by the intensity of desire,”178 he still insists in the 1771 edition that “the desire which 
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is connected with that pleasure is only distinguished by degree from the actual will.”179 He 
also revises “the three elements of will” theory for the 1771 edition. Of these three 
elements, the initial two remain the same: we first represent an object and then judge it 
to be good. The third element is changed from “a judgment that we would rather have 
than not have this representation” to “desire, or the striving of the spirit to make such a 
representation actual, or to obtain it.”180 But crucially, the perception of the 
representation as good, which must precede desire, is pleasurable by definition. So, for 
all of these reasons, Mendelssohn still considered pleasure to be at least a necessary 
condition for desire. Even in the example of the suffering loved one, our desire is led by 
a pleasurable representation of a state where the cause of the suffering has been 
eliminated. 
 Mendelssohn also continues to hold that cognitions, provided they have the right 
content, lead to desire and action.181 The view that pleasure “can be resolved into the 
original drive for perfection” is retained, while Mendelssohn expands on his theory that 
a cognition that contains more “positive notes” (perfection) will be pleasurable.182 And 
pleasure and desire are both determined according to the same quantities he had posited 
in the 1757 fragment “Von der Herrschaft über die Neigungen,” namely the quantity of 
perfection and the distinctness and speed of perception. Thus Mendelssohn writes even 
in the 1771 Rhapsodie, for example, “The less time is required to consider the perfection 
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offered to us by a certain concept, the more pleasant is its intuitive cognition, and the 
more powerful the desire to enjoy it.”183 He also retains the thought that beauty impels 
us to desire the good: “We are called [bestimmt] in this life not only to improve the 
powers of the understanding and the will, but also to educate feeling through sensible 
cognition and the obscure drives of the soul through sensible pleasure to a higher 
perfection.”184 So, despite his doubts about the theoretical adequacy of his original 
theory, Mendelssohn clearly wanted to retain the core Platonic implications of that view. 
 Nonetheless, it must be asked whether Mendelssohn still holds that pleasure, by 
itself, determines the will. He has, after all, plainly disavowed the idea that the pleasure 
involved in a representation simply becomes a desire for that representation if the 
pleasure is intense enough, through a natural necessity. If “desire does not belong 
essentially to the enjoyment of pleasure,” it seems that something further must be added 
to pleasure – something that results in the judgment that I ought to actualize this 
representation. But what would determine such a judgment? What, in other words, 
distinguishes a representation which I merely perceive with pleasure from one which I 
perceive with pleasure and also desire to actualize? Mendelssohn does not directly 
address this all-important question in the 1771 work, so I turn now to the later passages 
for clarification. 
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The later passages 
 As far as I am aware, it has not been previously recognized that “das Erkenntnis-, 
das Empfindungs- und das Begehrungsvermögen,” which Mendelssohn posits in an oft-
cited 1776 fragment,185 are simply iterations of the three “essential elements of the will” 
which he had already indicated in “Von dem Vergnügen” and in the sixth letter of the 
1755 Briefe, and the third of which he revised in 1771. Recall that in the Briefe, the first 
element was simply the perception of the object – Erkenntnis. The second element was 
the consideration of the object as good (or bad), which is pleasurable or displeasurable – 
Empfindung. And the third element (in the revision) was the striving to actualize that 
representation – Begehren. This illustrates a much deeper continuity in Mendelssohn’s 
thought than most commentators credit him for. 
 Let us now consider the key passages in the 1776 fragment. Mendelssohn writes, 
“Between the faculty of cognition and the faculty of desire lies the faculty of sentiment, 
by means of which we sense pleasure or displeasure from an object: approve of it, and 
find it good and pleasant – or disapprove of it, and find it faulty and unpleasant. – There 
are thoughts and representations about which we do not involve ourselves at all, which 
are not connected with any sentiments. There are also sentiments, which never become 
desire. We can find a piece of music or a painting which moves us beautiful, without 
desiring anything.”186 Here Mendelssohn treats sentiment as something that includes 
cognition, but goes beyond it; and desire as something that includes pleasure, but goes 
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beyond it. The enjoyment of art is singled out as a pleasure that does not become desire. 
There is no suggestion at all that the faculties are completely independent in the sense 
that the desire and will can operate independently of pleasure or pleasure 
independently of cognition, as Kant would later claim. But, we are left with the same 
question as before: what exactly constitutes sentiment beyond cognition, and what 
exactly constitutes desire beyond pleasure?  
 Mendelssohn still provides little help on this question. Most significantly, he 
writes soon after the passage above that “Every sentiment is connected with a desire 
[Begehren] to put the properties of the object in harmony with our concepts. This desire 
is the element of striving.”187 The claim appears to baldly contradict what Mendelssohn 
had written just a few sentences earlier – that some sentiments never become desire.  
 This tension reappears in the 1785 Morgenstunden, in a section which draws 
substantially on the 1776 fragment. In Morgenstunden Mendelssohn writes of “the 
approval [Billigen], the assent [Beyfall], the pleasure of the soul, which is far removed 
from desire.”188 Again, he singles out the beautiful, claiming that it seems “to be a 
particular feature of beauty that it is considered with a quiet pleasure; that it pleases 
even if we do not possess it, and it is also very far removed from the desire to possess it. 
Not until we consider the beautiful in relation to ourselves, and view the possession of it 
as a good, does the desire arise in us to have it, to bring it to ourselves, to possess it – a 
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desire that is very far removed from the enjoyment of beauty.”189 He admits that the 
pleasure of beauty produces an inclination to consider the object further, but suggests 
that this not be considered desire, at least not strictly speaking. Pleasure is “a seed 
[Keim] of desire, but not yet desire itself.”190 Thus far, this rhymes with the former 
passage from the 1776 fragment, where each mental function depends on the previous, 
but also goes beyond it in some unspecified way. 
 Yet within the very same paragraph, Mendelssohn claims that the 
“Billigungsvermögen” (a new name for what he had called the Empfindungsvermögen, 
the faculty of sentiment, in the 1776 fragment), “is as it were the transition from 
cognition to desire, and connects both of these faculties through the finest gradation.”191 
Two paragraphs later, he writes, “Strictly speaking, every cognition already brings a 
kind of approval with it. Each concept, insofar as it is merely thinkable, has something 
that pleases the soul, that engages its activity, and which is thus cognized with pleasure 
and approval.”192 Further, “Both the faculty of cognition and the faculty of approval are, 
as you know from psychology, expressions of one and the very same power of the 
soul.”193 Like the latter passage from the 1776 fragment, these suggest that the faculties 
differ in degree only, with nothing new being needed to transform cognition into 
pleasure, and pleasure into desire. 
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A murky solution 
 Unfortunately, nothing Mendelssohn writes in the Morgenstunden adequately 
relieves the tension between these sets of passages. Following a line of thought he had 
begun in the 1776 fragment, Mendelssohn does explain that one important difference in 
the faculties has to do with their directionality – whether they involve a striving to bring 
our concepts into conformity with the way the world is, or a striving to bring the world 
into conformity with our concepts.194 The faculty of cognition does the former, he 
explains, while the faculty of approval [sentiment] does the latter.195 While interesting, it 
must be said that this distinction does little more than create a terrible muddle. The 
faculty of approval here is simply not the same as the faculty he had just described as 
being involved in the experience of beauty – after all, the previous “faculty of approval” 
did not always involve desire. Soon after, Mendelssohn also writes that the faculty of 
approval is connected to our general inclination toward being moved,196 which also 
contradicts his claim that this faculty characteristically strives to put the world into 
conformity with our concepts. The faculty of desire itself is not given a place in this 
apparently new scheme, even though the act of striving to make the world conform to 
our representations, to produce the good, is plainly what Mendelssohn had up to this 
point called desire.  
The problem with Mendelssohn’s explanation here becomes especially obvious 
in the final retelling of his Lieblingsbeispiel, the bloody battle: “As soon as the evil has 
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occurred, and can no longer be altered, then it stops becoming an object of our faculty of 
approval; now it stimulates our faculty of cognition, which wants to cognizes these 
things as they are, not as we would wish them or prefer them to be.”197 Yet it is plainly 
false that a person would not disapprove of such a scene, and not find it displeasurable, at 
least from the perspective of the object. Mendelssohn himself had admitted as much. He 
is perhaps right to deny that we would want to deceive ourselves about the carnage, but 
that does not seem relevant. Much more salient is that we would not strive to undo the 
carnage, which would be an expression of our faculty of desire. But Mendelssohn, 
hewing to his inexplicable new categorization, fails to recognize this (though he had in 
previous explanations of this example). 
 Setting that unfortunate bit of theorizing aside, Mendelssohn does attempt in one 
place to address the question of what determines whether a particular mental act is an 
instance of cognition or approval. He asks why we sometimes strive for the truth, but at 
other times allow ourselves to be deceived in order to enjoy an artistic illusion. 
Mendelssohn explains that this depends on our intention in the given situation, and in 
particular which capacity of our soul we wish to exercise.198 But this hardly answers the 
question. At best, it pushes it back a step: what determines our intention in a particular 
situation? Mendelssohn comes closest to answering when he writes, “As soon as we take 
an interest in the thing itself and its reality, we resist all illusion, however happy that 
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[illusion] would make us, and strive for truth.”199 Unfortunately, this claim is inadequate 
to our question, since it presupposes an interest in or intention to realize an object. And, 
it is certainly false at the descriptive level. People are often taken in by comfortable 
illusions and shape their wills around them. Charitably, since Mendelssohn could not 
have been ignorant of this, he actually meant to make a normative claim here. But in that 
case, the statement does not help answer the descriptive question of what determines 
the difference between cognition, pleasure, and will. 
 Without much guidance from what Mendelssohn actually said, we must retreat 
to the question of what he should have said, given what needed to be said in order to 
address the issue. The issue can be summarized in the following way: Mendelssohn 
noticed that the existence of subjective pleasure (1757) required a refinement in his 
theory of the will. At first he saw that a displeasurable representation does not always 
determine us to strive for the removal of that representation (the suffering loved one 
example), and that a representation of a displeasurable object (the bloody battle 
example) does not always determine us to strive for the removal of that object (1771). 
Later, he noticed that the representations of a certain pleasurable objects (the beautiful) 
do not always determine us to strive toward the object – i.e., to possess it or take it into 
ourselves; and perhaps also that not every cognition produces pleasure or displeasure 
(1776). In order to address these worries, Mendelssohn argues that pleasure is something 
beyond cognition, and desire is something beyond pleasure. But what, exactly? 
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 Fortunately, there is a very straightforward and plausible account that also 
retains all of Mendelssohn’s Platonic intuitions. Mendelssohn never mentions any sui 
generis feature which must be added to cognition to yield pleasure, or which must be 
added to pleasure to yield desire. Further, he insists that the three faculties (at least in 
some sense) differ only in degree, and that they are all expressions of the same power of 
the soul. Therefore, we can surmise that pleasure arises naturally out of something 
specific that is already contained in (some) cognitions, and desire arises naturally out of 
something specific that is already contained in (some) pleasurable representations. 
Mendelssohn even suggests something along these lines in the last part of the 1776 
fragment, writing: 
Every sentiment is connected with a desire to bring the properties of the object 
into harmony with our concepts. This desire is the element of striving. The 
moment of its effectiveness stands in a composite relation to 1) the goods 
cognized (according to their extension and intension), 2) possibility (inner and 
outer), and 3) difficulty. That moment which is greatest in each instant 
transitions from the dead power of desire into the living power of activity, which 
is either merely inner, that is if only the attention and focus of the soul is being 
directed; or outer, if the limbs are moved according to their goal to change 
thoughts or things.200 
 
According to this suggestion, desire is nothing more than a recognition of the good in 
the representation of a state of affairs that is possible and not too difficult for me to bring 
about.  
 Mendelssohn does not develop this thought further, but it could be parsed as 
follows, as part of a complete theory of cognition, pleasure, and will: Pleasure is the 
intuition of perfection, so if we become aware of such an intuition within our total 
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representation of the world at a given time, then we feel pleasure. It follows that if the 
perfection is not noticeable, or we deliberately abstract from it, or our representation 
contains an equal amount of offsetting imperfection, then we will not feel pleasure. 
Desire (in the strict sense), as Mendelssohn claims repeatedly and mostly consistently, is 
the striving to make a certain object of representation X actual, or to make the world 
conform to X. So, desire (in the strict sense) is determined by a judgment that X ought to 
be actualized. This judgment, in turn, could be determined by the perfection perceived 
(pleasurably) in a representation of a possible world W in which I strive for the 
actualization of X. If I perceive a relatively large amount of perfection in my 
representation of W relatively quickly and distinctly, then I get a lot of pleasure from 
that representation and begin to desire it, and if the desire is intense enough, actually to 
strive for it. In other words: if the idea of bringing about X is pleasing to me, then I 
desire to bring about X to that extent. On the other hand, if a representation of my 
actualizing X does not please me, or even if I just do not think about actualizing X, then I 
do not desire X. On this view, desire (in the strict sense) is a natural consequence of a 
particular kind of pleasurable representation – namely, a representation of my bringing 
about a certain state of affairs. In a looser sense, I can also desire my own subjective 
having of certain representations on account of the pleasure they afford. 
 Mendelssohn’s worrisome counterexamples can now be analyzed in the 
following way: in the case of the bloody battle, the representation of the scene as it is 
amounts to a subjective perfection, which is pleasurable. I perhaps wish in some sense 
that the battle had not happened, but the representation of myself actualizing that state of 
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affairs lacks perfection, because it contradicts the order of nature or simply lacks any law 
connecting means and end.201 Such a representation does not give me pleasure and so I 
do not strive for it. In the suffering loved one example, the representation of suffering is 
objectively displeasurable, and I do want to be rid of it as far that displeasure goes (this 
is an expression of desire in the loose sense). But at the same time, it is necessary for me 
to have that representation in order for me to represent myself as acting to alleviate the 
suffering. This latter representation contains a large amount of perfection, since it 
connects my actions to an improved state of affairs according to confusedly perceived 
instrumental principles. So, it is pleasurable, even more (all things considered) than a 
representation of my striving to become ignorant of the suffering, which after all 
involves inflicting an imperfection on my subject as well as allowing the suffering to 
continue objectively. That is why I prefer to alleviate the suffering than to be ignorant of 
it. In the case of experiencing beauty, I do not represent myself as actualizing any 
representation at all, so desire in the strict sense does not enter into this experience. 
Nothing, however, bars the experience of beauty from contributing to my desire for the 
good. For beauty shows me how to recognize the good, and desire arises naturally as 
soon as I add to this recognition a consideration of the representation as a possible object 
of my will.  
 Still, while Mendelssohn certainly does not assign sui generis principles to the 
three mental faculties as Kant does, he also does not explicitly develop his own account 
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of pleasure and the will in light of the problems he discovered. His view as written 
remains unsatisfyingly murky. One might only wish that he had discovered these 
matters earlier in his career, when perhaps he would have had the peace and mental 
clarity to treat them with the careful attention they deserve. 
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Chapter 2: The role of art in human life 
Part 1: Mendelssohn’s response to Rousseau 
 Sometime in 1755, Lessing introduced Mendelssohn to the works of Rousseau 
and encouraged him to translate the Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality 
Among Men202 into German. Rousseau’s praise of nature as the happiest state for human 
beings and his attack on the ethical value of the arts are both diametrically opposed to 
the rationalist views that humanity is improved through cultivation and that the arts 
play an important role in this improvement. Mendelssohn was fascinated by Rousseau’s 
arguments, and wrote up several responses to him over the subsequent years. 
 While Mendelssohn’s response to Rousseau is wide-ranging, the discussion of 
this chapter will focus on the issue of the role of the arts in human life.203 Interestingly, 
Mendelssohn’s responses to Rousseau on this topic are not all consistent. There seem to 
be two Mendelssohns: one a conservative moral stickler who sees art in an instrumental 
and subordinate role, constantly worrying about its corrupting effects; the other a patron 
of the arts who gives them a central place of their own in human life. This tension is 
reflected in the secondary literature, with one group accusing Mendelssohn of 
inappropriate moralizing204 and of subordinating art entirely to moral ends. “The 
cognizing and sensing of sensible perfections get their value only as a practice and 
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preparation for the cognition of true morality” writes Deditius.205 On the other hand, 
many other commentators206 insist that Mendelssohn saw art as being an essential part 
human life in its own right, as an end in itself rather than merely a means. A third group 
insists that Mendelssohn actually attempted to sever the connection between art and 
morality altogether.207 
 In part one of this chapter, I reconstruct Mendelssohn’s responses to Rousseau on 
the value of the arts and attempt to reconcile these competing views. I argue that 
Mendelssohn was taken with Rousseau’s arguments and indeed became something of a 
moralizer about art, but only for a limited period from around late 1755 to mid-1756. 
After that time, he transformed into a liberal patron of the arts, offering a plausible 
alternative to Rousseau’s spartan ethic while retaining a significant role for morality.  
Rousseau’s challenge and Mendelssohn’s initial response 
 Rousseau’s attack on the arts is bound up with his general skepticism about 
reason and progress. He argues that human beings were happiest in the state of nature 
for two primary reasons: first, the needs and desires of natural humans were limited to 
what they can attain through their natural powers. Second, natural humans tended to 
act virtuously toward each other automatically – to the limited extent this was necessary 
for them – because of their innate natural feeling of pity, which Rousseau held (along 
with the desire for self-preservation) to be the foundation of all virtue. When human 
beings left the state of nature and began cultivating the arts and sciences, they increased 
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the range of human desire beyond what is attainable by all. This led some people to 
subjugate others in order to satisfy their expanded desires. Even as these wealthy people 
became able to satisfy more and more desires, they amassed an ever increasing number 
of unsatisfied wants. They ended up enslaving themselves through their dependence on 
the less fortunate, and neglected true virtue through the pursuit of these unimportant 
forms of satisfaction. 
 As Mendelssohn recognized, Rousseau does not believe that humans should 
attempt to return to the state of nature. But Rousseau is very skeptical of the powers of 
both reason and art to improve virtue. According to him, reason has a role to play in 
ethical development, but only as a guide to the proper expression of natural feeling. If 
treated as an end itself, reason simply expands desire and leads to corruption. 
 The core of Mendelssohn’s response, which remains consistent throughout his 
writings, occurs in an early undated fragment written sometime in 1755. It runs as 
follows: “If satisfaction were the highest good, Rousseau would be right. But the law of 
nature binds us not only to be satisfied, but chiefly to make ourselves more perfect.”208 In 
other words, Rousseau erred when he claimed that humans would be happier simply if 
they could satisfy more of their desires, even if the content of those desires were purely 
animal. Because increasing our perfection and that of those around us is the highest 
good, we are actually ethically compelled to cultivate ourselves. 
So, although he was right that cultivation expands human need, Rousseau was 
wrong to think that needs are inherently corrupting, for “every need is a drive toward 
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perfection” and “all objects of true pleasure extend our being.” We must only take care 
not “to make a part of our needs into the purpose of our being,” and instead recognize 
that “all together in an agreeable harmony make up our perfection.”209 Mendelssohn 
does not specifically discuss art in the fragment, and it seems that this initial response is 
agnostic about whether art has purely instrumental value, or value in its own right. 
Mendelssohn the moralizer 
 By October 1755, Mendelssohn had reworked and expanded these notes into a 
polished essay, which was published in early 1756 under the title “Sendschreiben an den 
Herrn Magister Lessing in Leipzig” [“Missive to Master Lessing in Leipzig”]. In this 
essay Mendelssohn gives an argument for his denial of Rousseau’s claim that human 
good consists in satisfaction of the mere greatest proportion of desires: 
One knows that the satisfaction of our true needs constitutes our duties. But how 
little of this is known to the natural man! Nutrition, rest and intercourse are, 
according to Rousseau’s admission, his only needs and even these he satisfies 
through a blind drive, without an inner conviction of the rightness of his action; 
(what a wretched gift is freedom without reason, without the inner certainty of 
the rightness of our path!).210 
 
In addition to satisfying desires, it is inherently good for human beings to know the 
reason behind their desires. “Natural man has no feeling of human dignity, of true 
morality, or of the general love of order and perfection.”211 Gaining this feeling requires 
cultivation, and that carries with it an expanded range of objects recognized as a good, 
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as well as a corresponding desire for those objects. An abandonment of the state of 
nature was therefore necessary for the true happiness of humanity.  
In this work, Mendelssohn also strongly emphasizes the importance of love and 
desire for human development: 
The will is a capability of the soul to strive after certain concepts, or to turn its 
original power to beloved objects. Pleasure determines this capability. We find a 
desire212 for perfect forms, so that we turn our attention to them… All human 
inclinations, all desires and the most hidden drives have no other power on the soul 
except insofar as they represents to it the form of a good, of a perfection, of an order 
– and whatever is not grounded on this can be attributed neither to a wild nor to a 
cultivated person.213 
 
This is a clear endorsement of the Platonic view that love and desire generally aim to 
satisfy our fundamental need for greater perfection. Mendelssohn denies Rousseau’s 
claim that the feeling of pity is the foundation of virtue, for “pity is grounded on love, 
love is grounded on desire [Lust] for harmony and order. Where we see perfection, there 
we wish to see it grow; and as soon as a defect expresses itself, displeasure at it arises in 
us, which we call pity.”214 And love itself is no mere feeling, for it always purports to 
have perfection, a rational property, as its object. He concludes, “True love, considered 
in its whole extent, is the motivation, means, and purpose of all virtue.”215  
 Now, it might seem that the arts deserve a central place in human life simply 
because they provide pleasure and can be the object of love.216 But it is not so clear that 
Mendelssohn accepts this conclusion. He reiterates his earlier claim that no aspect of our 
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perfection should be allowed to suppress the others or be “unjustifiably enthroned.”217 
Much of Rousseau’s argument, he explains, would have been acceptable if only it had 
been restricted to corrupted society and a corrupted taste that gets the proper order of 
human perfections wrong.218 So, what is the proper order? In the earlier fragment, 
Mendelssohn had flatly denied any significance to bodily perfection, writing: “The 
needs of our body, insofar as they only belong to our body, do not pertain to us.”219 He 
tempers this claim somewhat in the “Sendschreiben,” insisting only that the perfections 
of the soul are most important, followed by the preservation of the body.220 Next are 
the innocent pleasures of the senses... Music, painting, fine foods, drink… [and] 
the marvelous works of nature and of art are mild gifts of our gracious Father, 
which compete [sich wetteifernd bemühen] to enlighten our soul with a heavenly 
joyfulness, and spur on its powers when it is exhausted, so that it can work with 
redoubled industriousness at the great purpose of creation… Finally [in the order 
of perfections], we should alternate these delights with certain bodily exercises.221 
 
It is not surprising that Mendelssohn places beauty below the development of 
intellectual perfection; he had argued for the same in the Briefe über die Empfindungen. 
But this is nonetheless a remarkably weak defense of the arts in two senses: First, 
Mendelssohn places sensible beauty virtually on par with “bodily exercise.” Second, he 
treats both art and beauty here merely as pleasant diversions from the striving after the 
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“great purpose of creation,” in which the arts themselves seem to play no role. Thus, he 
appears to assign the arts only a weak instrumental value.222  
In an essay published about the same time in a short-lived journal called The 
Chameleon, Mendelssohn does argue that “the purpose of poetry is to make you more 
human, to implant in you the blessed feeling of virtue and love of mankind.”223 This 
suggests he thought poetry, at least, plays a somewhat larger role in ethics than he had 
admitted in the “Sendschreiben.” But even here, that role is limited to the instrumental 
support of distinctly known virtue. For example, Mendelssohn suggests, comedy aims to 
make the errors of human beings laughable, while tragedy aims to make them terrifying, 
both so that the audience will strive to avoid these errors.224 It is true that poets strive to 
arouse the passions, but this means that the audience must assess their works critically 
in order to draw the proper lessons from them.225 “Beware of standing by slick and 
poisonous descriptions…. it is just as easy for many poets to mock virtue as to exalt it to 
the stars, if they have no further intention than to display their art.”226 Here 
Mendelssohn seems at least as worried about the possible corrupting effects of art as he 
is sanguine about its role in implanting a love of virtue. 
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The conservative Mendelssohn articulates his critique of the arts most forcefully 
in an unfinished and unpublished fragment of disputed date titled Briefe über Kunst 
[Letters on art]. This work, consisting of two mostly finished letters and an outline and 
plan for four (including the two written), is notorious in Mendelssohn scholarship 
because it contains some rather astonishing attacks on art, especially music. Goldstein 
declares that it is “nearly unbelievable” that the contents of this work had come from 
“the mouth of Mendelssohn,”227 though his authorship has never been doubted. Because 
the dating of this work is not known with certainty, its corresponding place in the 
development of Mendelssohn’s thought is also disputed. Let us first consider the content 
of this work and then return to these questions when we are in a position to resolve 
them. 
While Mendelssohn does not mention Rousseau’s name in Briefe über Kunst, it is 
plainly meant as a response to the Genevan philosopher. Nearly the entire work, both 
the two completed letters and the outline, is specifically devoted to the issue of the 
proper role of the arts and sciences in human life. Mendelssohn begins the Briefe über 
Kunst with a reiteration of the view about the highest good stated in the other pieces on 
Rousseau: “The perfection of men consists, in spite of all the ridicule from the despisers 
of wisdom, in a righteous heart, and in a fine and sensitive feeling of true beauty, or in 
the agreement of the lower powers of the soul with the upper.”228 But as in the other 
works, Mendelssohn does not wish to give the arts a place of their own in the highest 
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human good. Instead, he writes “the most fundamental truths are indeed convincing 
and undeniable by their very nature, but they are not persuading. They rule the 
understanding, but not the sentiments, the drives, and the inclinations. Truth must 
borrow soft fire and divine persuasiveness [Suade] which drives into the mind, rules the 
inclination, animates dry arguments with the fire of sentiment and lets the sentiments 
themselves break out in to decisions and action.”229 In other words, beauty, art, and the 
lower faculties serve to prepare the mind for morality as it is known distinctly, and it 
makes the truths expressed by the upper faculties effective for our limited minds. As in 
the essay for The Chameleon, the value of art is limited to lending “fire” to the truths of 
virtue, which itself is known only through the intellect. Mendelssohn does add that 
“One must already feel the advantages of the graces if he is to be ruled by them,”230 but 
it is not clear whether this claim pertains to art or just beauty generally. In any case, it 
too gives beauty no more than an instrumental purpose in ethical development. 
Developing the arts and sciences certainly contributes to our perfection, 
Mendelssohn explains, but emphasizes that “they are a means to blessedness – but 
nothing more than a means.”231 He then develops this point into a remarkable view 
about the condition under which the arts and sciences can contribute to human 
happiness: 
One misses the true intention, when one stops with [the arts and sciences], and 
sees them for the purpose after which we strive. And what else do those do, who 
tear a single science, a single art from the connection, and dedicate their whole 
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life to it and it alone? What do they do, besides improve some of their powers of 
the soul miraculously, while as it were suppressing the others? … [Such a 
person] has taken a means for the end. He has made science more perfect, not 
himself. Our Theophrast [Lessing232] once named such a one a sacrifice for the 
human race; I would rather call him a sacrifice for his pet science… Only those 
parts of the arts and sciences which reciprocally influence each other also have 
an influence on the happiness of human beings.233  
 
Mendelssohn seems to be arguing here that those who focus on a single art or science 
end up missing the highest good, improving neither themselves nor the rest of 
humanity. Art as means to human improvement, it seems, is not itself part of that end. 
In order to make this point absolutely clear, Mendelssohn launches into a scathing attack 
on instrumental music: 
Nowhere has the separation of art and science led to greater extravagance than in 
relation to music [Tonkunst]. The purpose of this invaluable art is to make the 
effects of poetry, the furtherance of our happiness, more lively and fierier in our 
minds. If a song to the praise of God, wisdom, or virtue is sung with the requisite 
energy, and animated as it were by an accompanying instrument, then it reigns 
unauthorized over our sentiments… The exaltation becomes general, we are as it 
were torn against our will, and accompanied on the way to happiness by joy and 
ecstasy. That is the true purpose of music. But here there are also boundaries, 
which music must not be exceeded if music is to stay true to its calling 
[Bestimmung]. And my God! in what alleyways has one become lost! Music has 
been torn from the side of poetry and treated as a particular science. Its 
boundaries have been endlessly broadened, instruments upon instruments 
invented, melodies upon melodies concocted that aren’t led by anything 
understandable [die keinen Verstand zum Führer haben], but are a mere jingling 
of sounds which flatter the ear. One has attempted to please the senses without 
improving the understanding, without improving the heart, and without the 
intention of making us happier. The way music [Musik] now appears before our 
eyes, it is at best an idle diversion, like those unfortunate games which throw a 
great part of humanity into ruin. The wise, on the other hand, see with chagrin 
that the boundaries have been exceeded, that the ears are all-too-accustomed to 
empty, incomprehensible sounds, and that on this account one barely notices the 
words anymore… the song alone fills our ears, the words sneak by 
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unremarked… Through its supposed progress music has therefore lost its 
dignity, its calling [Bestimmung], and its true use.234 
 
In an outline for the complete series of letters that follows the fragment, Mendelssohn 
adds that music without poetry immediately affects only the body, so that “if it is 
separated from poetry it has no use in morality.”235 He also extends his argument to 
cover the other arts, lamenting the lost age when “painters could also be philosophers” 
and faulting the development of the arts for requiring “more skill, but less spirit.” Art 
has exchanged its main purpose, the promotion of human virtue, for self-serving ends, 
he explains. Mendelssohn even signals his intention to respond to several objections to 
this view, including the opposing view that music in and of itself can contribute to the 
improvement of virtue,236 but does not actually provide any response before the work 
trails off. Mendelssohn’s overall attitude toward art in this piece could not be clearer: its 
purpose is to support, but not be a part of virtue, and it derives all of its value from this 
supporting role. As soon as it is separated from explicit and distinct incitements to 
virtue, it becomes an idle and destructive force in human life. At the time he wrote the 
Briefe über Kunst, at least, it was fair to say that Mendelssohn totally subordinated the 
arts to the demands of a rather austere morality. 
Mendelssohn, patron of the arts 
 By late 1756, Mendelssohn was espousing a very different attitude toward the 
arts. Along with his new friend Friedrich Nicolai, at this time he even forcefully argues 
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against Lessing that the purpose of tragedy is not to improve morals, but to arouse the 
passions (see Chapter 3 for a full discussion of this correspondence). And his main work 
on the fine arts, the 1757 Betrachtungen über die Quellen und die Verbindungen der schönen 
Künste und Wissenschaften [Observations on the sources and connections of the beautiful arts 
and sciences], gives a very different account of art than what one would expect from the 
author of Briefe über Kunst. The Betrachungten opens with the lines: 
The beautiful arts and sciences are for the virtuoso an art, for the connoisseur 
[Liebhaber] a source of pleasure, and for the philosopher a school of instruction. 
In the rules themselves, which the artist led by his genius exercises, and the critic 
abstracts through analysis, lie hidden the deepest secrets of our soul.237 
 
Unlike in the previously discussed essays, Mendelssohn now seems to recognize that the 
feeling of beauty is an essential and important part of the human soul, one that merits 
particular investigation by philosophers. He goes on, 
Beauty is the unauthorized ruler of all our sentiments, the ground of all our 
natural drives, the animating spirit that transforms speculative knowledge of 
truth into sentiment, and urges on to active decision. It enchants us in nature, 
and the genius knows how to imitate it in the works of art with happy success. 
Poetry, rhetoric, beauties in figures and sounds work into our soul through the 
various senses, and master all of our inclinations.238 
 
The first sentence is familiar from the Briefe über Kunst,239 with some important 
differences. In the works described in the previous section, Mendelssohn had credited 
art only with supporting virtue, while itself remaining distinct from it. Here, by contrast, 
beauty and sentiment are described as forms of truth – something into which truth can 
be transformed. And by calling beauty “the ground of all our natural drives,” 
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Mendelssohn is implicitly taking issue with Rousseau. He had already argued that 
human happiness and the highest good consists in an increase of perfection; now he 
finally connects this view to beauty, the sensible apprehension of perfection, of which 
“natural man” is capable even prior to the development of art and science. The last part 
of the passage, as well as the overall work, show that Mendelssohn  is happy to admit all 
of the arts as contributing to this beauty. 
Indeed, one of Mendelssohn’s main goals in the Betrachtungen is to explain how 
art fits into the overall striving for perfection that is characteristic of human life. This 
comes out in his answers to the opening questions of the work: Granting that Batteux 
was right to say that the fine arts should aim to please through their imitation of nature, 
why does nature please us to begin with? And why does its imitation please us?240 
The key to both questions is that both nature and its artificial imitation are highly 
perfect.241 Nature pleases because it is the maximally perfect creation of an absolutely 
perfect God, and more directly because its law-governed structure satisfies the definition 
of perfection. Imitations of nature please us because they reflect this perfection for the 
senses.242 This imitation need not slavishly follow every detail of nature,243 a point 
already made by Wolff and Baumgarten. Rather, it aims to mimic the underlying perfect 
structure of nature, i.e. that each part has a law-governed place in the whole, at least as 
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judged by the senses. As Wolff taught, art represents a possible world in this sense,244 not 
necessarily the real world. Because truth is an expression of perfection, art also represents 
truth about possible worlds, confusedly. Here Mendelssohn returns to the old idea that 
the artist is a creator whose powers are similar to the divine creative power, only lesser 
in degree. 
Mendelssohn’s rationalist predecessors had attempted to specify when deviations 
from actual nature were justified in artistic representations: namely, when the deviation 
serves to increase the perfection of the whole.245 Mendelssohn basically agrees, but 
expresses the thought a bit differently: 
What [nature] has strewn into different objects, the artist collects into a single 
perspective, forms a whole out of it, and exerts himself to represent it just as 
nature would have if the beauty of this object had been its sole intention… 
[Artists] aim to depict a certain subject as God would have created it if more 
important purposes had not prevented him… The artist must raise himself above 
common nature, and because the imitation of beauty is his only end, he is 
everywhere free to concentrate it in his works, so that they move us more 
strongly.246 
 
In this passage, Mendelssohn plainly gives art a unique role in the expression of 
perfection and aesthetic truth. Although his principle is very similar to the earlier 
rationalists’ criterion in a practical sense in that it focuses on the beauty of the whole 
work, he also emphasizes the maximal perfection of the actual world as posited in 
rationalist theology and cosmology. Why would Mendelssohn desire this emphasis? 
One possible explanation has to do with an objection commonly levied against 
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rationalist aesthetics in 20th century literature.247 The admission that art could be more 
beautiful by representing a non-actual world than the actual world, the objection runs, 
means that the actual world is not the most beautiful, and hence not the most perfect, 
since beauty is just perfection. But that contradicts the fundamental rationalist idea that 
the actual world is the best of all possible worlds. 
Now, it may seem that Mendelssohn’s restatement of the principle of imitation 
only more deeply entangled rationalism in this problem. But in fact, the objection is 
doubly fallacious. First, due to fundamental constraints on compossibility posited by 
Leibniz, only the world as a whole, not any of its parts, can be maximally perfect. For 
this reason, a work of art can represent a part of a possible world as being more perfect 
or beautiful than it is in the actual world, without threatening the status of the actual 
(whole) world as maximally perfect. Second, beauty is not equivalent to perfection in 
general, but only to sensible perfection, the perfection of phenomena. Thus what we 
sense to be more perfect may not actually be more perfect, a point Mendelssohn makes 
repeatedly in both the Briefe über die Empfindungen and the present essay. With this in 
mind, we can see that Mendelssohn’s formulation actually addresses the objection rather 
than falling prey to it. He is careful to include the cognitive limitations of artists (i.e. that 
they work through confused sense), and distinguish between parts and wholes. If 
anyone had been worried by the fallacious objection, Mendelssohn’s explanation may 
have satisfied where earlier explanations did not.  
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In sum, Mendelssohn understood the fine arts as sensible representations or 
imitations of possible worlds, worlds which may deviate from the actual world through 
beautification or idealization. This theory is designed to give the artist a real share in the 
creation of perfection, not just a role supporting some distinctly known “great purpose 
of creation.” Though he never altered this general view even in the 1771 edition of his 
essay on the arts, it would come under pressure from the problem of tragedy, which is 
discussed in the following chapter. 
In the Betrachtungen, Mendelssohn also treats pure instrumental music as a 
science in its own right – something he had expressly warned against in Briefe über 
Kunst. Music is in fact one of several basic types of art, Mendelssohn explains, whereas 
song is theorized as a compound art – a combination of poetry and music. Despite his 
strong attack on pure music in Briefe über Kunst, there is not even a trace of the idea that 
pure music is inherently problematic or corrupting in the Betrachtungen. Mendelssohn 
simply appropriates instrumental music under the general rubric of the fine arts, 
explaining that it imitates the passions and is capable of its own perfectly sensible 
structure.248 In a letter to Lessing written shortly after the publication of the essay, 
Mendelssohn even explains that music can represent concepts through association, 
something he vigorously denies in Briefe über Kunst.249 
Mendelssohn does not explicitly raise the question of what role art ought to play 
in human life in the Betrachtungen, although his overall attitude toward art there is 
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clearly more positive than and inconsistent with the view expressed in Briefe über Kunst. 
He does, however, work out a correspondingly liberal approach to this larger issue in 
the fragment titled “Verwandtschaft des Schönen und Guten,” written between 1757 
and 1763. There Mendelssohn accuses Rousseau of presenting the issue unfairly, of 
“collecting together everything evil of which the arts and sciences have ever been 
accused, and concluding from this that they corrupt morals.”250 It is true, he admits, that 
art has tended to corrupt morals in some cases, but “even more often luxury has spoiled 
the beautiful arts.” A corrupt people can also turn even the best goods, like “freedom 
and heroic virtue” into vices. So the philosopher must investigate first what (positive) 
effects the arts and sciences might have, before surveying the negative effects they 
actually did have in certain cases.251 
In order to address the question of the potential good of art, Mendelssohn invokes 
the highest good, just as he had in his other works on Rousseau. Following Socrates’ 
analogy to a well-ordered Republic, Mendelssohn claims that “the perfection of man 
consists in the perfection of his single powers and abilities, and in their agreement with 
the whole.”252 This formulation is subtly but important different than that in the 
“Sendschreiben” and Briefe über Kunst. According to those works, the perfection of 
human beings consists solely in the proper harmony of powers with each other. Here 
Mendelssohn retains the importance of harmony, but also emphasizes the importance of 
the development of powers individually. Mendelssohn suggests that each individual 
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must decide for him or herself how this harmony and development is best achieved: 
“All duties to ourselves reduce to the law: be just to yourself! In this connection each 
rational person must ask themselves the question that Rousseau wanted to answer for 
entire nations. If the cognition of the beautiful can lead me away from the love of the 
good, then perhaps I can develop my taste at the cost of my morals – and I [would be] 
unjust to myself.”253 By the same token, if a person honestly believes that beauty would 
not corrupt her, then it can take a rightful place of its own in her life. 
 Toward the end of the essay, Mendelssohn emphasizes the unity of beauty and 
perfection known through the intellect. “Judgments [of taste] can be resolved into 
rational and distinct grounds, but as they present themselves in the soul they are fully 
distinguished from the effects of distinct arguments. They are phenomena, which relate 
themselves to the reasons into which they are resolved like colors to the angles among 
which the light beams refract: according to appearance of an entirely other nature, but at 
ground they are just the same.”254 While he is not fully explicit, his overall view seems 
clear enough: beauty cannot be endorsed unconditionally because it belongs to 
phenomena, but neither can it be considered inherently corrupting, because it is one way 
that we participate in the perfection of the world. To deny this part of ourselves without 
good reason (e.g. a sincere worry that it would corrupt me) would be to needlessly rob 
ourselves of a share in the highest good. 
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Reconciling the two Mendelssohns, and the place of the Briefe über Kunst 
Not surprisingly, commentators who view Mendelssohn as a moralizer 
(especially Deditius) tend to focus on the Briefe über Kunst, while those who see him as a 
supporter of the arts tend to downplay that work. Of critical importance in this dispute 
is the dating of Briefe über Kunst. According to Goldstein, the work predates the Briefe 
über die Empfindungen and represents an immature view that Mendelssohn soon 
abandoned. According to Braitmaier, Deditius, and Bamberger, on the other hand, Briefe 
über Kunst was written in mid-1758, well after the Betrachtungen. This would place the 
work squarely within Mendelssohn’s early but mature thought about art, making it 
much more likely to represent his settled view. I will argue that both of these dates are 
incorrect, but let us first consider the case for them in turn. 
Goldstein finds the views expressed in Briefe über Kunst so reactionary and so 
unparalleled that he concludes it must be among Mendelssohn’s earliest works.255 
Indeed, Briefe über die Empfindungen seems directly at odds with Briefe über Kunst in three 
important ways. First, the attack on music in Briefe über Kunst seems directly opposed to 
Mendelssohn’s attitude toward that art in the 1755 Briefe über die Empfindungen, where he 
writes: “Divine music [Tonkunst]! You are the only [art] which surprises us with every 
kind of pleasure. What a sweet confusion of perfection, bodily pleasure, and beauty!”256 
In this passage, Mendelssohn seems to treat music (instrumental music, as the rest of the 
passage makes clear) as valuable in its own right, not merely on account of its use in 
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supporting the songs of an austere ethic. He also decisively attributes intellectual and 
sensible pleasures to music, not merely bodily pleasure as he had argued in Briefe über 
Kunst. Second, in Briefe über die Empfindungen Mendelssohn claims that “the purpose of 
tragedy [and poetry in general] is to arouse passion,”257 not merely to serve as a vehicle 
for teaching moral truths. Finally, while Mendelssohn does not explicitly discuss the 
value of art in Briefe über die Empfindungen, his overall attitude is clearly liberal, not 
reactionary. Palemon often uses very positive words and descriptions when discussing 
art, and never advises Euphranor to beware of its potentially harmful effects – as it 
seems the author of Briefe über Kunst surely would have. Since the Briefe über die 
Empfindungen went through two further revisions (1761 and 1771) with no relevant 
changes to these passages, it seemed to Goldstein that Briefe über Kunst must be simply a 
product of Mendelssohn’s early thought which he quickly left behind. 
 Bamberger supplies the most complete argument for the 1758 dating. Against 
Goldstein, he argues that “Mendelssohn always allowed the arts to contribute to 
[human] happiness.”258 Further, to show that Mendelssohn had held a similar 
conservative view of instrumental music elsewhere around the same time as his favored 
dating, Bamberger points to Mendelssohn’s 1757 comment on an early draft of Lessing’s 
Laokoon: 
Music can simply be connected to poetry; in fact according to its first calling 
[Bestimmung] it served to support poetry. For that reason, the art of music is 
never taken to such excess as when it creates a disadvantage for poetry, and we 
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rightly criticize the newer music because its affectation does not agree with any 
harmonious poetry.259 
 
Neither point is convincing. While it is true that Mendelssohn always gave the arts some 
role in promoting human happiness, the issue is precisely what role. There is a clear 
difference between making art merely a means to the end of virtue, as Mendelssohn did 
in the “Sendschreiben” and Briefe über Kunst, and giving art a value in its own right, as 
he did in his Betrachtungen and “Verwandtschaft des Schönen und Guten.” As for the 
passage from Laokoon comments, it establishes that music is rightly criticized insofar as it 
creates a disadvantage for poetry. This presupposes that the music was intended to be 
joined to poetry to begin with – in other words, the topic of this passage is song, not 
pure instrumental music. In that sense, this point exactly corresponds with 
Mendelssohn’s explanation in the Betrachtungen that song is a compound art in which 
poetry takes precedence over music. In other words, when the principles of poetry 
conflict with the principles of music in a song, the principles of music must yield.260 The 
passage in Briefe über Kunst, by contrast, explicitly targets instrumental music in general. 
 Bamberger next provides his positive case for the 1758 dating. First, following 
Braitmaier, he draws attention to a reference to a certain “letter” in Mendelssohn’s 
November 1757 missive to Lessing: “Herr Nicolai can certify that I will shortly resign 
from the beautiful sciences. But before that, I want to write a letter in which I will freely 
pronounce my thoughts on the beautiful sciences. I don’t repudiate all of them, but I 
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want to make a choice for myself.”261 Bamberger (ironically following Goldstein) 
surmises that the letter mentioned in this passage is the first of an exchange of letters on 
art, which Nicolai reported he had begun with Mendelssohn in order to discuss issues 
raised in the 1757 publication of the Betrachtungen. The series was originally intended for 
publication, but according to Nicolai only two letters were ever completed, one by 
Mendelssohn and one by himself. The letters were subsequently given to Lessing and 
then, as far as Nicolai knew, lost. Nicolai reports that the authors used Greek 
pseudonyms, assigning “Theophrast” to Lessing – whom they hoped would join in the 
correspondence. He did not, and Nicolai reports that the plan was cut short because of 
Lessing’s return to Berlin around June of 1758. In a letter to Mendelssohn of April 1758, 
Lessing also refers to “your letter on the essence of the beautiful sciences” in connection 
with his assigned name “Theophrast.” Since Mendelssohn refers to “our Theophrast” in 
Briefe über Kunst (see above), Bamberger (now following Deditius) concludes that “the 
letter” mentioned twice in the correspondence is the same as the Briefe über Kunst. In his 
retrospective Nicolai does get his own purported pseudonym in what is purported to be 
Briefe über Kunst wrong, but Bamberger attributes this to a slip of memory. After all, 
Nicolai in fact reported two different pseudonyms for himself on the two much later 
occasions when he wrote about this episode (“Eudemon” in 1791; “Kalophil” in 1800 – 
but Mendelssohn  had actually addressed the letters in Briefe über Kunst to 
“Agathocles”). From all this, Bamberger concludes, agreeing with Deditius, that the first 
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letter of Briefe über Kunst was written around March 1758, and the second around “May 
or June” 1758.262 
 This account hinges on the idea that Briefe über Kunst is identical to 
Mendelssohn’s contribution to the unfinished planned correspondence with Nicolai and 
Lessing. But that is not likely to be the case for several reasons. First, Nicolai reports that 
he and Mendelssohn had each written only one letter in their planned exchange, but 
Briefe über Kunst contains two mostly finished letters by Mendelssohn and none by 
Nicolai. Second, the Briefe über Kunst fragment contains an outline for four letters, all 
clearly expressing Mendelssohn’s own views. Bamberger admits that this outline was 
probably not written after the two letters, since that would not have allowed time for “a 
free engagement with the opinions of his correspondents” between the time of the 
second letter and Lessing’s return to Berlin, both around June 1758. On this point 
Bamberger is correct, but it seems even more unlikely that Mendelssohn would have 
drawn up such an outline before he had received replies from Nicolai, as Bamberger 
suggests. Prior to receiving these replies, which were never written, Mendelssohn could 
not have known what form the four letters should take. Again, Briefe über Kunst has 
every appearance of being a work planned and executed by a single author. Finally, 
neither the finished letters, nor the outline for the additional two contain anything about 
“the essence of the beautiful sciences,” nor do they discuss the beautiful sciences (poetry 
and rhetoric) at all except in connection to music. Thematically, Briefe über Kunst has far 
more affinity to the issues raised in Mendelssohn’s other responses to Rousseau than 
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they do with the majority of the theory discussed in the Betrachtungen, which Nicolai 
had reported as being the spark for the planned correspondence. 
 There can be little doubt that Nicolai and Mendelssohn began collaborating on a 
correspondence about the “beautiful arts and sciences” in late 1757 to early 1758. But the 
only positive evidence specifically identifying Briefe über Kunst as part of that 
correspondence is the name “Theophrast.” And this is weak evidence indeed. Lessing 
had left Berlin for Leipzig in late 1755, and Mendelssohn had become close with Nicolai 
by early 1756. The two friends could have devised the nickname Theophrast for Lessing 
at any time before his return, and for any reason (Nicolai was especially thrilled with 
Mendelssohn’s use of Greek names in the Briefe über die Empfindungen, so this is not 
implausible). Most likely, then, Briefe über Kunst is a work entirely distinct from the 1757-
1758 planned correspondence on the beautiful arts and sciences. 
So, when was Briefe über Kunst written? We know that the “Sendschreiben” was 
completed in late 1755, and despite Goldstein’s claim that Briefe über Kunst is sui generis, 
it actually has much in common with this other work. Both are responses to Rousseau, 
and both share many of the same themes: that the highest good consists in a formal 
harmony of powers, that corruption occurs when one part of human nature is allowed to 
dominate others, and that the arts play at most a supporting role as a means toward 
ethical development. Now, Mendelssohn did not hold these views (at least not in such 
strict form) when he wrote the Briefe über die Empfindungen, which, for example, lacks 
any admonitions about the corrupting influences of art. And as we saw, he did not hold 
them in the Betrachtungen (1757) or the “Verwandtschaft des Schönen und Guten” (1757 
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or later). Thus Briefe über Kunst was probably written around the same time as the 
“Sendschreiben” – sometime between late 1755 and mid-1756. To deny this implausibly 
entails that Mendelssohn oscillated repeatedly between two very different worldviews. 
 But even on this interpretation, we must accept two changes of attitude: one 
between the Briefe über die Empfindungen and the Briefe über Kunst, and one between the 
Briefe über Kunst and the Betrachtungen. Why would Mendelssohn have changed his 
mind, and why did he change it back? To the first question, Mendelssohn most probably 
became temporarily convinced by part of Rousseau’s argument soon after he wrote the 
Briefe über die Empfindungen. While it is true that he never agreed with Rousseau’s overall 
skepticism about reason, he was certainly taken by Rousseau’s paean to virtue. This 
comes out in his December 26, 1755 letter to Lessing: “I can only disagree with Rousseau 
in very few places... if Rousseau had only not denied all morality to cultivated 
people!”263 But perhaps the best evidence of Mendelssohn’s infatuation with Rousseau’s 
thought is the content of the works in question themselves. What else but Rousseau’s 
Discourses could have led him to adopt such an stark view of the arts?  
Mendelssohn’s view likely began to soften in 1756 through his discussions with 
his new friend Nicolai, whose views the Briefe über Kunst were probably at one time 
meant to address. One can see an almost guilty self-reproach as Mendelssohn began to 
recognize his own change of heart in August 1756: 
We read poetry, Herr Nicolai reads his own drafts to me, I sit on my critical 
judge’s chair, admire, laugh, approve, and criticize until night falls… I’m rather 
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getting an idea of becoming a bel esprit.  Who knows whether I might sometime 
write a verse? Madame Metaphysics may forgive it.264 
 
By the end of 1756 , the change was complete, as shown most clearly by Mendelssohn’s 
alliance with Nicolai against Lessing’s claim that the purpose of drama is to improve 
morals (see Chapter 3). There was no longer any barrier preventing Mendelssohn from 
taking a more liberal view of the role of the arts in human life. In sum, Mendelssohn was 
indeed a moralizer who subjugated the arts to an austere ideal of virtue – but only for a 
short time in his early career, under the influence of Rousseau. His settled view is best 
represented by the Betrachtungen and “Verwandtschaft des Schönen und Guten.”  
Part 2: Key points in Mendelssohn’s theory of fine arts 
In Part 1 of this chapter, I argued that Mendelssohn meant to grant the arts a 
legitimate place of their own in human life. In this part, I briefly sketch out Mendelssoh’s 
view of the arts themselves in order to flesh out that claim. Mendelssohn’s Betrachtungen 
was the first German work to include an account of each of the fine arts: music, painting, 
poetry, rhetoric,265 architecture, and dance.266 While an analysis of each art is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation, certain general features of his account are of broader 
importance. 
First, Mendelssohn is careful to treat each type of art as an explainable 
modification of art in general (as described above). The arts are distinguished by the 
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type of “signs” they use for representation, as well as the type of objects best suited to be 
represented through them. Music, painting, architecture, and dance make use of natural 
signs in that they are actually similar, in some sense, to the objects they try to represent. 
Such arts belong to the “schöne Künste” (beaux arts). Poetry and rhetoric make use of 
arbitrary signs in that they succeed in representing their objects only by linguistic 
convention; these arts fall under the “schöne Wissenschaften” (belles lettres). The arts 
which use natural signs are categorized according to their characteristic sense modality, 
the arrangements of their signs (simultaneous or successive), and the perfections 
typically associated with them. For example, music is experienced through hearing, 
arranges its signs both simultaneously (harmony) and successively (melody), and is 
capable of perfectly representing “the passions of the human soul which can be cognized 
through [musical] sounds,”267 as well as formal qualities of order and agreement that are 
common to other arts. Mendelssohn makes extensive use of Hogarth’s theory of the 
beauty line in describing the perfections of the visual arts.   
Mendelssohn also provides an explanation of what he called the compound arts, 
e.g. song, theater, and opera. Each of these arts, he explains, has one of the basic types of 
art as primary. For example, in theater the primary art is poetry, even though it also 
contains elements of dance (movement and gesture broadly speaking). In song poetry is 
also primary, even though it also involves music. Because he conceived of the 
compound arts as combinations of the simple arts, Mendelssohn realized that he needed 
a general rule to adjudicate among potentially conflicting principles of the underlying 
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simple arts. This approach, which orders principles and then allows exceptions to the 
less important when a conflict arises, is a standard rationalist strategy first developed by 
Wolff and used extensively by Baumgarten in his theory of poetry. As an overall 
adjudicating rule, Mendelssohn suggests that the principle of the “primary art” should 
always take precedence over the principles of the other secondary or “helping” arts 
when there is a conflict. Only when a particular principle of the primary art conflicts with 
more general principles of the helping arts, in such a way that the composition of arts 
impossible, should the rule of the main art should be excepted.268  
Unfortunately, while Mendelssohn’s rule of the primacy of the primary art 
fulfills a theoretical requirement, it fails utterly as a rule for creating compound arts. For, 
it  entails that any rule of the primary art should, if at all possible, take precedence over 
all rules of the secondary arts in a compound work. But that is implausible. Compound 
works such as song and opera are typically products of compromise among all their 
various aspects, with no one part universally taking precedence. Perhaps there is some 
other, more nuanced principle that Mendelssohn could have invoked here. Or perhaps 
song, theater, and opera (etc.) deserve their own categories – but in this case it is not 
clear how Mendelssohn would have characterized them.269 
More broadly, Mendelssohn’s rather rigid characterization of the fine arts seems 
to be a product not only of his personal views (e.g. his need to give poetry precedence in 
song), but also of the early rationalist tradition. Along with Wolff and Gottsched’s 
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prescriptivism and intellectualism (see Chapter 1, Part 2) came a certain rigidity in which 
rules were held to be those appropriately operative in the specific arts. Wolff and 
Gottsched saw these rules as flowing from more or less fixed “species” of works (even 
though Gottsched was deeply aware of the historical development of art forms), just as 
the essential principles of an organism were thought to follow from its species-essence. 
Gottsched, for example, organizes his Versuch einen critischen Dichtkunst [Essay on a 
critical poetics]270 according to different types of poetry (lyric, epic, tragic, etc.) and lays 
down rules for each. This kind of categorization is also present in Baumgarten, but he 
tends to treat them more as conventional categories that can differ in degree, rather than 
fixed essences.  
As far as poetry goes, Mendelssohn tended to align himself with Baumgarten’s 
less rigid approach. For example, in one letter he chides Lessing for too rigidly 
observing the classical categories of drama.271 On the other hand, he does occasionally 
find fault with art for not conforming to the standards of their purported kind. For 
example, he criticizes the poet Karschin for misunderstanding the concept and proper 
execution of the ode.272 Nonetheless, Mendelssohn does not seem strongly committed to 
this form of criticism. When accused by Hamann of criticizing according to an arbitrary 
standard of “the novel,” Mendelssohn quickly clarified that he did not put stock in such 
judgments, but was judging according to the way Rousseau himself intended to express 
                                                 
270 Johann Christoph Gottsched, Versuch einer critischen Dichtkunst (Leipzig: Breitkopf, 1751). 
271 JubA, 11:99. 
272 JubA, 5.1:586. 
 109       
(possible) truth aesthetically.273 Most likely, Mendelssohn would have retracted his 
criticism of Karschin’s odes if he had been made aware of an alternative explanation for 
their apparent disorder. Nonetheless, this method of criticism is problematic, and 
Mendelssohn would have done well to justify and explain his use of it, especially given 
the way he divides the fine arts in general. 
Art and nature 
Another significant commentary on art appears in a series of Mendelssohn’s 
Literaturbriefe reviewing C.F. Flögel’s Einleitung in die Erfindungskunst [Introduction to the 
art of invention].274 In these essays, written in late 1760, Mendelssohn distinguishes art 
from 1) making in general; 2) science; and 3) nature. The first two distinctions mostly 
follow long-established rationalist tropes. But Mendelssohn’s comments on art and 
nature are both original and deeply influential. 
Flögel held that art can be understood in three ways: most generally, it is the 
process or product of making or bringing forth something; more specifically, art is the 
making of something that nature would not produce on its own; and most specifically or 
strictly, it encompasses productions that are “not scientific,” namely music, dance, 
painting, and sculpture – those productions designated as schöne Künste (beautiful 
arts). According to Flögel, poetry and rhetoric are in the strictest sense not arts because 
they belong to the schönen Wissenschaften (the beautiful sciences). In his review, 
Mendelssohn points out that this supposedly sharp distinction between the schönen 
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Wissenschaften and the schönen Künsten rests on an artifact of translation: “Schöne 
Wissenschaften” is simply a rendition of the French belles lettres, which suggests neither 
the concept of “science” nor any sharp contrast with the “arts.” Thus Mendelssohn 
writes, “I’m amazed that… from these words [Flögel] wants to show that art and science 
are [fundamentally] different.”275 In his own essay on the fine arts, Mendelssohn had 
argued that the differentia specifica of the schönen Künsten (belles lettres) is that they make 
use of artificial rather than natural signs. But they do not differ from the schönen 
Künsten (beaux arts) qua art. 
Mendelssohn also points out that Flögel wrongly ignored part of Aristotle’s 
original definition: art is not simply making, but making cum recta ratione (with right 
reason), i.e. creation according to proper principles. Yet Mendelssohn himself does not 
exactly agree with the Aristotelian definition of art, because he thinks it is too one-sided. 
He writes instead: 
One calls the collection of theoretical propositions [Erwägungssätze] which agree 
with the certain cognition of a thing science, but the collection of practical 
propositions [Ausübungssätze] which agree with the carrying out of an end is 
called art.276 
 
“Erwägungsatz” is Wolff’s translation of propositio theoretica, which according to his 
Logica is a theorem, while “Ausübungssatz” is his translation of propositio practica, which 
is the statement of a problem to be solved. Wolff himself had made broad use of these 
concepts – for example, to establish principles and solve problems in architecture in his 
Architectura civilis. As Mendelssohn further explains, “Art relates to science as the 
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solving of a problem relates to a theorem. The former teaches what is to be done if a 
certain purpose is to be achieved, and the latter what is attributed to a certain subject 
under this or that condition.”277 He concludes, “In this sense there are as many arts as 
there are ends which one can seek to carry out.”278 Thus, Mendelssohn considers art to 
be a body of facts – facts about how to effect a given end – that is itself independent of 
particular human ends. The Aristotelian definition is valid, but only if we consider art 
subjectively, as a certain kind of knowledge about these facts (called a skill) that allows 
us to produce things “with right reason.”279 This passage is a clear demonstration that 
Mendelssohn hewed to the standard rationalist view that the ends of art may be freely 
chosen, but that there are objectively correct means for achieving the chosen end. These 
rules are the embodiment of the art itself. 
Mendelssohn explains the final and most interesting distinction between art and 
nature in the following way: 
For the realization of any end a series of actions and alterations is required that 
are the means to this aim; and insofar as they all agree as means to their end, 
they are also connected among each other. Besides this ideal connection, 
however, there is also a physical connection, according to which these means 
themselves can belong together as effects and causes; and in this lies the whole 
secret to be explained! When an end is achieved through such means that stand 
only in the first [ideal] connection, it is a work of art; but if they stand not only in 
the first, but also in the second [physical] connection, or to express myself more 
distinctly, when the means, through which an end is achieved, not only 
harmonize with this end, but are also connected among themselves in such a 
way that one is the efficient cause of another, then the obtained end is a work of 
nature…. 
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The means the artist used to create the Laocoon all agree with his overall 
intention, but among themselves they do not stand in any further connection, 
and all the things that he carried out in the completion of his artwork followed 
merely arbitrarily from one another [i.e. with respect to each other]. That’s why 
one says this Laocoon is no work of nature, but a work of art. – But the plant 
that’s growing here? This one can consider in a double aspect. One looks either at 
the excellent harmony of all means to a single purpose, and says, the growth of 
the plant is proceeding extremely artificially, or one considers the means to the 
growth as they are physically connected among each other as effects and causes, 
and says just as rightly, the growth of the plant is a work of nature. You see from 
this that the natural actually does not exclude the artificial. All works of nature 
are at the same time artificial in the highest degree. But by contrast one calls 
those things entirely artificial which are not natural, and which arose through 
voluntary means, insofar as they agree to a [common] end.280 
 
While Mendelssohn is certainly more dogmatic about the existence of natural purposes, 
this still amounts to an account of nature and art essentially equivalent to the one Kant 
would publish over 30 years later.281 The account, though certainly due to Kant’s 
expression of it, became extremely influential in the era of German Romanticism and 
Idealism. Furthermore, Mendelssohn, unlike Kant, recognized the immediate practical 
implication of this theory for artists: 
The beautiful arts and sciences have the aim to please. The virtuoso must 
therefore apply all means which lead him to this goal. Now when we notice the 
effort to please all too distinctly, and therefore more the agreement of the means 
to the end as their natural connection among each other, we say it is too artificial 
[gekünstelt]. But if the artist connects his means – setting aside their agreement 
to the end – among each other in such a way that they flow unforced from each 
other, then we say rightly, he knew to conceal the art, it is all nature in his 
works.282 
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Chapter 3: Tragedy 
As we saw in previous chapters, Mendelssohn held the following four theses: 
1. Pleasure is the intuition of perfection. 
2. Art should aim to depict a thing not as it is, but rather as it would be “if the 
beauty of this object had been nature’s sole aim”283 
3. One with correct (or “good”) taste feels pleasure at objects in which 
perfection really (and not merely apparently) outweighs imperfection. 
4. Art has ethical value because it instills in us a love of perfection. 
 
Tragedy seems to be a decisive counterexample against each of these. It gives us a 
profound pleasure despite depicting great suffering and misfortune, which are certainly 
imperfections. Tragic poets generally do not idealize; in fact, they usually choose more 
misfortunate objects than those familiar from ordinary life. Yet tragedy was traditionally 
considered one of the highest—if not the highest—forms of poetry, so one could hardly 
claim that people who enjoy tragedy did so only out of bad taste. Even Gottsched, the 
strictest of the rationalist aestheticians, made no attempt to deny the pleasure and value 
of tragedy. How Mendelssohn responded to these challenges is the subject of this 
chapter. 
Account of tragic pleasure in the Briefe über die Empfindungen 
Mendelssohn first raises the problem of tragic pleasure in his 1755 Briefe über die 
Empfindungen. In the eighth letter, he has Euphranor, the foil for Mendelssohn’s view, 
argue against Palemon, Mendelssohn’s spokesman, as follows: 
Even you, Palemon! How often has that painting which is displayed in my 
father’s chamber not far from the entrance delighted you? It is of a ship, 
threatened by destruction from all sides. The foaming waves crash ceaselessly 
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against its fragile structure, which [seems to] rush to be engulfed by the flood. 
The oarsmen labor futilely; sweat runs down their faces in vain. The ship falters. 
Now it will be knocked over and sunk into the abyss. How grimly everyone who 
sees unavoidable death before their eyes struggles with their exhausted hands! 
… And this sight pleased you, Palemon? You called it beautiful? It is true, you 
admired the master who knew to imitate nature so skillfully. But was that all? 
Admit it, Palemon! You would have been less pleased if the danger had not been 
depicted in the highest degree. … And you find pleasure in it? Shouldn’t the 
unhappy thought that these men are subjected to such misfortune horrify you? 
How does this rhyme with your theory? Consider it well, Palemon. Suppose we 
remembered in every moment that our fear is [merely] an artistic deception; then 
this comforting thought can indeed alleviate our pain, but the object itself can for 
that reason offer no pleasure. At the representation of a tragedy we remain, not 
attending to this comfort, more and more melancholic, more and more sad, and 
this sadness, this melancholy, has unspeakable charm for us. Even the most 
cheerful youth gladly gives up his joy, and crowns the poet who possesses the 
terrible skill to bring him to tears.284 
 
In the conclusion to the Briefe, Euphranor admits that he learned of this objection 
from Dubos, for whom pleasure derives from the subjective activity of the mind in 
considering extraordinary objects, regardless of the moral content of those objects. By 
way of response, Mendelssohn explains how tragic pleasure is rooted in perfection after 
all. Whenever we seem to take pleasure in imperfection, Mendelssohn explains, the 
pleasure is actually grounded in either the skill of the performers, or pity. (This account 
does not yet grapple with the sublime, which is discussed in Chapter 5). Pleasure in 
skill, a bodily perfection, is generally connected to spectacle, e.g. tightrope acts, 
performances with swords, and Roman gladiator fights. In these cases (especially the 
last), we can take pleasure purely in skill even if we feel no pity for the performers. 
Pleasure in tragedy, by contrast, is characteristically based on pity. Pity, Mendelssohn 
claims, is “the only unpleasant sentiment which charms us, and that which is known as 
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fear in tragedies is nothing but a pity that suddenly overtakes us, for the danger does 
not threaten ourselves, but the person for whom we feel sorry.”285 But why does this pity 
please, and what does it have to do with perfection? As Mendelssohn explains, pity is 
a mixture of pleasant and unpleasant sentiments… [specifically] the love of an 
object which is connected with the concept of misfortune, of a physical evil, that 
happened to it undeservedly. Love is grounded in perfection, and the concept of 
an undeserved misfortune makes the innocent loved one more dear to us and 
increases the worth of his excellences. This is the nature of our sentiments. When 
some bitter drops are mixed into the honey-sweet skin of pleasure, they improve 
the taste of pleasure and double its sweetness.286 
 
One common view of pity at the time, generally identified with Hobbes but also 
endorsed by Shaftesbury and Gottsched, is that pity arises when I observe the 
misfortune of another and then imagine that I could suffer the same fate.287 This makes 
pity a form of self-love. As the passage shows, Mendelssohn did not accept this view. 
Instead, he largely followed Wolff,288 who taught that love is grounded in the perfection 
of the object loved. And, according to Wolff, I share in the pleasures and pains of one I 
love, with the latter being the feeling of pity. If this is true, it follows that pity always 
presupposes love of another, and thus always involves a perception of perfection and a 
corresponding pleasure. As Mendelssohn explains in the passage, pity is always 
connected to love, so that it always has a pleasurable aspect. Further, he plausibly claims 
that this pleasurable aspect will be felt more strongly when it is contrasted with the 
misfortune that gives rise to pity. But this explanation raises a new problem: If pity 
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always contains something pleasurable grounded in perfection, why does it often feel 
just painful when those I love suffer? And what makes tragic drama different, so that the 
pity involved in it is pleasurable?  
According to Dubos in his Critical Reflections, tragedy is pleasurable simply 
because it is moving. While unpleasant passions are involved, these remain “as it were 
on the surface of the heart” through our realization that the depiction is fictive.289 But 
this answer will not do for Mendelssohn for two reasons. First, he had rejected Dubos’ 
purely psychological account of pleasure, insisting that it must be explained through the 
perception of perfection. Second, as Euphranor points out, if we focus on the fictional 
nature of the depiction, our pleasure is actually destroyed. So, Mendelssohn attempts a 
different answer. First, he argues that pleasure cannot result when the perception of the 
misfortune and the perception of perfection are directly opposed: 
When the melancholical remembrance of that wretched person… arrives at the 
concept of a present happiness, we pour out friendly tears; tears that are the 
height of all joys. Why? The concept of a past imperfection no longer quarrels 
against the concept of present perfection. Both can exist with each other, and that 
makes us more sensitive to the feeling of pleasure… If this present fortune were 
not complete, if some pestering circumstances remained, which presently still 
pain us, this would rub out a part of our joy, and noticeably reduce its degree.290 
 
Now, this much seems true enough. But what does it have to do with tragedy, 
which by its nature often has no such happy resolution? Both Aristotle and more 
recently Addison had pointed out that the best tragedy leaves the hero suffering at the 
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end.291 In fact, it seems that this explanation implies either that tragedy should not be 
pleasurable, or Mendelssohn did not understand what tragedy is! 
Fortunately, we can at least rule out the latter possibility based on the final 
example Mendelssohn provides in the Briefe: 
If such a thing (as in a tragedy) happened in reality it would be unbearable, 
because our displeasure at the misfortune would far exceed the pleasure that 
arises from love; but it pleases on the stage nonetheless. For the remembrance 
that it is nothing but an artistic deception alleviates our pain to some degree (see 
letter 5), and leaves only so much of it remaining as necessary to give our love 
the required fullness.”292 
 
So, Mendelssohn agrees that the pity of tragedy is pleasurable only insofar as we 
realize that its object is fictional and illusory. This realization supposedly reduces the 
painful aspect of pity by the perfect amount, making the overall sentiment highly 
pleasurable. However, this explanation is dubious. Why would the realization of illusion 
reduce displeasure by just the right amount, while not also reducing our pleasure in the 
equally illusory perfection? It seems Mendelssohn is faced with a dilemma: either we 
believe the depiction is truthful, which would simply make us upset (as he admits), or 
we notice that it is not, in which case the perfection, the pity, and the overall sentiment 
would be severely reduced, as Euphranor had pointed out in his ship example. One 
possible reply is that once we notice the play is fictional, we no longer believe that 
anyone actually suffered, but we may continue to believe that people ought to be as good 
and virtuous as those depicted. In other words, in a play any real suffering is false, but 
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the ideal perfection depicted, as ideal, need not be. Yet this does not really solve the 
problem. For the characters need not be ideally good and virtuous for the play to 
produce tragic pleasure in us. Indeed, according to the traditional view, tragic characters 
should be neither extremely virtuous nor extremely base, but something in between.293 
Further, as Mendelssohn claimed, even a small amount of imperfection tends to reduce 
pleasure when it is “directly opposed” to the perfection of the loved person. Of course, 
in tragedy, the hero is typically subject to a large amount of misfortune. Mendelssohn’s 
explanation here is just not adequate. 
Plato’s ethical challenge to tragedy 
Nor had Mendelssohn yet faced the full brunt of the issue. Beyond the 
psychological-metaphysical challenge of tragic pleasure lay another, even thornier 
ethical problem. Although Mendelssohn tackled the general claim that the arts corrupt 
morals elsewhere (see Chapter 2), his reply does not seem directly applicable to tragedy, 
at least not without further explanation. According to that reply, the basis of the 
goodness of art and its edifying character lay in its perfection – but the nature of 
tragedy, it seems, is to depict imperfection. This is perhaps why Plato singles out 
tragedy again and again in his critique of art, saying that the “weightiest charge” against 
tragic imitation is that it makes us into less virtuous people:  
If you consider… that when in misfortune we feel a natural hunger and desire to 
relieve our sorrow by weeping and lamentation, and that this feeling which is 
kept under control in our own calamities is satisfied and delighted by the poets;-
the better nature in each of us, not having been sufficiently trained by reason or 
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habit, allows the sympathetic element to break loose because the sorrow is 
another's; and the spectator fancies that there can be no disgrace to himself in 
praising and pitying anyone who comes telling him what a good man he is, and 
making a fuss about his troubles; he thinks that the pleasure is a gain, and why 
should he be supercilious and lose this and the poem too? Few persons ever 
reflect, as I should imagine, that from the evil of other men something of evil is 
communicated to themselves.294  
 
As we saw, Mendelssohn ultimately views the value of aesthetic phenomena as 
being grounded in an ethical value: promotion of the love of perfection, which is the 
highest good. But how can tragedy do this? Why should we not insist, with Plato, that 
the only ethically defensible poems are encomiums to the gods and the state, which 
serve explicitly to  promote the love of perfection? 
Mendelssohn was aware of two existing responses to Plato’s challenge from the 
earliest days of his career. The first comes from Aristotle, who had claimed that tragedy 
“through pity and fear effects the proper catharsis of these emotions.”295 The concept of 
catharsis is not well explained in Aristotle’s surviving works, but he seems to mean at 
least that tragedy tends to free us from the aspects of the passions that are ethically 
problematic in life, whereas Plato had claimed that tragedy merely indulges us in and 
enslaves us to these passions. 
The second response comes out of the modern German rationalist tradition, 
under the heavy influence of the French mode of drama.296 In his seminal 1730 work 
Versuch einer critischen Dichtkunst [Essay on a critical poetics], Gottsched argued that 
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tragedy should be understood as a moral fable which aims to communicate a central 
“moral principle”.297 Specifically, it shows the audience how terrible misfortune can 
result from a bad action or a flaw of character, so that they will strive to avoid these 
flaws and actions. In this way, he gave tragedy a straightforward, morally edifying 
purpose.  
However, in a 1729 speech entitled “Dramas, and particularly tragedies, are not 
to be banned from a well-ordered republic,” Gottsched offers a somewhat different 
account of the ethics of tragedy. 298 He begins by citing agreement with Aristotle’s idea of 
catharsis, which he notably understands as the bringing of passions “into their 
appropriate limits.”299 Although he claims explicitly that “a tragedy… is a didactic moral 
poem… an allegorical fable that has a central lesson as its end,”300 his actual description 
of tragedy in this work focuses more on its effect on the emotions. “Tragedy is a picture 
[Bild] of cases of misfortune that the great of the world encounter, and which is either 
borne by them heroically and steadfastly, or nobly overcome. It is a school of patience 
and wisdom, a preparation for misery, an encouragement to virtue, a chastisement of 
vice.”301 A good tragedy must be well-constructed so that it arouses the passions, a 
necessary condition for engaging the audience and producing catharsis. This is in fact 
the advantage of tragedy over history and other veridical representations: Through 
                                                 
297 Gottsched, Critische Dichtkunst, “Anderer besonderer Theil,” Kapitel X, §11, §15. 
298 This speech was almost certainly given around the same time the Versuch was being written, so the 
difference in his views here is rather mysterious. 
299 Johann Christoph Gottsched, “Die Schauspiele und besonders die Tragödien sind aus einer 
wohlbestellten Republik nicht zu verbannen” in Ausführliche Redekunst: nach Anleitung der allen 
Griechen und Romer, wie auch der neuern Ausländer (Leipzig, Bernh. Christoph Breitkopf, 1739), 662. 
300 Ibid. 
301 Ibid. 
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poetic ornamentation and license the poet makes “one see, as it were, the living colors 
[of the things depicted] before one’s eyes.”302 Gottsched specifically points out that 
tragedy can show us characters acting nobly in the face of misfortune: “I admire 
[bewundere] such heroes. I revere their perfection. I conceive a noble purpose to imitate 
them, and feel a secret ambition to become no worse than them.”303 
It would be pointless to argue that tragedy doesn’t succeed in improving 
people’s morals, Gottsched continues, for the very same could be said of distinct moral 
lectures. “It takes thousands of preparations, experiences, examples, and 
encouragements to it, before a vicious person lets go of his [evil] way. It’s enough that a 
tragedy contributes something – in fact, very much – to that.”304 And unlike a boring 
sermon, tragedy ends up affecting people for the good even if they are only after 
pleasure. “They seek only charm [Anmuth], and find use; they strive for sweets, and 
find the nutritious food hidden beneath.”305  
Notably, Gottsched recognizes that in some tragedies a truly virtuous person 
ends up suffering while an evil person does well. In such cases, Gottsched claims, at 
least for well-constructed tragedy “innocence is always represented as triumphant, and 
evil as damnable. And even if the former appears unhappy and the latter happy, both 
still appear in the beauty and ugliness appropriate to them.”306 On this point Gottsched 
returns to the “moral lesson” view, writing that through tragedy one should learn “it is 
                                                 
302 Gottsched, “Die Schauspiele,” 664. 
303 Ibid. 
304 Gottsched, “Die Schauspiele,” 667. 
305 Gottsched, “Die Schauspiele,” 668. 
306 Gottsched, “Die Schauspiele,” 667. 
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better to suffer innocently than become great and fortunate through vice.”307 Overall, his 
view is ambiguous between the “moral fable” and the “ennobling effect on the passions” 
approaches. And, Gottsched does not explain what it could mean for a suffering person 
to be depicted as beautiful (etc.), if beauty is sensible perfection but suffering is 
(generally sensible) imperfection. 
Gottsched revisited the issue of depicting the unresolved suffering of the 
virtuous and unresolved fortune of the vicious in a speech given in 1751.308 There, he 
offers three reasons why such depictions ought to be permitted on the stage. First, 
following Addison,309 he explains that because tragedy is an imitation of nature, it ought 
to be a true reflection of the actual world, not of “an idealized world, let alone a Platonic 
Republic.”310 In the actual world, of course, we often see virtuous people suffer while 
vicious people become wealthy and powerful. Second, while he insists that in the actual 
world vice eventually leads to misfortune and virtue eventually leads to reward, this often 
takes place on a timescale of “weeks, months, or years.” As a strict adherent to the 
traditional three unities of drama, Gottsched believed that the stage may only depict a 
single action taking place “over a 12 or 15 hour period.”311 Thus, tragedy is not the right 
sort of representation to show every resolution of virtue and vice. Finally, he argues that 
                                                 
307 Gottsched, “Die Schauspiele,” 666. 
308 Johann Christoph Gottsched, “Ob man in theatralischen Gedichten allezeit die Tugend als belohnt, 
und das Laster als bestraft vorstellen müsse?” in Gesammelte Schriften von Johann Christoph Gottsched, 
ed. Reichel (Berlin: Gottsched-Verlag, 1906), 6:265-284.To demonstrate to his princely audience for this 
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work: “Die Tugend betteln geht, der Tor in Kutschen sitzt / Viel stolzer als sein Ross, dass sie mit Kot 
bespritzt” (6:276). 
309 Addison, Spectator, No. 40, 1:205. 
310 Gottsched, Gesammelte Schriften, 6:278. 
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natural moral sentiment causes people to love virtuous characters despite, and even 
more strongly in their suffering, while vicious people are naturally hated, and all the 
more so if they enjoy good fortune. 
The first two of these arguments is extremely problematic. As Aristotle had 
pointed out, tragedy need not depict the world only as it is, but may also show it as it 
ought to be. This view had not only liberated aestheticians (including the rationalists) 
from advocating the slavish copying of nature, but it also formed the basis of 
Mendelssohn’s ideal of art, as described above. The second argument is based on an 
extremely weak assumption (the necessity of the three unities) that was about to be 
decisively challenged by the Sturm und Drang movement. While Mendelssohn tended to 
accept the three unities, he was more allowing of exceptions (Shakespeare’s plays, e.g.) 
and would never have based the justification of tragedy on such a dogmatic claim. The 
third point about natural sentiment is perhaps more promising, but it is left 
undeveloped, and Gottsched does not explain how this idea might or might not be 
compatible with his original view that tragedy is a moral fable which depicts a central 
moral lesson. 
Mendelssohn first touched on the ethics of tragedy in his Briefe über die 
Empfindungen. In the ninth letter, Euphranor points out that our revulsion to unvirtuous 
fictional characters is resolved into pity only at the moment when they commit suicide. 
Since pity only arises out of love, if we previously found a character to be morally 
repugnant, then it seems we must end up loving and approving of him or her precisely 
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because of the suicide. Euphranor thinks that this gives us reason to believe suicide is 
morally permissible, and that the character who commits the act is virtuous.312  
In his reply, Palemon makes clear that he will have none of this. Suicide is no 
demonstration that a character has acted in a truly virtuous way. For, “The stage has its 
own313 morality. In life nothing is morally good that is not grounded in our perfection; 
on the stage, however, it is everything which has its ground in strong passion. The 
purpose of tragedy is to arouse passion. Therefore suicide is theatrically good.” Indeed, 
“the poet must carefully conceal the debate about true morality” lest her stirring 
depictions of immoral acts become repulsive. “Our pity, which had barely begun to raise 
itself, would change into repulsion in the mirror of true morality.”314 
In this passage, Mendelssohn clearly denies that our feeling of pity at a fictional 
suicide is any indication that suicide is actually virtuous. But the pity nonetheless 
indicates that we have love for the character, so at least for the time we are considering 
him as perfect. And if the deed is not actually perfect, why do we even consider it to be? 
Mendelssohn’s answer is simply to insist that the love involved in pity is always based 
on the positive, perfect properties of the character. He offers the following example: as a 
condemned prisoner is being marched to execution, everyone feels anger and hate 
toward the deed and cheers on the proceedings. But as the executioner draws near, 
everyone begins to pity him and even wants desperately to see him freed. The reason 
must be some small amount of love we feel for his person, contrasted with the imminent 
                                                 
312 JubA, 1:79-80. 
313 Mendelssohn originally has “besondere;” this is changed to “eigene” in the 1761 edition. 
314 JubA, 1:94-95. 
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onset of physical evil. Just as the execution itself is not the primary source of pleasure, 
neither is the suicide in Euphranor’s objection.315 The immoral act simply brings out our 
latent love for the other, perfect aspects of the character.316 
Mendelssohn’s claim that “the stage has its own morality” has often been read as 
meaning that Mendelssohn radically liberated tragedy from any dependence on ethics 
or ethical accountability.317 But the text simply does not bear this out. Certainly 
Mendelssohn is rejecting Gottsched’s account of tragedy as moral fable. But this does not 
entail that tragedians ought to disregard all ethical considerations when creating their 
works. Nonetheless, it is important for Mendelssohn to clarify what he means by “the 
stage has its own morality,” and exactly how he understands tragedy to relate to ethics. 
He would work through these questions in his subsequent correspondence with Lessing. 
                                                 
315 JubA, 1:111. According to Wolfgang Ranke, Theatermoral: moralische Argumentation und dramatische 
Kommunikation in der Tragödie der Aufklärung (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2009), 
Mendelssohn thinks that “in the theater we don’t react to the suicide as suicide, but as… a sign of 
regret [Reue]” (28). In other words, such immoral actions on the stage have a functional or 
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(29). Ranke’s argument that Mendelssohn accepted such a functional role for immoral actions is 
persuasive, but his suggestion that Mendelssohn thinks this is the only basis for our affective reaction 
is too strong and unsupported by the text. 
316 This passage also shows that Mendelssohn was fully aware of, and indeed addressed, the worry 
that “it is possible to take pity on an imperfect or even evil character when they suffer greatly” (Beiser, 
Diotama’s Children, 209). It is therefore unlikely that this consideration would have induced 
Mendelssohn to downplay the importance of pity in tragedy, and in any case (as discussed further 
below) he never did downplay the importance of pity (cf. Beiser, Diotima’s Children, 208-209).  
317 Altmann, Frühschriften, 153; Segreff, Moses Mendelssohn, 93; Beiser, Diotima’s Children, 210 (though 
he thinks Mendelssohn later changed his view); Ranke, Theatermoral, 33-34; perhaps Hammermeister, 
German Aesthetic Tradition, 19 – he does allow that “art… fulfills ethical purposes” but does not 
coherently explain how this is so in the case of tragedy. Goldstein reads “the stage has its own 
morality” narrowly, to mean simply that “the morally good is not without further [condition] also 
theatrically good” (26). This is not a very plausible interpretation, as no one had held the view 
Goldstein is having Mendelssohn deny. Goldstein also takes issue with Mendelssohn’s attribution of 
morality to the stage, calling it incoherent (Moses Mendelssohn, 27), but he later provides a somewhat 
more nuanced reading of Mendelssohn’s view about tragedy and ethics (31-34). 
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The correspondence on tragedy with Lessing and Nicolai 
 Around October of 1755 Lessing moved from Berlin to Leipzig, leaving 
Mendelssohn to develop his friendship with Friedrich Nicolai, a critic and publisher. In 
mid-1756, Nicolai wrote to Lessing to ask his opinion of an essay he had recently 
written, titled Abhandlung vom Trauerspiele [Treatise on tragic drama].318 This letter would 
end up sparking a lively and important correspondence about tragedy, mostly between 
Lessing and Mendelssohn. Because Nicolai’s essay itself was “unter der Presse” at the 
time of writing, Nicolai initially supplied Lessing with only a summary of his main 
points, of which two were most significant. First, Nicolai argues that the purpose of 
tragedy is neither the purification of the passions nor the improvement of morals. He 
complains that this turns tragedy into “a school of virtue,” a view he falsely attributes to 
Aristotle319 – though as we saw, it really applied to Gottsched and his followers, as well 
as many adherents of the classical French school of drama.320 This attitude explains, 
                                                 
318 Friedrich Nicolai, Abhandlung vom Trauerspiele  in Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften und freyen 
Künste (Leipzig: Dyck, 1757), 1:17-68. 
319 Nicolai, Abhandlung, 22. 
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writes Nicolai, why “so many German tragedies are so terrible.”321 Instead, he argues, 
the purpose of tragedy should be to arouse the passions – the more strongly, the 
better.322 Second, Nicolai argues that the passions most effective in moving the audience 
are not only fear and pity, as Aristotle held, but also Bewunderung – admiration or 
wonder. In fact, Nicolai held that the proper aim of one type of tragedy (which he terms 
“heroic”) is to arouse admiration.323 
 In his first letter of the correspondence, Lessing expresses disagreement with 
Nicolai’s central claim. The purpose of tragedy, he claims, is to improve morals, and the 
arousal of the passions is the means by which it achieves this end. He also denies that the 
arousal of any emotion other than pity should be essential to tragedy. Lessing goes so far 
as to say that “fear and admiration aren’t [even] passions, as I understand them.”324 He 
claims that these emotions are to be explained as dependent modes of pity: We feel fear 
in a tragedy at the sudden onset of pity, while we feel admiration at its resolution. That 
is, Lessing thinks that we begin to feel admiration for someone when we stop feeling 
sorry for them because we begin to pay attention to their good qualities instead.325 
Lessing is motivated to defend the essentiality of pity for tragedy precisely because he 
thinks that arousing pity is the surest means (proper to tragedy) of promoting virtue in 
                                                 
321 Lessing, Werke, ed. Herbert G. Göpfert (München: Hanser, 1970), 4:58. I will generally cite the 
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322 Nicolai, Abhandlung, 19. 
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324 Lessing, Werke, 4:161. 
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the audience. For, as he famously claims, “the most pitying person is the best person, the 
most well-disposed to all social virtues and to every kind of magnanimity.”326 
 Mendelssohn’s entry into the debate consists largely of a forceful defense of the 
role of admiration in tragedy. He calls on Lessing to “apologize” to admiration, which 
he says is no derivative emotion, but an independent passion that is “grounded in 
uncommonly good properties.”327 While he does not go so far as to argue explicitly that 
arousing admiration is the only or even the primary goal of the tragic poet, he does refer 
to admiration as “the mother of virtue.”328 By this, he means that the feeling of 
admiration for one who is virtuous leads us to imitate that person, which makes us more 
virtuous. He even chides Greek tragedy for “never having brought admiration-worthy 
characters onto the stage,” at least not any “who would deserve admiration from the 
side of his morality.”329 Mendelssohn’s emphasis on admiration is entirely new in his 
thought, for as we saw, Mendelssohn had recently argued that tragic pleasure is based 
on pity alone. Lessing’s reduction of fear to a form of pity is even taken from 
Mendelssohn’s Briefe über die Empfindungen.330 
While Mendelssohn does not directly address the issue of the end of tragedy in 
his initial reply, he had already endorsed the view that “the end of tragedy is to arouse 
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327 Lessing, Werke, 4:168. 
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the passions” in the Briefe über die Empfindungen, and he would continue to resist 
Lessing’s position throughout at least most of the correspondence. Since Mendelssohn 
was united with Nicolai on this central issue, and because the two were working 
together closely throughout the correspodence, it will be helpful to see how Nicolai 
understood the role of ethics in his treatise. 
Although in his letter Nicolai perhaps gave Lessing the impression that he was 
completely unconcerned with the effect of tragedy on the virtue of the audience, his 
Abhandlung itself gives a very different perspective. There, Nicolai is careful to clarify 
that tragedy at least shouldn’t go against morality. Although the poet can represent 
actions driven by passion or prejudice – as are disallowed by true morality – he cannot 
let this aesthetic depiction “conflict” with true morality. 
He must represent such disallowed action in such a way that either they flow 
from good but not rightly applied motivations, or through strong passion, so that 
the acting person could be excused, so that we sooner feel sorry for the person 
who committed the act than want to represent them as a model for ourselves. 
Otherwise [the poet’s] tragedy would be not only damaging, since it would seem 
to justify improper principles, but it would also fail in its highest purpose, 
namely being moving, since the audience will constantly revolt against him, and 
would want to have nothing of these actions that go against the principles which 
are implanted in them by nature.331 
 
As Nicolai goes on to clarify, poets need not always represent the virtuous as 
rewarded and the vicious as punished, but they will in fact miss the highest end of 
tragedy, the arousal of the passions, unless they represent the virtuous as worthy of love 
and the vicious as repulsive in the way he described. Otherwise, he explains, we will be 
unable to sympathize with the characters, and our feeling will be destroyed by the 
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unbearable contradiction between our idea of good and the evil of the characters.332 
Nicolai plainly takes Plato’s challenge seriously, and there are even clear echoes of 
Gottsched’s discussion of undeserved suffering. In a sense, Nicolai connected the 
explanations Gottsched provided in his speeches: the poet must represent the vicious 
person as ugly even in his fortune, etc. because we are naturally inclined to hate vice; if 
the vicious person is depicted as beautiful then this will conflict with our natural feeling.  
In sum, Nicolai insists that moral considerations must be a constraint on good 
tragedy, even if the improvement of morals is not its purpose. From a practical 
perspective, this means that a morally edifying effect is neither necessary nor sufficient 
for good tragedy. A playwright need not make moral edification a goal while creating, 
but must only be careful to avoid encouraging people to become immoral. The critic 
ought not disapprove of a work simply because she cannot say what it contributes to 
morals, but may still attack it on grounds that it is actively harmful to the virtue of its 
audience. Despite these limitations, Nicolai held that both artists and critics must be 
mindful of morality because our affective response to a drama depends deeply on our 
moral judgments. 
 Nicolai’s view, while certainly plausible as far as it goes, does not seem a good 
response to Plato’s challenge. He agrees with Plato that art should not be harmful to 
morals, but fails to address Plato’s central claim that tragedy is inherently damaging to 
morals – not just in this or that case, but in general. Already in his first letter, 
Mendelssohn attempts to get beyond Nicolai’s view by intimating an account of how 
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tragedy can contribute positively to morals – namely, by arousing admiration. Does this 
mean that Mendelssohn thought a morally edifying effect is indispensable to good 
tragedy? If so, would he have to concede that improving morals is the end of tragedy 
after all? Answers to these questions must wait for the end of the correspondence. 
Mendelssohn also seems to have become dissatisfied with the psychological account of 
tragic pleasure he had provided in his Briefe über die Empfindungen, possibly for the 
reasons noted in the above section. In any case, he had discovered that pity alone could 
not explain what he took to be most ethically inspiring and aesthetically pleasing in 
tragedy. Let us now continue to consider the development of the debate. 
The debate continues 
 In his first letter to Mendelssohn (his second of the debate), Lessing defends the 
role of pity against Mendelssohn’s favored sentiment of admiration. Pity is more 
suitable than admiration in improving virtue, he argues, because many of the heroic 
qualities which we admire in characters do not, and indeed ought not, produce imitation 
in real life. For example, we admire the obstinacy of Cato—but only because Cato is a 
virtuous man; we do not and ought not attempt to imitate this obstinacy in general.333 
Lessing argues that in order to produce imitation and thereby to improve virtue, 
admiration requires a distinct cognition of the perfection to be imitated. “How many 
have this cognition? And where it’s lacking, doesn’t admiration remain unfruitful?” he 
                                                 
333 Later in the same letter, Lessing disavows the part in which he made this claim, but it is taken up by 
Mendelssohn nonetheless. The example of Cato is almost certainly borrowed from Gottsched’s 
“Trauerspiele,” 664. 
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asks.334 Pity is more suited to improvement, he claims, because it betters everyone 
immediately and regardless of their understanding. 
 In his reply, Mendelssohn writes that he will explain why admiration sometimes 
induces a desire to imitate and other times does not. However, he is primarily interested 
in clarifying Lessing’s claims about the necessity of distinct cognition for imitation. All 
our judgments are either based on confused, intuitive cognition or distinct, symbolic 
cognition, Mendelssohn explains. He uses this distinction to reiterate and clarify his 
earlier claim that the stage has its own morality:  
Theatrical morals do not belong in the court of symbolic [i.e., distinct] cognition. 
If the poet, through his perfectly sensible discourse, can convince our intuitive 
cognition of the dignity and disgrace of his characters, then he has our approval. 
We gladly obscure the distinct rational argument which opposes itself to our 
illusion, just as we put ourselves into another climate, into other circumstances, 
and among other men by means of illusion, in order to feel the strength of the 
[poetic] imitation really forcefully.335 
 
Now, writes Mendelssohn, while only distinct cognition gives us truth with certainty, 
the sensible (clear but confused) cognition characteristic of drama often has more 
influence on our will. Mendelssohn notes that he has “newly come upon these 
thoughts,” most likely from (re)-reading Baumgarten’s Metaphysica.336 Thus, even if we 
recognize that a property like stubbornness is not truly virtuous, we can still admire it. 
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“Away then with the distinct recognition of the worthlessness of a stubborn hero!” he 
exclaims.337 This knowledge ought to disturb neither the feeling of admiration nor the 
momentary intention to imitate. If all goes well cognitively, the distinct realization that 
imitating (say) heroic stubbornness is inappropriate in a given situation will preclude a 
person from actual imitation. But, Mendelssohn admits, those who lack this distinct 
knowledge may be moved to action by their feeling of admiration alone, even if the 
behavior depicted is unvirtuous in truth. This is simply unavoidable, due to the 
confusion of poetic cognition: as confused, it represents appearances, not reality as such, 
so by nature it can be deceiving. As he reminds Lessing, “You mustn’t think that your 
pity has an advantage to my admiration here. Even pity can bring us to do unvirtuous 
things if it is not ruled by reason, by cold symbolic reason, which one must entirely ban 
from the theater if one wants to please.”338 
Mendelssohn does not seem troubled by this outcome. He even writes that it is 
precisely because tragedy does not depict morality as it is known distinctly that its end 
cannot be the improvement of morals.339 In a sense, this claim is a non-sequitur, for 
Lessing had always maintained that tragedy should improve morals by means of the 
passions, not by means of depicting true morality. But taken more charitably, 
Mendelssohn seems to be allowing that the effect of moral improvement is completely 
dispensable in tragedy after all. This “new thought” seems to sidesteps Plato’s challenge, 
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but it makes Mendelssohn’s overall position puzzling and leaves unclear why 
Mendelssohn has been so concerned to defend admiration in tragedy to begin with.  
Lessing next pens a comprehensive rebuttal to Mendelssohn’s new apparent 
radicalism. He begins by questioning the idea that a work which primarily aimed at 
admiration would be a tragedy at all. Citing Aristotle’s Poetics §14, he notes that tragedy 
does not produce every kind of pleasure without distinction, but rather a certain kind of 
pleasure, namely one involving pity.340 A work which aims primarily at arousing 
admiration is not a tragedy, but an epic. The letter then turns to straightforwardly 
ethical considerations. First, as Mendelssohn himself admitted, not everyone recognizes 
the supremacy of the intellect over feeling in ethical matters. If tragic drama can really 
induce people to behave in unvirtuous ways, “then it must be one of the first duties of 
poets to arouse admiration only for truly virtuous actions. For if they were allowed to 
give even unvirtuous actions the varnish of admiration, then Plato would have been 
right in wanting to banish them from his Republic.”341 
To this problem Lessing offers Mendelssohn the following palliative: “Just 
because wine often leads to stupid bickering, that [doesn’t mean] it shouldn’t [serve to] 
cheer the human heart.”342 By analogy, just because tragedy sometimes fails to promote 
virtue does not mean that its purpose is not to promote virtue. Of course, Lessing’s 
argument about the duty of the poet actually does not go any further than Nicolai had in 
his Abhandlung  – that poets must avoid arousing admiration for vicious actions does not 
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imply that the purpose of tragedy is to improve morals. But Lessing has certainly 
noticed the tension in Mendelssohn’s view, and is challenging him to consider whether 
he really thinks it is acceptable for a poet to depict action in a way that goes against 
morality.  
Lessing argues further that Mendelssohn has failed to explain the mechanism by 
which admiration in tragedy might function to improve morals, even if that is not its 
end. If a person refrains from imitating a theatrically but not actually admirable action, 
Lessing notes, then it is the person’s intellect, not the sensibly cognized tragedy which 
produces this effect.343 And, Lessing points out, if the viewer unwittingly happens to 
imitate a virtuous action without knowing that it is virtuous, it seems he has not really 
done anything virtuous at all.344 In other words, Mendelssohn’s theory seems to commit 
him to the view that only intellectual knowledge can really improve morals, while the 
stage can contribute nothing.345 
Lessing goes on to reiterate the particular ethical value of pity. Only the arousal 
of pity, he thinks, can produce the right kind of moral effect, for “even suppose that the 
poet makes me pity an unworthy object, namely by means of false perfections, through 
which he seduces my intellect in order to win my heart. Nothing comes of it if only my 
pity is stirred up, and as it were becomes accustomed to being stirred up more and more 
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easily.”346 Lessing cites one final difference between pity and admiration. Pity is a 
universally virtuous passion, Lessing believes, so that any exercise of it will improve a 
person’s general virtuousness. Admiration, on the other hand, is more suited to arouse a 
desire to imitate particular behaviors in particular cases. Perhaps it is suited to induce 
people to practice certain difficult physical tasks, he speculates. In support of this view, 
Lessing points out that no one would want or expect a tragedy to increase a person’s 
disposition to admire in general. 
In his reply, Mendelssohn opens by writing that he is “mostly, but not entirely in 
agreement” with Lessing,347 but in fact the agreement is somewhat hard to see. He takes 
issue with Lessing’s claim that tragedy must aim primarily at arousing pity in order to 
be tragedy at all: 
Here you’ve taken a prejudice as a shield which I’ve often heard you yourself 
attack. On what is this artificial distinction [between the tragedy and the epic] 
based? In view of the works of nature, it’s been determined in the last century 
that they haven’t been divided by their master [Nature] into any particular and 
separate classes.348 
 
The passage shows that Mendelssohn had a very liberal view of natural forms 
and tended to resist artificial conventions, but it seems weak against Lessing’s objection 
nonetheless. Even if there is no natural division between tragedy and other forms of 
poetry, it might be instrumentally helpful to put dramas into conventional classes into 
order to understand their distinctive histories and ways in which they ought to be 
                                                 
346 Lessing, Werke, 4:189-190. 
347 Lessing, Werke, 4:195. 
348 Lessing, Werke, 4:195-196. 
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constructed to produce the best effect. And intuitively, it does not seem that a drama in 
which we simply admire several characters is helpfully thought of as a tragedy.  
Fortunately, Mendelssohn finally provides an example of a tragedy which aims 
at arousing admiration, and explains precisely how it ought to function. As it turns out, 
he is not concerned with the admiration of physical prowess, but of moral goodness. 
Tragedy is the best vehicle for arousing moral admiration in the following way: 
The hero must value the moral good incomparably higher than the physical 
good. If pain, chains, slavery, and death collide with a duty, then he must not 
delay in rushing over to these evils in order to keep his innocence unblemished. 
This inner victory of the divine soul over the body enraptures us, and puts us 
into an affect which no bodily pleasure approaches.349 
 
Mendelssohn cites the example of Orestes, who had submitted himself to be executed in 
place of his friend Pylades in Euripides’ drama Iphigenia in Tauris. “These are perhaps 
the only characters of the ancients that arouse a true [moral] admiration,” Mendelssohn 
notes.350 The depiction of moral goodness even at the cost of physical suffering is 
Mendelssohn’s tragic ideal,351 the element which make tragedy best from both the 
aesthetic and ethical standpoints. He is on solid ground here, as Iphigenia in Tauris is also 
the most frequently cited example in Aristotle’s Poetics. And all this is perfectly 
consistent with his earlier view from the Briefe über die Empfindungen, where he had even 
                                                 
349 Lessing, Werke, 4:197. 
350 Ibid. 
351 Braitmaier also uses the term “tragisches Ideal” to refer to Mendelssohn’s attitude here (Geschichte, 
260). 
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suggested “undeserved physical evil” in particular makes the perfection of the hero 
appear more brightly to us.352  
This tragic ideal does not, however, constitute a wholesale replacement of 
Mendelssohn’s earlier view that explained tragic pleasure through pity alone. 
Mendelssohn does not and would never claim that all tragedy must conform to the 
formula specified above, nor does he ever claim that pity is relatively unimportant in 
tragedy or that admiration is necessary and indispensable to all tragedies. Mendelssohn 
makes this clear in his last letter of the correspondence, in which he writes, “I would 
therefore advise a poet that he should seek to arouse both pity and admiration in his 
tragedy. If he asks which of these affects should rule, I for one [für meinen Theil] would 
not grant any preference to pity. [But] at the same time admiration without pity is cold, 
as Nicolai noted about Canut.”353 In the end, Mendelssohn seems to think that pity is 
indispensible to tragedy, but that admiration is also needed if the work to rise to the 
highest level of art.354 
Beyond Iphigenia in Tauris, Mendelssohn has in mind especially the “heroic” 
17th-century French tragedies of Corneille.355 Thus, despite all of his alleged radicalism 
                                                 
352 Mendelssohn was certainly influenced by Addison, who wrote: “A virtuous Man (says Seneca) 
struggling with Misfortunes, is such a Spectacle as Gods might look upon with Pleasure: And such a 
Pleasure it is which one meets with in the Representation of a well-written Tragedy” (Spectator, No. 39, 
p. 199). Addison does not develop this thought especially clearly, however. Mendelssohn would 
approvingly cite the same passage from Seneca in connection with tragedy in his Rhapsodie (JubA, 
1:196). 
353 Lessing, Werke, 4:222. 
354 Cf. Beiser, Diotima’s Children, 208-209. 
355 As Braitmaier also suggests, Geschichte, 271. Mendelssohn specifically cites Corneille’s 1639 play 
Cinna (JubA, 11:197), in which a character suffering because of treasonous crimes she has committed 
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and tendency toward liberating the stage from moral considerations, Mendelssohn’s 
ideal of tragedy is in a sense deeply conservative. Unlike Lessing, he takes French 
classical drama as a model, and thinks that the best tragedy directly depicts moral 
perfection in the face of evil.  
 The remainder of Mendelssohn’s letter, which includes some important attached 
fragments,356 has two goals. First, Mendelssohn aims to explain, in response to Lessing’s 
objection, the general mechanism by which tragedy in general can contribute to morals. 
Second, Mendelssohn attempts to provide a new view of tragic pleasure that will 
accommodate the claims he had made about the overarching importance of passion in 
tragedy. We will take these in turn. 
Good tragedy unavoidably presents a confused version of morality, 
Mendelssohn insists, for whenever it attempts to present true morality it becomes cold 
and lifeless. And this means tragedy will sometimes give people unvirtuous 
motivations, whether from admiration or pity. But this unfortunate outcome does not 
mean that tragedy can play no role in moral improvement. To explain how it can, 
Mendelssohn develops a somewhat original357 theory of moral motivation. Beginning 
from the Leibnizian compatibilist tradition, he posits that the quantity of motivation (the 
greatest of which at a given time actually determines the will) is “composed out of the 
amount of good (m), how distinctly we perceive it (p), and inversely with the time 
                                                                                                                                                 
decides to accept the consequences and confess; upon doing so she is pardoned and she and her 
friends granted estates by Augustus. 
356 These would serve as the basis for much of the 1761 Rhapsodie. 
357 The idea of including time in the calculation is original, but also not well defended. Overall, 
Mendelssohn’s theory is indebted to Baumgarten, Metaphysica sec. XVI, “Facultas appetitiva.” 
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needed for the contemplation (t). Thus the quantity of motivation = mp/t.”358 As a result, 
a perception is more motivating when we can grasp it quickly. But perceptions grasped 
quickly must be more confused and even obscure, because we do not have the time to 
analyze their parts. Nonetheless, if t becomes “extremely small,” it begins to dominate 
the also diminished p.359 In this way a confused perception can be more motivating than 
a distinct one. For example, Mendelssohn thinks this can account for why people are 
afraid of cannonfire even when they know it cannot hurt them, and how practice allows 
people to perform complex tasks like speaking and playing music smoothly and 
effortlessly.360 
 Becoming virtuous, Mendelssohn continues, is not a matter of acquiring purely 
theoretical knowledge, because virtue involves acting well. A person who only has 
symbolic cognition of the good will not be able to resist sensible inclinations to vice, for 
these inclinations are generally intuitive and can therefore have an outsized impact on 
the will, in the way just described. On the other hand, a person who only has intuitive 
cognition lacks full certainty, can be deceived by examples without proof, and cannot 
recall the good as well when it is not sensibly present. Mendelssohn concludes that only 
                                                 
358 JubA, 2:149.  
359 JubA, 2:150. 
360 “Through practice… each capability in our mind becomes a skill. A skill  consists in a capacity to 
bring about something so quickly that we don’t have to be as conscious of everything as we once were. 
In every action a series of concepts is needed which agrees with a series of voluntary motions in the 
body. The closer this series of concepts is bound together, that is, the more similarities, relations, and 
connections we perceive within it, the more quickly [these concepts] follow each other, that is, the 
more quickly the imagination passes from one to the other. Practice or habituation allows us to see 
more connections between the concepts in the series. If we practice enough, we can reach a point 
where the connection of concepts happens so quickly that it is no longer distinct; and then the 
capability has become a skill.” (JubA, 2:151). 
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a person “who connects the symbolic and intuitive cognitions of the value of virtue, who 
has made the lower powers of the soul agree with the upper, is perfectly virtuous.”361 He 
defines “moral sensibility” as the ability to quickly represent “the true or seeming good 
which is to be met with in the object.” This ability can be improved by allowing us to see 
more of the good in a thing more accurately and more quickly. And, Mendelssohn 
explains, fictions, including tragedy, often serve as better exercise than reality, because 
they can be made more interesting and made to seem more probable than actual events, 
and they can be “cleaned up” of irrelevant and distracting elements. In this way tragedy 
can contribute to the improvement of morals.  
 The core idea behind Mendelssohn’s new account of tragic pleasure is the 
principle of imitation:  
Reason… attributes a great and worthy thing to the objects of a tragic drama, if it 
is only capable of a greater degree of imitation by means of its lively representation… 
Therefore you mustn’t exclude any particular passion from the theater. As soon 
as the imitated passion can convince us intuitively of the excellence of the 
imitation, then it deserves to be performed on the stage. Even hate and revulsion 
can… please on the stage, because it is enough if the imitated passion convinces 
us that the imitation is similar to its archetype.362 
 
Mendelssohn’s view here evokes the theory of the Swiss aestheticians Bodmer and 
Breitinger, who for decades had defended an extremely permissive interpretation of the 
principle of imitation.363 However, it is important to see that Mendelssohn has not 
suddenly shifted to a kind of formalist view. After all, he had just defended the value of 
                                                 
361 JubA, 2:153. 
362 Lessing, Werke, 4:196. 
363 See especially Johann Jakob Breitinger, Critische Dichtkunst, worinnen die poetische Mahlerei in Absicht 
auf den Ausdruck und die Farben abgehandelt wird (Leipzig: Orell, 1740), 95-99, where he espouses 
essentially the same view of tragic pleasure that Mendelssohn is endorsing here. Nonetheless, Bodmer 
and Breitinger agreed with Gottsched that tragedy should be understood as a moral fable. 
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depicting admirable moral victories in tragedies, so such a shift would be utterly 
incoherent. Instead, according to Mendelssohn, the formal imitative aspect of the 
tragedy plays a very specific role in the pleasure we get from it. “The best means of 
convincing us intuitively of the value of the imitation [i.e. similarity to reality] is if 
unpleasant passions are aroused in us by means of the illusion… That is why all 
unpleasant affects please us in imitation.”364 This similarity of the imitation to reality is, 
according to Mendelssohn here, the only basis for our pleasure in the imperfect aspect of 
the tragedy. He insists that a “second judgment – that these [depicted] affects are only 
imitated – must immediately follow the affect; because otherwise the unpleasant 
sentiment, which flows from the affect, would grow greater than the pleasant sentiment, 
which is an effect of the imitation” (ibid). So in and of themselves, Mendelssohn still 
thinks, perceptions of imperfection are displeasurable. 
 In sum, Mendelssohn holds the following views at this point in the 
correspondence: 1) that tragedy can be morally edifying by improving the audience’s 
“moral sensibility”; 2) that the most moving and best tragedy succeeds because it 
arouses admiration through the morally positive content it depicts; and 3) that we only 
get pleasure from the perfect aspects of a tragedy, whether material or formal. 
Nonetheless, he did not back down from his earlier claim that the end of tragedy is not 
to improve morals, nor from his claim that tragedy might be moving while harming 
morals. While not strictly inconsistent, these views are deeply in tension. If it is possible 
and desirable that tragedy be morally edifying, then why – despite the concerns of Plato 
                                                 
364 JubA, 2:155. “Illusion” is the taking of the sensible appearance for reality. 
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and Rousseau – insist that it need not be? Perhaps Mendelssohn intended claim (3) to be 
a defense against these concerns, since it bars people from taking pleasure directly in 
imperfection. If so, this defense would fail, since (as Mendelssohn well recognized) 
people can become deeply immoral simply by learning to ignore the negative aspects of 
things.365  
 Lessing admits being convinced by Mendelssohn’s theory of motivation and its 
relation to art. But he cannot accept Mendelssohn’s account of how imperfection can 
give rise to pleaure. He has a better idea: 
Now surely we’re agreed, dearest friend, that all passions are either intense 
longings or intense repulsions? And also that at every intense longing or 
repulsion we are conscious of a greater degree of our reality, and that this 
consciousness cannot be other than pleasant? Consequently, all passions, even 
the most unpleasant, are pleasant qua passion. And I certainly don’t need to tell 
you that the pleasure which is connected to the stronger determination of our 
power can be so infinitely outweighed by the displeasure we have about the 
object… that we are no longer conscious of [the pleasure].366 
 
This passage shows that Lessing fully agrees with Mendelssohn’s view that the 
imperfect object depicted is displeasurable in and of itself. He also agrees that so long as 
we take the perceived imperfection to be real, displeasure will predominate. But rather 
than locating the pleasurable aspect of fictional imperfection merely in the quality of 
imitation, Lessing locates it in the subjective reaction to the depicted imperfection, the 
feeling of revulsion. When we recognize that we are not perceiving reality, the 
                                                 
365 I have in mind Mendelssohn’s example of the Romans, who (Mendelssohn says) took pleasure in 
gladiator fights by focusing on the skill of the combatants while suppressing their pity (JubA, 1:109).  
366 Lessing, Werke, 4:201-202. 
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displeasure at the object disappears and we are left only with the pleasure involved in 
our passionate moral repulsion.  
While this view is certainly indebted to Dubos’s idea that the passions as such 
are inherently pleasurable, the background assumptions are importantly different. 
Dubos had thought that the passions are pleasing simply because they present the mind 
with a multitude of ideas to occupy it, and he identified the mind’s state of being 
occupied with the feeling of pleasure.367 For Lessing, the passions are pleasing because of 
their connection with the “appetitive” faculties of inclination and revulsion. Because 
these faculties are proper to us as human beings, their exercise counts as a “reality” or 
perfection, and it is because we notice their activation through our sentiments that we 
feel pleasure. Lessing concludes his letter with an unpersuasive counterexample to 
Mendelssohn’s imitation theory.368 
 In a brief reply, Mendelssohn concedes that Lessing’s explanation for why 
imperfection pleases in tragedy is superior to his own, and that the quality of the 
imitation is not the best explanation in this case. “It’s too bad that fine observation was 
                                                 
367 Dubos, Critical Reflections, 1:4-9. 
368 Lessing’s attempted counterexample runs thus: Suppose I see a beautiful woman beckoning to me 
from afar. This vision creates all sorts of pleasant affects in my mind. Suddenly, I discover that she is 
just an excellent artistic illusion; there is really no beautiful woman at all. According to Mendelssohn’s 
view, Lessing points out, this separate judgment would make me even more happy, because excellent 
imitations are supposed to produce pleasure. But of course, this is not the case; I actually experience 
disappointment and sadness (Lessing, Werke, 202-203). The example is unpersuasive because it is still 
plausible that the skillful imitation would give me some pleasure in this case. Disappointment and 
displeasure may predominate, but there the imitation may provide a small pleasurable aspect 
nonetheless. 
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unknown to me when I wrote my Briefe über die Empfindungen,” he admits.369 In the next 
and final letter of the correspondence, dated 14 May 1757 (more than eight months after 
Nicolai’s first letter to Lessing), Mendelssohn sums up and restates his view of tragedy 
in light of the prior correspondence. The summary is divided into “agreed” and 
“disputed” points; however, it is clear that all of the points represent Mendelssohn’s 
own views, and they are only labeled as “disputed” when Mendelssohn has some 
reason to think that Lessing is not in full agreement. The summary was also written by 
Mendelssohn and Nicolai together (apparently with Nicolai writing part of the first half 
and Mendelssohn writing the second), but since even minor disagreements between the 
two are explicitly noted, we may assume that the general view is Mendelssohn’s own. 
 Mendelssohn begins the summary by restating Lessing’s suggestion about the 
source of pleasure in imperfection, but makes clear that he intends this to supplement, 
not replace, his previous view.370 “The imitation itself contributes to this obscuring [of 
the objective imperfection], if it is perfect, not the least because it increases the quantity 
of sensible pleasure.”371 In other words, at least some of the pleasure we get from a 
depiction of imperfection relates to the formal quality of imitation in the work.  
                                                 
369 Lessing’s view here has a clear provenance in Wolff, who had explained that the displeasure we get 
from the imperfection of an object is moderated and reduced by the pleasure we get from our 
recognition of the imperfection, since the ability to recognize it is a subjective perfection which we 
perceive confusedly (PE, §519). The novelty here is the idea that pleasure can actually predominate if 
the displeasure is removed – something that happens when we realize that our representation does 
not depict reality. Ironically, that novel aspect came from Mendelssohn (influenced by Dubos), who 
neglected to connect it with the Wolffian doctrine. 
370 Cf. Braitmaier, Geschichte, 2:273-274. 
371 Lessing, Werke, 4:214. 
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Next, Mendelssohn clarifies the role of various passions in tragedy. If, as 
Mendelssohn held, tragedy is meant “to arouse the passions,” how are we to make sense 
of the privileged role of pity and (if Mendelssohn has his way) admiration? To answer 
this, Mendelssohn offers an expanded concept of pity.372 He points out first that the 
intuitive consideration of our own misfortune can take on various modifications 
depending on our relation to it. Various modes of misfortune can feel different to us, 
and we have attached various words to these various feelings: displeasure, sadness, 
sorrow, fear, desperation, shock, horror, etc.373 And as the intuitive consideration of 
others’ misfortune can take on just the same modifications, Mendelssohn reasons, there 
must be just as many variations of pity. Thus “there is a pitying fear, a pitying 
desperation, a pitying shock, yes, even a pitying wrath, etc…. just as there is sadness, 
fear, shock at the representation of our own imperfection. Pity as the general name 
encompasses all modifications of displeasure in itself, which we feel about the 
displeasure of another.”374 This expanded view of pity allows for consistency with 
Mendelssohn’s claim, all the way back in the Briefe über die Empfindungen, that pity is the 
only negative sentiment which pleases. 
                                                 
372 Here Mendelssohn explains pity in general as the “the intuitive consideration of the misfortune of 
another” (Lessing, Werke, 4:216). Although this definition does explicitly include love, and would seem 
to include hate and even Schadenfroh (see Metaphysik, §458), it is more likely that Mendelssohn is 
being sloppy here and unlikely that he changed his view. In his 1761 Rhapsodie, a work derived largely 
from this correspondence, he clearly states that pity is based on love (PS, 2:5; for the 1771 edition see 
JubA, 1:395). 
373 Lessing, Werke, 4:216-217. 
374 Lessing, Werke, 4:217. 
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Commentators are certainly wrong to say that Mendelssohn – at the end of the 
correspondence, anyway – permitted all passions unconditionally in tragedy.375 As he 
writes, those “unpleasant passions, whose exercise is not even considered a reality, must 
be kept entirely away from the stage or depicted as ugly. As for example envy, etc. and 
all affects which consist in a displeasure about the perfections of another.”376 These also 
do not count as pity, because they relate to the other’s misfortune in some way other 
than sharing or participating in it. Here, for the first time, Mendelssohn concedes 
somewhat to Lessing and explicitly endorses Nicolai’s view that tragedy must not be 
opposed to morals or promote immorality.377 Also left entirely out of Mendelssohn’s 
analysis of pity is admiration. This is because admiration does not relate to misfortune at 
all, but to extraordinary perfection. In this way Mendelssohn finds a way to include a 
multitude of passions under the umbrella of pity, while retaining a separate place for the 
sublime sentiment produced by his ideal of the best tragedy. 
Mendelssohn’s view of tragic pleasure at end of the correspondence is best 
understood as a compound view. We get pleasure in tragedy from 1) the formal quality 
of the imitation (verisimilitude), which is a perfection;378 2) the internal structure of the 
                                                 
375 This commonly held view goes hand in hand with the idea that Mendelssohn radically liberated 
drama from ethical considerations. Thus Hammermeister’s view that for Mendelssohn the “subject 
matter [of drama] is free from regulation” is false (German Aesthetic Tradition 19), as is Goetschel’s 
similar but proto-Kantian-tinged reading  (103), as well as Ranke’s claim that Mendelssohn was “not at 
all interested in the problem of setting boundaries for such manipulation of moral feeling” (42). 
376 Lessing, Werke, 4:215-216. 
377 This is why Lessing describes this final letter of the correspondence as “eine Art von Kapitulation” 
(Lessing, Werke, 4:213). 
378 Certainly Mendelssohn also thought that we get pleasure in recognizing the perfection of the artist 
through his or her work, but this does not come out explicitly in this correspondence. This idea first 
appears in an early summary of his Briefe über die Empfindungen (JubA, 1:531)  and comes out fully in 
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play, i.e. the greatness of action depicted and how the parts relate to each other, which is 
a perfection; 3) the extraordinary perfection of the characters, especially their moral 
perfection, which gives us a feeling of admiration; and 4) a reflexive perception of the 
exercise of moral disapproval, a perfection, which gives rise to the various forms of pity. 
Depictions of suffering and misfortune tend to enhance or produce each of these 
pleasures, which explains their importance in drama. And, all of these sources of 
pleasure are intuitions of perfection having at least some objective basis, preserving the 
rationalist theory. 
In the remainder of the summary, Mendelssohn develops a new explanation for 
the end of tragedy and its place in ethics. Aristotle’s view that tragedy serves to purify 
the passions, he writes, is false. For according to Mendelssohn, to purify the passions 
means “to turn the strong desire, which is connected with [the passions] away from 
[merely] seeming-goods, and to remove the excessive from them which is opposed to 
natural law.”379 However, as he had already argued, arousing pity and other passions 
does not have this effect. The exercise of pity may help us feel the misfortune of others 
more strongly and deeply, but it must be “ruled by reason” if excess is to be avoided. 
Following this, Mendelssohn attempts to determine the end of tragedy:  
I call the faculty of the soul for detesting vice, loving virtue, and feeling 
displeasure at the physical imperfections which are connected with virtue in a 
subject, moral taste. The aim [Absicht] of tragedy will therefore be to exercise this 
moral taste through a beautiful and lively imitation. Through the term 
“beautiful” I understand a single, complete and great action; but through 
                                                                                                                                                 
his 1758 essay Betrachtungen über das Erhabene und das Naïve in den schönen Wissenschaften [Reflections on 
the sublime and the naïve in the beautiful sciences]. 
379 Lessing, Werke, 4:220. 
 149       
“lively,” that it should be capable of being dramatically arranged and 
performed.380  
 
Presumably, moral taste (apparently an iteration of “moral sensibility,” above) is 
like taste in that it involves judging the perfection and imperfection of things through 
sense. But it is also more specific than general taste, because its judgments involve moral 
objects, feelings, and concepts. A work of art having a certain (very general) form, and 
which aims to exercise this capacity in us is tragedy.381 This definition seems promising, 
but Mendelssohn immediately turns it to a very unexpected use: “How easily this 
definition can be reduced to the principle of our dear Nicolai, I don’t have need of 
explaining. Yes, nothing but affects are capable of exercising this moral taste. Tragedy 
must therefore arouse the passions, but not purify them.”382 (Despite Mendelssohn’s 
assurance, this does need explaining, which will be done momentarily). 
The explication of “beautiful” at the end of the passage is important, because it 
explains how a tragedy can offer ideal beauty in a sense even though it depicts 
misfortune and suffering. A “single, complete” plot gives the work a unity bound by a 
theme, while its greatness, which encompasses the movement of the plot sufficient to 
interest us and bring out our passions,383 is its diversity. Thus the beauty of tragedy 
consists in perfection after all, though this only applies to the formal or structural 
                                                 
380 Lessing, Werke, 4:221. 
381 For a contemporary account which locates the ethical value of art (in general) in something like the 
exercise of moral sentiments, see Noël Carroll, “Art and the Moral Realm” in The Blackwell Guide to 
Aesthetics, ed. Peter Kivy (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2004), 130-140, and his “Art, narrative, and moral 
understanding,” in Aesthetics and Ethics ed. Jerrold Levinson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), 140-143. 
382 Lessing, Werke, 4:221. 
383 On this see Nicolai, Abhandlung, 30. The topic of greatness is largely passed over in the 
correspondence between Mendelssohn and Lessing. 
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elements of the work itself (not simply qua imitation, but also in its own right). Indeed, it 
consists in a kind of ideal perfection, for this sort of clean and easily comprehensible 
structure, even if it contains misfortune and suffering as depicted objects, is to be 
expected only from a well-constructed drama—not from the contingencies of history 
and actual life.  
At the end of the summary, Mendelssohn explains how tragedy, with its exercise 
of moral taste, can help promote ethical improvement: “Both admiration and pity can 
exercise moral taste… Pity moves our heart, admiration moves our soul. The former 
teaches us to feel, the latter to think sublimely [erhaben denken]. The former lets us feel 
sorry for our unlucky friends, the latter to rush to help even with danger to our life. But 
all these effects are merely the second aim of tragedy.”384  
So, what does Mendelssohn mean when he says his view entails that the end of 
tragedy is to arouse the passions (Nicolai’s “principle”), but that tragedy also has 
positive moral effects - which are however only its “second aim?” At first glance, this 
may seem to amount to nothing more than the theory Lessing had espoused from the 
beginning, according to which tragedy should aim to improve morals through the 
arousal (but not the purification) of the passions. There is, however, one all-important 
difference: Lessing thought that the exercising and arousal of pity alone is sufficient to 
improve virtue, because “the most pitying man is the best man.” Mendelssohn 
disagrees. As he had explained in an earlier letter, becoming virtuous involves neither 
feeling nor intellect alone, but the two working together in harmony. Tragedy, or at least 
                                                 
384 Lessing, Werke, 4:221-222. 
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aesthetically good tragedy, affects only the sensible half of our moral being, our “lower 
power” for cognizing the good. While this is an important and worthy exercise which 
we can demand from good tragedy, we ought not expect that this alone could improve 
virtue.385 We can hope with good reason that it ultimately will, but that cannot happen 
without a corresponding improvement in the distinct, intellectual knowledge of the 
good.  
This explains why improvement in virtue can only be the “second aim” of 
tragedy: any effect on virtue is dependent on other conditions that have nothing to do 
with tragedy itself. In sum, Mendelssohn is forging a middle path between two 
extremes. On one side is Gottsched, who thinks that tragedy ought to teach a lesson 
about morality as it is known distinctly. On the other is Lessing, who thinks that the 
increase in feeling produced by tragedy alone will improve morals. Mendelssohn is just 
as interested in championing the rational basis of morality against the encroachment of 
pure feeling as he is in liberating tragedy from Gottsched’s aesthetic moralizing. That he 
manages to do this while retaining both a generous aesthetic dimension as well as a 
moral aim for tragedy is no small feat. 
Now, one might ask how Mendelssohn can claim that the “aim” of tragedy is to 
exercise moral taste, while simultaneously denying that the purpose of tragedy is to 
improve morals. While the exact meaning of the term “purpose” in the context of 
tragedy is unfortunately never discussed in the correspondence, Mendelssohn seems to 
                                                 
385 On this point, I am in an agreement with Braitmaier, Geschichte, 2:252 and Goldstein, Moses 
Mendelssohn, 35. However there is no reason to suppose that the moral improvement which is a 
possible effect of tragedy must be understood as an “unintentional effect” (Braitmaier, Geschichte, 
2:259). 
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have thought that 1) the agreement of a work with its purpose determines how good it 
is; and 2) a critic rightly evaluates a work in relation to its conformity with its purpose. 
Thus, if the purpose of tragedy were to improve morals, then a work which failed to do 
so would be ipso facto a defective work and criticizable for that reason. But that cannot be 
true, Mendelssohn thinks, because moral improvement depends on conditions outside 
and independent of tragedy. The purpose or aim of tragedy is thus to provide for moral 
improvement by exercising moral taste, but not directly to improve morals. 
Mendelssohn certainly only came to this view at the end of the correspodence, but it 
does seem to be his settled opinion. 
 Now, there is another theory, besides Lessing’s, to which Mendelssohn’s seems 
almost identical (and with better reason): Aristotle’s. Aristotle also thought that tragedy 
could play a role in ethics by modifying the passions, but never claimed, despite the 
misreading by Nicolai and others, that tragic drama should be a “school of virtue” 
which alone could improve morals. Instead, he, like Mendelssohn, thought that virtuous 
action must ultimately be ruled by reason, not mere feeling. Aristotle’s theory differs 
from Mendelssohn’s primarily in the mechanism by which the passions of tragedy are 
supposed to affect us. For Aristotle, the arousal of passion leads to their catharsis, while 
for Mendelssohn, the arousal of the passions merely leads to an increase in our 
disposition to feel them. Now Mendelssohn, possibly due to Nicolai’s error, seems to 
have misunderstood the meaning of catharsis (generally translated into German as 
“Reinigen,” “purifying”). There is little reason to think Aristotle took catharsis to 
improve our ability to discern true perfections from false, which is an intellectual 
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capability. More plausibly, Aristotle meant its effect to remain at the level of the 
emotions. If this is granted, then the difference between Mendelssohn’s view and 
Aristotle’s comes down to whether tragedy contributes to virtue by increasing or 
decreasing the passions. But this would be a dispute most easily settled by empirical 
investigation, not armchair theorizing. Perhaps Aristotle even meant that catharsis could 
both increase or decrease the disposition to feel emotion, bringing them to an 
appropriate mean from either inadequacy or excess. Indeed, this is how Lessing would 
interpret Aristotle years later in his 1767 Hamburgische Dramaturgie.386 
Mendelssohn’s response to Plato’s challenge can be summarized as follows: If we 
are to be virtuous, we must act rightly. To act rightly requires not just that we have 
theoretical, distinct knowledge about which acts are right, but also good moral taste, i.e. 
the right sorts of immediate emotional responses, when we encounter moral situations 
in life. In order to have the right sorts of emotional responses, we need to exercise our 
faculty of moral taste, which involves the whole range of passions. Since real life 
generally does not present a sufficient amount of suitable exercise for us, we need to 
make use of fictions, particularly tragedy, which exercise the most important passions: 
pity (in all its forms) and admiration. On this point Plato’s encomiums and praises of the 
gods are insufficient, for they cannot effectively arouse pity. Overall, the universal need 
for moral exercise outweighs the contingency that this very exercise will lead some 
people astray in particular cases. 
                                                 
386 Lessing, Werke, 4:595. Arguably, this is also what Gottsched intended in his 1729 speech, but he 
does not explain sufficiently what he means by “die Leidenschaften… in ihre Schranken bringen.” 
(“Die Trauerspiele,” 663). 
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Perfectly virtuous heroes and the art of tragedy 
 The new account of the ethics and pleasure laid a foundation for a theory of 
tragedy, but something more explicit still needed to be said about the relation between 
tragedy and ideal beauty: As mentioned above, if art aims to idealize nature, what room 
is left for an art form that self-consciously aims for the opposite? Mendelssohn took up 
this issue in a short essay inspired by Lessing’s 1759 review of Wieland’s drama Lady 
Johanna Gray. In his review, Lessing had poked fun at Wieland for making all of his 
characters “dear and pious” and suggested that Wieland was not able to present the 
characters “in action, according to life,” which prevented the work from being “of the 
most moving kind.”387 In his response of a month later, Mendelssohn takes up Lessing’s 
point and generalizes it, asking “why is it expressly required of the poet [as opposed to 
the painter to depict] a mixture of moral evil?”388 The immediate reason, Mendelssohn 
surmises, is that the depiction of a perfectly virtuous person is just too easy for the poet 
to accomplish. “I conclude from this that poetry, considered as a fine art, has an entirely 
different ideal beauty than the moral perfection of the characters.”389 Now, “the purpose 
of drama is… to arouse social [gesellige] passions,”390 which are presumably the kind 
which give rise to the proper exercise of moral taste. These passions are produced in us 
by works which “represent the actions and inclinations of people according to life.”391 
                                                 
387 G. E. Lessing, letter 63 in Briefe, die neueste Literatur betreffend (Berlin: F. Nicolai, 1759), 1:243-244. 
388 JubA, 5.1:98. 
389 Ibid. 
390 In the same passage, Mendelsohn indicates that the purpose of drama is also “to represent actions 
and inclinations of people according to life.” This is taken from Lessing’s original review, and 
Mendelssohn does not elaborate. 
391 Ibid. 
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Although this characterization seems entirely opposed to idealization, Mendelssohn 
simply redefines the term “ideal”: now the “ideal beauty” of drama lies precisely in its 
aptitude for arousing these “social passions.”392 A perfectly virtuous hero, if actual, 
would be worthy of our love and admiration, but in a drama they simply fail to be 
moving or even interesting. The sense of “ideal” here is no longer that the content must 
exceed nature, but rather that the work itself is suited to its end of arousing the “social 
passions.”393  
 Of course, this just pushes the question back a step: why are less than perfect 
characters so much more interesting, moving, and difficult to write than perfect ones? 
Why does even Mendelssohn himself admit to preferring stories about Achilles or 
Othello to those about Aeneas or Cato? Part of the answer is that mixed characters 
“provide more opportunities for action”394 – a perfectly virtuous character is unlikely to 
get into very much trouble from which he must extricate himself. But Mendelssohn’s 
main reason begins from his idea that imitations of perfection only produce their 
intended effect when the illusion is so good that it seems real. While painters can 
directly depict lifelike images through their medium, Mendelssohn explains, the poet’s 
route to effective illusion runs through the passions aroused in the mind – “only these 
are mightier than the senses.”395 Since verbal descriptions of perfectly virtuous heroes 
                                                 
392 JubA, 5.1:99. 
393 It might be objected that this sense of “ideal” is no longer objective but at most relational. However, 
even his original definition of ideal beauty from On the sources and connections of the beautiful arts and 
sciences is relational, simply because it pertains to phenomena. The artist always creates what seems 
ideal to the human senses, not what is strictly ideal from the perspective of distinct knowledge. 
394 Ibid. 
395 JubA, 5.1:100. 
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can only rarely arouse the passions, they will rarely seem real, which makes them, again, 
ineffective in arousing the passions. In other words, Mendelssohn seems to think – 
plausibly – that verisimilitude and the arousal of the passions are mutually reinforcing, 
so that they stand or fall together. Perfectly virtuous heroes are problematic on both 
counts because they are rare and somewhat implausible to begin with, and they also are 
not inherently well-suited to arousing passions through action, which prevents the 
illusion from taking hold. Thus, they are rarely appropriate objections of poetic 
depiction. 
 In an important clarification and swipe at Gottsched (see above), Mendelssohn 
adds that the poet should not aim to mix evil in with good simply because good and evil 
are often mixed in nature. He reaffirms the poet’s freedom to beautify and idealize, and 
notes that heroes often exceed nature in wisdom, bravery, and beauty.396 Perfect virtue is 
only excluded because it does not rhyme with poetry’s purpose of arousing passion, not 
because it is an idealization. 
 Mendelssohn might be charged with inconsistency here. After all, he held in his 
correspondence with Lessing that great perfection is capable of arousing admiration – 
according to him the most powerful of all the passions. But the inconsistency is only 
apparent. Even in the correspondence, he had explained that admiration does not result 
simply from great perfection, but from a great and unexpected perfection. We must at 
least be uncertain that the character will perform the admirable action, which means we 
cannot have seen them as perfectly virtuous to begin with. Indeed, as Mendelssohn 
                                                 
396 Ibid. 
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mentions in another Literaturbrief of around a year later, the only way a perfectly 
virtuous character can be made to work in a drama is the audience is made to pity him 
on account of deep suffering.397 
Later developments in the Rhapsodie 
 Much of the Rhapsodie, an addition to the Briefe über die Empfindungen which 
Mendelssohn included in his Philosophische Schriften, is largely a restatement of the 
results that had been reached in the correspondence.398 The most significant addition is 
Mendelssohn’s introduction of the concept of “mixed sentiments,” an attempt to 
generalize the lessons he took from the consideration of pity. In the 1761 edition, 
Mendelssohn limits himself to explaining why sentiments involving some displeasure 
are often more appealing than those involving pleasure alone: “The mixed sentiments 
have the special property that, although they are not so pleasant [angenehm] as pure 
pleasure [Vergnügen], they nonetheless push deeper into the mind, and also seem to 
remain there longer. What is merely pleasant soon leads to satiation, and finally even to 
disgust… on the other hand the unpleasant which is mixed with the pleasant fastens our 
attention and averts the all-too-early satiation.”399  
                                                 
397 JubA, 5.1:248. In the same work, Mendelssohn also wrote of his discovery of some thoughts about 
perfect heroes similar to his – in Shaftesbury’s Characterticks. He quotes the English philosopher at 
great length, translating into German except for the famous culminating line, “in a Poem, whether 
Epick or Dramatick, a compleat and perfect Character is the greatest Monster; and of all poetick 
Fictions not only the least engaging, but the least moral and improving” (Characteristicks, 3:161f). 
398 Mendelssohn emphasizes his expanded concept of pity in a passage that Lessing would quote in 
full in his 1767 Hamburgische Dramaturgie (PS, 2:4-5; Lessing, Werke, 4:577-578). Mendelssohn also 
explains his theory of motivation (discussed above) in greater detail, without significant change.  
399 PS, 2:7. 
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In the 1771 edition, there is a decided shift in emphasis regarding the concept of 
mixed sentiments. Although Mendelssohn retains this idea of mixed sentiments as being 
both pleasurable and displeasurable,400 he now emphasizes the subjective vs. objective 
(or representation vs. object) aspect of the phenomenon.401 As he had “discovered” in 
1770, a representation could be subjectively pleasurable qua representation even as its 
object is inherently displeasurable (see Chapter 1, Part 3). “Imperfect, evil, and defective 
things, according to this explanation, generally always arouse a mixed sentiment which 
is composed from a displeasure at the object and a pleasure at the representation.”402 As 
this passage shows, a “mixed sentiment” is still fundamentally a representation that 
includes pleasurable and displeasurable aspects, but it is obvious from the order, length, 
and evident enthusiasm in the text that Mendelssohn now sees the subjective/objective 
angle as the most interesting and important instance of this phenomenon. 
How significant is this change in Mendelssohn’s view, and why does 
Mendelssohn add this material only in the 1771 edition, when the idea was plainly given 
by Lessing and acknowledged by Mendelssohn in the last letters of the 1757 
correspodence on tragedy? To the second question, the idea of the object/representation 
distinction was actually already present in the first edition of the Rhapsodie, but without 
the full conceptual apparatus and generalization of the second. In his striking example 
                                                 
400 Beginning at JubA, 1:394. 
401 Cf. Bamberger, “We may discuss both editions of the Rhapsodie together, because the revised 
version in no sense breaks new ground, thus it is no different [from the original].” (Introduction to 
JubA, 1:XLI). This error perhaps led to the only significant defect in the Jubiläumsausgabe – its omission 
of the 1761 first edition of Mendelssohn’s Philosophische Schriften. 
402 JubA, 1:386. 
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of the pleasure “even the wise” might take in viewing the aftermath of a bloody battle, 
Mendelssohn writes in the first edition: 
As soon as the evil is no longer considered as an object of our choice, countless 
motivations come together which entice us to view it. Not only are many good 
things mixed in with it, but our imagination can arrive at thousands of delighting 
representations through contrast; and even if both did not occur, the cognition of 
the evil itself, and the lively repulsion from it, is a perfection of the human being, 
and must necessarily provide pleasure for him. We abhor the imperfection, but 
not the cognition of it; we flee from the evil, but not from our power to recognize 
and damn it.403  
 
This example is retained in the second edition, but Mendelssohn alters the explanation: 
 
In all such cases it is obvious that our disapproval, our revulsion pertains more 
to the object than to the representation. Every representation stands in a double 
relation; once to the thing, as the object of [the representation] of which it is a 
picture or impression, and then again to the soul, or the thinking subject, of 
which it constitutes a determination. Many representations, qua determinations 
of the soul, can have something pleasant about them, even if at the same time qua 
pictures of objects they are accompanied by disapproval and revulsion.404 
 
The two explanations have essentially the same content, but the first edition is more 
casual and straightforward, while the second is less persuasive but more technical. This 
illustrates how Mendelssohn began to see the phenomenon of mixed sentiments within 
a new and more rigorous conceptual framework.  Thus, the expansion in the 1771 
edition represents a refinement and generalization of an earlier point whose full 
importance Mendelssohn had not fully recognized. Mendelssohn himself, who was 
always very open about changes in his view, describes the change in the preface to the 
1771 edition: “In the Rhapsodie, the doctrine of mixed sentiments is further discussed, 
better explained, and applied to many particular cases and appearances in common 
                                                 
403 PS, 2:15. 
404 JubA, 1:384. 
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life.”405 This too, indicates that the change is a refinement and expansion, not a 
monumental shift. 
 Nonetheless, the change may have more radical implications for Mendelssohn’s 
theory of tragedy. It may seem that the 1771 emphasis on subjective pleasure is the 
culmination of a slow march toward subjectivism that began when Mendelssohn first 
doubted his objectivist account in the 1755 Briefe. The more the subjective source of 
pleasure is emphasized, the less any objectively determinate properties of the aesthetic 
object seem to matter. In the 1771 Rhapsodie, Mendelssohn even goes so far as to 
explicitly repudiate his original disagreement with Dubos from the Briefe über die 
Empfindungen:  
Thus [in the Briefe] I unjustly criticized Dubos for saying that the soul strives only 
to be moved, and should also be moved by unpleasant representations. This is 
true [at least] in the most exact sense, since motion and stirring, which are 
brought forth in the soul through unpleasant representations, cannot be other 
than pleasurable in relation to the subject. Yet pleasure has just as little as the will 
anything other than a true or seeming good as its ground – but this good need 
not always be sought in the objects outside of us.406 
 
While this is not arbitrary subjectivism, according to which no general reasons at all can 
be given for why one person finds a work pleasurable while another does not, it is 
subjectivism nonetheless. For, according to this view, an object need not have any 
particular properties in order to produce pleasure in us, nor do we need to perceive 
some perfection in it – we simply need to be disposed to react to it in a certain way. 
Mendelssohn insists that this reaction must display our own apparent perfection if we 
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are to feel pleasure, preserving a link between pleasure and perfection – but again, the 
properties of the object itself seem to have become unimportant. 
Mendelssohn next explains that our reaction to tragedies often depends on the 
observer’s degree of cultivation: “The gruesome objects of nature that delight 
uncultivated people are too violent for more sensitive and better-educated minds. They 
[the latter] sympathize too vividly with their fellow creatures, set themselves in the place 
of their passions, feel their pain as their own, and the pleasantness of the representation 
is thereby weakened too much.”407 He goes on to claim that more cultivated people are 
only able to take pleasure in such events when they can put some sort of distance 
between themselves and the imperfection – whether spatial, temporal, or the distance of 
fiction.408 Fictions are particularly helpful here, because a cultivated audience can use 
their knowledge of the illusion to “control” the emotional distance between themselves 
and the imperfect objects. By oscillating between suspension of disbelief and recognition 
of the object’s illusoriness, well-cultivated people can achieve a pleasurable sort of 
middle ground between sorrowful sympathy and indifference. Uncultivated viewers 
who are taken in fully by the illusion will miss the better pleasure of sympathy and 
instead react just as if the depiction were real. Being uncultivated, they may even laugh 
due to being overwhelmed by the represented events. Such laughter should count as 
praise for the poet because it is evidence of the effectiveness of the illusion.409 Again, it 
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seems that the particular properties of the subject, not of the object, determine the feeling 
of viewer. 
 Subjectivism at the descriptive level, however, need not translate into 
subjectivism at the normative level. Mendelssohn had recognized the former even in the 
description of the Roman taste for bloodsport from the 1755 Briefe über die Empfindungen. 
Since that time, he gradually came to recognize the pervasiveness of differences in taste, 
and how subjectivity universally affects our reaction to works of art. In the 1771 edition 
of the Rhapsodie, he admits explicitly that imperfect objects can please. But that does not 
mean he abandoned all objective standards of what constitutes good tragedy, i.e., of the 
sort that produces good pleasure. What are these standards? There is no reason to think 
that he ever backed away from those he had enumerated at the end of the 1756-1757 
correspondence: verisimilitude, internal structure and coherence, depiction of great 
moral perfection, and propensity to exercise moral taste or arouse pity (see above). 
These are the properties – at least partly objective – in which we ought to take pleasure. 
Even in the correspondence, he had implied that people might take pleasure in negative 
passions: envy, Schadenfroh, and so forth. At that time he advised the poet to exclude 
these passions from tragedy, and there is no reason to think he changed his view in the 
1771 Rhapsodie. The creep toward subjectivism is real, but it occurs only on the 
descriptive plane, not the normative. 
 163       
Chapter 4: Genius 
 Genius is an ancient concept. Plato apparently held genius to be a supernatural 
and divine source of inspiration for the poet. In his Ion, he has Socrates suggest that 
“beautiful poems are not human, not even from human beings, but divine and from [the] 
gods,”410 and in the Apology that “not by wisdom do poets write poetry, but by a sort of 
genius and inspiration.”411 To take Socrates at his word here would be scandalous for 
rationalist aesthetics – one of its most important and influential forebears attacking the 
rational basis of art and defending its supernatural origin! Despite this affront, 
rationalists were slow to take up the challenge of explaining genius in more favorable 
terms. By the early 1760s the French and English, and of course the rising Sturm und 
Drang in Germany, had devoted much more ink to the subject than the German 
rationalists. Mendelssohn himself never wrote a free-standing essay on genius, but he 
addresses the topic in several reviews, particularly those by J. G. Sulzer (the Wolffian 
whose work on pleasure had also stimulated Mendelssohn to write the Briefe über die 
Empfindungen), J. J. Rousseau (which led to a bitter dispute with Hamann, the founder of 
Sturm und Drang), and F. G. Resewitz (a little-known but interesting thinker). These 
reviews are best understood within the context of existing thought about genius in the 
mid 18th-century. 
In a review of April 3, 1760 written for the periodical Briefe, die neueste Literatur 
betreffend [Letters concerning the newest literature], Mendelssohn helpfully sketches out the 
                                                 
410 Plato, Ion, trans. Paul Woodruff, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1997), 534e. 
411 Plato, Apology, trans. Benjamin Jowett (http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/apology.html), 22c. 
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current theories of genius which were most influential in his own thought. He laments 
the fact that the idea of genius, “which is [now] constantly in the mouths of our art 
critics,” was entirely neglected by Wolff and covered by Baumgarten “only with his 
usual brevity.” “As far as I know,” he goes on, “besides [Baumgarten] no one but Dubos 
and Trublet have written on this material; the former more critically, the latter with 
more wit, but neither one philosophically enough.”412 Before delving into Mendelssohn’s 
writings on genius, it will be helpful to review Dubos, Trublet, and Baumgarten – both 
to set the stage for the debate and to see why Mendelssohn considered the work of the 
French insufficiently philosophical. 
The Inadequacy of Existing French Thought on Genius 
Dubos’ influential definition from his Critical Reflections runs as follows: “Genius 
is an aptitude, which man has received from nature, to perform well and easily that 
which others can do but indifferently, and with a great deal of pains. We learn to execute 
things for which we have a genius with as much facility as we speak our own mother 
tongue.”413 Beyond this basic definition, however, the French writers (Dubos in 
particular) had developed a remarkably rich collection of general observations about 
genius. These observations would form a sort of common basis, a largely agreed-upon 
concept of genius, for all the great 18th century debates about it. They can be 
summarized as follows: 
                                                 
412 JubA, 5.1:166. 
413 Dubos, Critical Reflections, 2:5. 
 165       
1. Novelty  
 According to Dubos, it is the privilege of the genius to produce new and even 
revolutionary414 works, while those lacking genius are left to be mere copiers and 
imitators.415 Dubos is careful to say, however, that novelty does not absolve the genius of 
the general artistic requirement to imitate nature. “A man of genius views and considers 
nature, as imitable by his art, with a different eye from those that have no genius… a 
painter of any genius lays hold of some instance untouched by his predecessors, and 
embellishes it with circumstances drawn from his own imagination, which give it the air 
of a new subject.”416 While a genius can discover something interesting even about the 
most trite-seeming objects, they do so not through flights of fancy, but by actually 
following nature more closely or directly than their predecessors.417 
2. Psychology 
 Dubos describes genius as a kind of “fire” or “enthusiasm,” and likens its 
exercise at the moment of creation to a kind of drunkenness.418 (The Dionysian, it seems, 
was  alive and well even in the early 18th century). But both he and Trublet recognize 
another aspect of the genius psychology as well: a genius has the ability to perceive 
deeply, to understand how objects are constructed beyond the surface apparent to the 
non-genius. The genius digests these insights and organically reorganizes them into a 
                                                 
414 Dubos, Critical Reflections, 2:137. 
415 Dubos, Critical Reflections, 2:41-46; Nicolas Charles Joseph Trublet, Essays upon several subjects of 
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new form.419 Notably, the French did not have much more to say about the precise 
psychology of genius and how it relates to the faculty of reason. 
3. Natural genius vs. cultivated taste and rules 
 Dubos understood genius as something distinct from, but also importantly 
moderated by taste. Genius is inborn and a gift of nature, but as it is a kind of raw power 
it must be cultivated and developed if it is be effective in producing great works.420 
Trublet explains that while genius can produce “a variety of good thoughts,” labor and 
cultivation are needed to bring them into good order.421 Those with genius but no taste 
end up creating enigmas that displease us.422 Both Dubos and Trublet recommend the 
study of examples, both in nature and from the great masters, as the best way to develop 
taste.423 
 On the other hand, genius was considered a necessary condition for the 
production of good art no less than taste. A poet must follow his genius if he is to 
produce works of any value, writes Dubos.424 Importantly, Dubos insists that genius is a 
more essential ingredient in a work than adherence to rules. Without genius, a work that 
strictly follows rules will be disagreeable, while a work of genius can be successful even 
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if it breaks many rules.425 Dubos downplays the value of rules when he claims that they 
are only general guidelines which can work from afar. Yet remarkably, he also ties rules 
directly to genius when he claims that only a genius is in a position to properly 
understand and make use of rules in the creation of art.426 
4. The scope and products of genius 
 For Dubos, genius was an extremely broad concept that covered all sorts of 
activities in all areas of life, from writing to rhetoric to the command of armies. 
However, it would be a mistake to think that Dubos failed to see any special significance 
of genius for art – after all, he devoted a full volume of his work on poetry and painting 
to the concept. Only a genius in the arts, writes Dubos, is capable of producing works 
with “life” whose parts are all brought together into a unified whole.427 A true genius 
makes the parts of a work themselves measured and appropriate to their subject – not 
too frosty but also not bombastic.428 Trublet, perhaps being more permissive, emphasizes 
the importance of the whole still more, claiming that “that aspect of his work which is 
excellent [the whole] cannot be destroyed by that which is indifferent, or even that 
which is bad in them.”429 
5. The genius vs. the critic 
 Dubos and Trublet leave little doubt as to whether they think the genius or the 
critic is more important and valuable in the production of art. Both see the genius as 
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superior, because she is creative and actually carries out the work, while the critic serves 
the merely negative purpose of pointing out errors.430 Critics “may straighten the tree, 
but they cannot render it fertile.”431 But what exactly is the proper relation between the 
genius and the critic? Here Dubos does not say enough, and Trublet is rather 
ambiguous. On the one hand, Trublet defends the right of the critic, writing “this 
principle that criticism is an easy thing may be very properly turned upon authors 
themselves, and they may be told that the less glory there is in perceiving some sort of 
faults, the more shame there is in committing them.”432 He also argues works and their 
creators should be judged on their merits, i.e. “from the degree of perfection there is in 
his work compared with those of the same kind,” not according to “the degree of genius 
supposed in [its maker].”433 Yet at the same time, Trublet claims that geniuses do not and 
ought not accommodate their creations to the public taste (leaving unclear whether this 
is distinct from the critic’s taste).434 Further, a genius’s work is not to be judged 
according to correctness, or adherence to rules.435 
6. Tendency toward a more radical view  
All of the above observations were largely uncontroversial and accepted by all 
parties. While the French view was generally moderate in its insistence that genius must 
be tempered by rules and cultivation, there are occasional glimmers of a more radical 
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stance that originated in England. In one place, Dubos quotes Addison436 suggesting that 
Homer and the great Greek poets were “never disciplined and broken by rules of art.”437 
They often created verses that could seem extravagant and absurd by themselves, but 
they were nonetheless able to combine them into a sublime whole in some inexplicable 
fashion. While Dubos himself does not pursue this thought further,438 Addison had 
claimed in the same article that some few geniuses “draw the Admiration of all the 
World… by the meer Strength of natural Parts, and without any Assistance of Arts or 
Learning.”439 Later, he claims Shakespeare as a modern example of such a genius. “Our 
inimitable Shakespeare is a Stumbling-Block to the whole Tribe of these rigid Criticks. 
Who would not rather read one of his Plays, where there is not a single Rule of the Stage 
observed, than any Production of a modern Critick, where there is not one of them 
violated? Shakespeare was indeed born with all the Seeds of Poetry… produced by the 
spontaneous Hand of Nature, without any Help from Art.”440  
Although Mendelssohn does not mention it, he was probably also aware of a 
recent, and even more radical development in English thought on genius: Edward 
Young’s 1759 Conjectures on original composition. In that work, Young vigorously defends 
both a strong preference for originality in art, as well as the rights of genius against what 
he considered to be stifling rules. “Rules, like Crutches, are a needful Aid to the lame, 
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tho’ an Impediment to the strong.”441 Even more strikingly, he assigns transcendent 
powers to the genius: “A Genius differs from a good Understanding, as a Magician from a 
good Architect; That [the former] raises his structure by means invisible; This [the latter] 
by the skilful use of common tools. Hence Genius has ever been supposed to partake of 
something Divine.”442 Perhaps Mendelssohn does not mention these English works only 
because he was interested in explanations of genius, and Young’s view in particular 
entails genius cannot be explained.  
From this background we can identify three points that would have especially 
interested Mendelssohn. First, to what extent can the use of rules be defended from the 
claims of genius? Mendelssohn raises this question explicitly in his 1759 review of 
Wieland’s Johanna Gray: “To our knowledge art critics have still thought very little about 
how to distinguish the boundaries of rules and genius from each other.”443 Second, how 
should the competing claims of the art critic and the genius be adjudicated? That is, if 
the genius’s work is not to be judged according to its adherence to rules, how can a critic 
claim to judge it with any kind of universal validity? Third, is the psychology of genius 
to be compared to a disorderly and chaotic force, whether natural or supernatural, 
something that needs reigning in by practice and taste, or does it rather serve to instill 
order and form? Mendelssohn recognized the threat that the radical claims of genius 
posed to the project of rationalist aesthetics. If genius makes rules irrelevant, then the 
                                                 
441 Edward Young, Conjectures on original composition (London: A. Millar, 1759), 28. Young does, 
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whole project of developing a science of aesthetics is doomed. If the critic must always 
defer to the genius, then criticism itself becomes at best a pointless exercise. And if 
genius itself is just a raw power of nature – or worse, a divine gift – then reason could 
lose its authority over the aesthetic domain altogether. Dubos and Trublet’s work is 
“insufficiently philosophical” because they gave ambiguous answers to all of these 
important questions. 
Baumgarten’s philosophical, but all-too-brief account of genius 
According to Baumgarten, genius is “a certain proportion of [the power of] the 
mental faculties.”444 Although Baumgarten does not elaborate much on the proportion 
that constitutes genius – other than to say that it involves a high degree of many of the 
faculties – his account is nonetheless broadly significant. For, in defining genius this 
way, he is attempting to explain it in terms of his already well-established and rationally 
grounded faculty psychology. If his view is correct, then genius would be nothing 
transcendent or supernatural, but simply a rare proportion of ordinary human abilities 
that allow a person to accomplish unusually great things. If vindicated, this approach 
would effectively answer those who attempt to place genius beyond the realm of 
criticism by assigning it transcendent or radically sui generis powers. As we will see, 
Mendelssohn was generally sympathetic toward this type of explanation, and he did 
some work toward elaborating on it. 
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Mendelssohn’s early comments on genius 
 Mendelssohn’s work on genius is primarily contained in several Literaturbriefe 
written between 1760 and 1764. There are, however, a few important scattered 
comments from his earlier writings. In the 1755 Briefe über die Empfindungen, he 
addresses the role of rules in artistic creation, writing that “Rules are preparations, by 
means of which the poet sets himself and the object to be depicted into a condition in 
which its beauties can be shown in their most powerful allure. During the execution [of 
the work], he must guard against having [the rules] too distinctly before his eyes. He 
must engage his whole attention only with the beauty of the whole. The rules should 
work only as it were from a distance on his imagination. In this way they can replace the 
lack of an extraordinary genius, and teach the poet what his genius was perhaps to small 
to invent.”445 The comment is ambiguous: it limits the effectiveness of rules even while 
suggesting that they can, at least to some extent, stand in for the author’s natural 
genius.446 This ambiguity can be resolved by recognizing that Mendelssohn viewed those 
rules as one and the same, “which the artist led by his genius exercises, and the critic 
through reflection abstracts.”447 In other words, the genius is in principle replaceable by 
rules because a great genius applies the same rules naturally and unconsciously which a 
lesser or non-genius can learn explicitly. At the same time, it may be practically 
impossible for a person to learn through explicit instruction those rules which the genius 
                                                 
445 JubA, 1:55. 
446 In the 1771 edition Mendelssohn has “Alsdenn können sie das geringere Genie dem grössern an die 
Seite setzen, und den Dichter das lehren, was sein Geist vielleiccht zu klein war, zu erfinden” (JubA, 
1:247). This makes it more clear that the difference between genius and art is a matter of degree, and a 
lesser genius can use rules to make for some of what he or she lacks compared to a greater genius. 
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follows instinctively and unconsciously. As Mendelssohn explains in a fragment written 
between 1757 and 1763, “He who has received no taste from nature [i.e., no genius] will 
grasp the rules of beauty as Sanderson [grasped] Newton’s theory of colors – as rational 
grounds, not as phenomena. But just as the judgments of the soul mix into the 
sentiments through long, repetitious practice and improve sensible judgment, in the 
same way the rules of beauty can purify and improve taste.”448 So, Mendelssohn thought 
that explicit knowledge of rules could improve art, but he did not have the wildly 
unrealistic expectation that this knowledge could actually serve as a replacement for 
genius in all cases. 
 And Mendelssohn clearly conferred a special value to genius. In the 1756 
“Sendschreiben eines jungen Gelehrten zu B.,” he suggests that flaws in the parts of a 
work can actually help draw attention to the beauty of the whole, but successfully 
executing this technique is reserved for the greatest artists, like Homer. “Perhaps,” he 
suggests, “this is because an all too careful working-out seems to betray more labor than 
genius.”449 This theme of downplaying the appearance of effort appears repeatedly in 
Mendelssohn’s works450 and shows that he admits something irreplaceable in the works 
of genius. In his 1757 treatise on the sublime, Mendelssohn claims that “the genius and 
extraordinary abilities of the artist”451 as evident in the work make up a kind of 
sublimity which we perceive with wonder. Still, though genius is irreplaceable in a 
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sense, it need not be understood as something supernatural or irreducible to common 
elements of psychology. 
 Mendelssohn took an opportunity to defend genius against the overly pedantic 
view of artistic production championed by Sulzer in his Kurzer Begriff aller Wissenschaften 
[Brief concept of all the sciences].452 In that work, Sulzer claims that in an ideal republic of 
letters, no one should be allowed to write without having first studied the entire corpus 
of the ancients “repeatedly and with effort.” “What about a Shakespeare?” Mendelssohn 
objects. Why should we allow those who cannot think for themselves, even if they had 
gone through the ancients in this way? “Genius can replace a lack of examples, but lack 
of genius is irreplaceable.”453 The final statement at the end is not nearly so radical as 
some have claimed.454 Just because genius can replace a lack of examples does not mean 
it ought to, or more importantly, that examples could not improve it further. And as we 
saw, that genius is irreplaceable in the production of art was already firmly established 
by the French. 
The review of Sulzer’s Analysis of genius 
 Mendelssohn first discussed genius at length in his April 3, 1760 review of 
Sulzer’s Analysis of genius,455 the first work to address genius from the Wolffian 
perspective which Mendelssohn broadly shared. Sulzer accepts the basic modern view 
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of genius as “what brings forth all great deeds and all masterly works in the arts and 
sciences, and through which a very few men tower over the great mass of others, and 
become the wonder of all times.”456 In true Wolffian fashion, he announces his intention 
to “analyze the concept of genius like a chemist” and trace the phenomenon to its 
ground both in the body and especially in the soul, which “gets to the heart of the 
matter.”457  
 Sulzer explains first that  genius “requires” the mental capacities of “attention, 
reflection, imagination, wit, memory and judgment” in order to carry out its work. 
Segreff sees this list of mental capabilities as evidence that Sulzer had an overly 
intellectual view of genius (63). But this is incorrect, because none of these faculties are 
characteristically intellectual, and the imagination is even characteristically non-
intellectual (i.e., sensible). The real purpose of Sulzer’s enumeration, and his whole 
analysis, is not to make genius something entirely intellectual, but rather to explain it in 
terms of rationalist psychology. Just as he had announced at the beginning of his 
treatise, Sulzer hoped to reduce genius down to a complex of concepts already 
understood.  
Sulzer writes next that genius “is not its own property of the soul, different from 
the others; rather it rules the others… It is as it were that in relation to the powers of 
cognition, which is temperament or humor in relation to the power of desire.”458 
Mendelssohn approves of this latter claim, which he traces back to Baumgarten’s 
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definition of genius (above).459 In a more narrow sense, explains Mendelssohn, genius 
involves “a certain proportion of cognitive powers which agree in such a way that a man 
who possesses them can perform certain things exceptionally.” (ibid). Mendelssohn’s 
subtle improvement relates the cognitive powers to particular productive ends, an 
important feature of genius Baumgarten had neglected. 
 Sulzer next enumerates the qualities which he believes constitute a happy 
proportion of faculties in general. First, genius requires liveliness of spirit, which is the 
power to bring forth many fruitful ideas. This encompasses both sharpsightedness, the 
ability to discover a variety of concepts connected to any given thing, and wit, through 
which the ideas are developed and similarities and dissimilarities discovered. Second, 
genius requires a “thoroughness of judgment… in order for the magnitude of these 
relations to be valued correctly.” Above all, Sulzer argues, the judgment of a genius is 
directed toward those relations which best bring out a maximal “effect of the whole” 
through a “noble simplicity” of elements.460 
 Thus far, Sulzer’s theory amounts to little more than a claim that the genius 
possesses all of the already enumerated mental capabilities at a very high degree. But 
the next quality he describes is more significant. Sulzer claims that genius additionally 
requires a certain presence of mind, or contenance, “which if necessary moderates the fire 
of the imagination and holds it back from extravagance; but primarily provides the soul 
with freedom to direct its attention to all sides, in order to oversee the object as a whole.” 
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Thus, at least in Sulzer’s initial formulation, contenance includes both a negative or 
restraining, as well as a positive or enabling aspect. Those lacking in this presence of 
mind will be carried away by their emotions and be rendered unable to stay focused on 
the ultimate end of the work, even if they possess the other requisite capabilities. 
As Sulzer explains his idea of “presence of mind” further, he seems to shift away 
from his initial formulation. He begins to write of contenance mostly as a means for 
correcting errors, and something opposed to the “fire” of creation. “The work of an artist 
who always works with fire can perhaps boast of gleaming and sublime strokes, but in 
the whole it would certainly contain errors. Whatever passion it may be, it always brings 
forth false judgments.” Significantly, Sulzer views contenance as something detached 
from the creative process itself, a process which Sulzer describes as decidedly 
nonrational: after “ordering and arranging everything” according to a plan, he explains, 
the artist “elevates and impassions himself, and puts himself into a holy rage, through 
which the presence of the divinity inspiring him announces itself. But upon this storm 
steadiness must follow, and with calm soul he must go back over what he brought forth 
in his attack of enthusiasm, he must investigate whether he did not drive his heat 
beyond the boundaries prescribed by reason.” Sulzer even endorses Horace’s 
recommendation that a poet should put off the publication of a work for nine years so 
that, with the benefit of contenance, all errors can be removed.461 
 While Mendelssohn approves of contenance as an essential aspect of genius, he 
wants nothing to do with Sulzer’s detailed explication of the concept. Sulzer did not 
                                                 
461 Sulzer, Schriften, 1:316-317. 
 178       
make the best use of this idea, he writes, expanding it too much into the realm of 
circumspection or prudence [Besonnenheit]. Such a property “transforms the creative 
genius… into a correct and error-free being, who remains always the same and shrinks 
from any reproach or scorn.”462 He rejects Sulzer’s endorsement of Horace’s nine-year 
prescription. It is laudable to improve one’s work, but not to aim fastidiously at the 
removal of every error – and in any case these corrections have nothing to do with 
genius. Quoting Trublet, Mendelssohn claims that “errors and offenses to taste are 
unavoidable in a work of genius” and that “the greatness in a work could not be brought 
out so successfully without the errors.” Indeed, the same point had also been made by 
pseudo-Longinus463 and by Baumgarten.464 
 Though he constantly tries to downplay his differences with Sulzer, 
Mendelssohn actually has a completely different idea of how contenance should be 
understood: namely, as the constant mastery of reason over the passions even in the 
most heated moment of creation. As he explains:  
The genius must be master over his enthusiasm; reason must rule in the 
disposition of his abilities, and even in the storm of passions not lose the wheel… 
This property is that, I reckon, through which genius becomes capable of the 
sublime; for everything that he brings forth in this disposition of mind will have 
the character of quiet majesty in itself… A man who drives before himself the 
greatest events and wildest passions happily and with a self-conscious greatness, 
like Addison’s angel did with his storm clouds, is in my opinion the most perfect 
mortal, and nearly exceeds the boundaries of human ability.465  
 
                                                 
462 JubA, 5.1:170. 
463 Longinus (pseudo), Longinus On the sublime, trans. W. Rhys Roberts (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1899), 127-129. 
464 Baumgarten, Aesthetica, §24. 
465 JubA, 5.1:170. 
 179       
Remarkably, Mendelssohn’s explanation places reason at the very forefront of the 
creative process itself.466 Perhaps, he suggests, the passionate representations of a genius 
only seem inspired and supernatural to lesser spirits because we lack the rational control 
and other cognitive abilities that they possess. But is this really a plausible counterpoint 
to Sulzer’s Dionysian “holy rage” and “divine inspiration?” Mendelssohn does not 
explain exactly how reason rules over the passions in this sense, nor does he develop 
this idea further in the present essay.  
He does, however, return to this theme several years later, in his 1764 
Literaturbrief on Karschin’s odes. Based on her work, Mendelssohn surmises that 
Karschin believes the ode to consist in a “beautiful disorder.” “But,” Mendelssohn 
points out, “the true critic recognizes a higher order in the ode, which is indeed hidden, 
but which ought never be neglected.”467 Mendelssohn explains that while the ode does 
not follow any temporal, spatial, or logical order, it ought to follow the order “of the 
inspired [begeisterten] imagination. The concepts in an inspired imagination achieve the 
highest degree of liveliness – just in this way and in no other must they follow each 
other in an ode.”468 Following the law-governed associative order of the fiery 
imagination, the odist skips over the less lively elements of her thoughts, even if they 
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would help a reader connect this series of thoughts together. This is the cause of the 
apparent disorder in an ode. 
Mendelssohn continues:  
Since the application of a plan to a poem, and thus also to an ode, is no work of 
inspiration [Begeisterung], but of contemplation [Nachdenken] and reflecting 
reason [überlegenden Vernunft], the plan of the ode must create unusual 
difficulties for the poet, for here reason must think [überdenken] which path 
fiery inspiration would take. One must establish through thinking and rational 
inference [Nachdenken und Vernunftschlüsse] which ideas will be the most 
lively, and in which order they will follow each other according to the laws of the 
imagination. The poet must therefore set himself in both constitutions at once, he 
must think and feel [nachdenken und empfinden], and one can easily see what 
difficulties this must make for him. If, entirely without a plan, he leaves himself 
to the stream of inspiration and invents, then he will indeed be able to bring forth 
a series of very lively concepts, but this series will seldom make up a whole, 
seldom have a subject and only through chance have the necessary unity and 
appropriate brevity…469  
 
Mendelssohn seems to reject poetic inspiration altogether when he claims that 
the poet need only understand the course the imagination would take, but the second part 
of the passage suggests that this understanding can only be gained by attending to 
immediate first-person feeling.470 Yet,  Mendelssohn admits that for some subjects, 
particularly “vigorous emotions,” the felt-emotion can immediately express itself in a 
poem without “art.” In this case “mere nature fulfills all the needs of art.” Still, for more 
moderate subjects, such as “hope, thanks, quiet joy, etc., nature without the guiding 
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thread of art is a very disagreeable [misliche] guide.”471 Mendelssohn does not explain 
why he makes an exception for more “vigorous” subjects; worse, it is not clear whether 
by “art” Mendelssohn means specific knowledge of rules, mere experience with existing 
art, or just the use of reason in general. His view here is unfortunately murky.472 
It is clear, though, that Mendelssohn accepted Dubos’ distinction between 
natural genius and studied art. For Mendelssohn, learned art and reasoning have a 
formal, high-level planning role, while genius and feeling bring forth the material of 
creation. This explains why genius without art tends to created unformed monstrosities 
that are beautiful in some parts but not as wholes. Now, how does this square with his 
idea from the review of Sulzer that reason is an essential, indeed the ruling part of 
genius itself? As we saw, the separation between a non-rational, productive genius and a 
rational, corrective capacity is precisely the view Mendelssohn had found so 
troublesome in Sulzer’s essay. 
To answer this question, we must recognize again that for Mendelssohn, feeling 
itself is just confused reason. His distinction between genius and art must be understood 
as one of degree, between highly distinct knowledge of rules (generally learned 
discursively) and more confused knowledge, which allows us to find similarities and 
distinctions without knowing the reasons underlying them. Thus reason is already 
operating confusedly even in someone with no distinct knowledge of aesthetic rules. 
With this in mind, we can think of contenance as a certain proportion of mental faculties 
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(following Baumgarten’s definition) in which more distinct thoughts constantly have 
mastery over the less distinct thoughts. Insofar as the more distinct thoughts do not rise 
to the level of learned rules, they remain a part of genius. Mendelssohn can indeed 
accept both the distinction between genius and art, and the idea that a ruling reason is 
an essential part of genius itself. 
The battle with Hamann 
Mendelssohn had been interested in the writings of Rousseau ever since Lessing 
asked him to translate his Discourse on the Origin of Inequality in 1755. While he often 
disagreed with Rousseau’s doctrines, he had the greatest respect for him as a writer and 
philosopher. For this reason, he explains, he began to read Rousseau’s novel Julie, or the 
New Heloise with the highest expectations. Unfortunately, these expectations were not to 
be met. When he had finally digested the massive work, he was so disappointed that he 
was moved to write not one but five critical Literaturbriefe, despite his periodical’s official 
policy of reviewing German works only. 
Mendelssohn’s critique of Julie consists of three general points. First, he attacks 
Rousseau for using his novel as a vehicle for espousing distinct philosophical 
arguments. Rather than including a lot of action, which should be the lifeblood of a 
story, Rousseau’s is filled with long and tedious moral speeches. The philosophy 
contained in these orations may have some value in itself, but Mendelssohn thinks its 
connection to the story is clumsy and ineffective. Mendelssohn even speculates that the 
speeches were written separately and then clumsily transplanted into the novel. 
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Rousseau’s work shows a lack of invention in that he did not bother to make his ideas 
sensible and felt, rather than merely thought by the reader. 
 Second, Mendelssohn complains that the characters’ expressions of passion are 
wildly out of proportion with what the reader could surmise to be their actual feelings. 
Not only does this make their hyperbolic pronouncements unnatural, but it also 
prevents the reader from feeling any sympathy for them.  “[Rousseau’s] passions chase 
off the imagination of his reader. They are already in the clouds, before the reader feels 
the slightest desire to climb up with them.” Mendelssohn heaps scorn on Rousseau’s 
Affektensprache, calling it “hair-splitting, affected, and bombastic.” “He who does not 
know a sentiment treads with difficulty on the approximately right part of the heart 
which appeals to this sentiment. Through proclamations and hyperbole one indeed 
becomes violent and exuberant, but does not move the heart. And I must admit that my 
heart remained ice-cold even through all the infatuated clamor of St. Preux. I could not 
even read it without aversion, for what makes a claim to sentiment must either arouse 
the sentiment or be distasteful.”473 
Third, Mendelssohn attacks the characters, especially St. Preux and Julie, for 
being unnatural and wildly implausible. St. Preux is supposed to be a philosopher, yet 
he is really nothing more than unvirtuous fool. And nothing seems to have bothered 
Mendelssohn more than Julie’s famous death scene. Far from seeming on the verge of 
her demise, “at every moment one doubts whether she is even sick.” Instead, Julie is 
animated and engaging in long and inappropriate casuistic pronouncements. 
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Mendelssohn points out, “If I am to admire the fortitude of Julie, along with her more-
than-Socratic courage with which she awaits death in her final hours, then Julie must be 
depicted as a mortal… I have to perceive the passion of her spirit and its triumph over the 
plague in her body… but [instead] Julie exceeds the sphere of humanity.” Mendelssohn 
diagnoses this as an example of excessive beautification,474 a fault he had pointed out in 
other contexts before.475 
On the last two points, Mendelssohn admits freely that he is not familiar with 
every “affectionate sentiment” that might exist in nature. But, he argues, such familiarity 
is not necessary for the critic. “In nature there can be many things which are unnatural 
in imitation. Before nature can serve the virtuoso as a guiding thread [Richtschnur], it 
must first itself be subjugated to the rules of aesthetic probability.”476 After chronicling a 
few of the most egregious examples of extravagance in Julie, Mendelssohn declares, “I 
believe that all these commotions are possible in nature. But who would [want to] 
describe everything that’s possible in nature?”477 This somewhat carelessly phrased 
statement would soon be bitterly satirized by Hamann. 
 Mendelssohn sums up his review by condemning Julie as “boring.”478 Regardless 
of the beautiful thoughts it might contain in places – and Mendelssohn does praise some 
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aspects of the work, like the character of Wolmar479 – to bore the reader is the greatest sin 
in a work that self-consciously aims to arouse the passions. 
 Shortly after this review had been published, the editors of the Literaturbriefe 
forwarded a provocative anonymous response to Mendelssohn, who immediately 
guessed that it was written by Hamann. He published Hamann’s letter, along with his 
own “anonymous” reply, complimenting himself for successfully imitating the mood of 
the original. “In addition to the irony, he has at the same time even affected the obscure 
and oracular writing style,”480 Mendelssohn says of himself. Evidently, Mendelssohn 
was confident that his response to Hamann was more than adequate. As I will argue, 
while Mendelssohn did effectively respond to some of Hamann’s points, he failed to 
recognize a more fundamental threat lurking in the background. 
 In his “Abelaerdus Virbius,” Hamann spares no rhetoric in expressing his 
negative attitude toward art criticism, and especially rationalism. He intentionally leaves 
his points suggestive and underdeveloped, wishing his “remarks, doubts, questions, 
suspicions, and insights,” written “in the tone of inspired taste” to be more than a match 
for Mendelssohn’s “sufficient reasons.”481 Repeatedly comparing criticism to a form of 
death482 opposed to the life of creation, Hamann tries to debase the value of the critic. He 
ridicules the rationalist idea that art represents universal truths sensibly: “The most 
powerful errors and truths, and the most immortal beauties and deadliest errors of a 
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book are invisible, like the elements, and those concern me least which one can set in 
appearance [Augenschein].”483 Here “appearance” is a reference to phenomena, the 
perfection of which rationalists understood as beauty; Hamann thinks art represents 
reality more directly. As a result, rationalist aesthetics is irrelevant to actual creation. 
Geniuses [witzige Köpfe] “are more supporters than true knowers of the beautiful 
sciences,”484 Hamann claims wryly. 
 Beyond the rhetoric, Hamann raises a variety of substantive objections to 
Mendelssohn’s review and to his general project of criticism. Most specifically, Hamann 
accuses Mendelssohn of failing to recognize a distinction between the dramatic and 
novel forms, and thus of judging Julie according to a false standard. “Perhaps Rousseau 
saw more deeply into the true nature of the novel”485 than Mendelssohn could fathom, 
and imbued his work with a particular kind of dialog for which he had a “special gift.”486  
Hamann also attacks the related standard of aesthetic probability, the belief in which he 
calls “superstitious.” “A humble observer of nature and society will take to heart the 
expression of one of the ancients… Incredibile, sed verum. Thus a kind of improbability 
might easily belong to the cultivation [Urbaren] of a story [Geschichte] and an aesthetic 
probability to the beauty of a poem.”487 In the cryptic passage which follows, he also 
suggests that even such general principles ought not be applied strictly, but rather 
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according to their sense, as understood through a sort of divine lens.488 This echoes 
Dubos’s remark that only one who is already gifted with genius can truly understand 
and properly make use of principles in aesthetics, while placing genius itself squarely in 
the realm of the supernatural.  
The central thrust of Hamann’s critique, however, is his attack on the idea that 
reason does and ought to play the sovereign in artistic representations of the passions. 
This attack consists of several steps. First, Hamann accuses Mendelssohn of judging Julie 
according to empty abstractions rather than his own feelings. “On account of your own 
certainty you would rather avoid every all-too-general conclusion [drawn] from your 
sentiments about the value of a book… [for my part] I’m not learned enough… to be 
able to analyze the essential concept of a novel, and not creative enough to invent it, not 
eloquent enough to make a chimera seem likely.”489 Second, Hamann argues that real 
love, in particular, stands beyond all analysis and rational criticism. Nothing could be 
more natural than that St. Preux, the philosopher, is made into a fool by his passion.  “A 
philosopher in love cannot possibly be anything but a foolish creation in our eyes… [for] 
love, like death, makes philosophers into idiots.”490 Love cannot be understood through 
reason; it must be lived and experienced in the concrete. “If only a pair of black eyes 
could work enough wonder on your ice-cold heart, sir, to transform it into a blossoming 
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springtime,”491 then Mendelssohn might perhaps understand this. If he did, he would 
see that all his complaints about excess and extravagance in Rousseau’s characters’ 
expressions of love are futile and misguided. His heart would not have been left “ice-
cold,” as Mendelssohn himself had put it in his original review. 
Hamann next broadens this same line of attack. With the aid of some anti-Semitic 
epithets that cut through Mendelssohn’s flimsy anonymity, he ridicules the claim that 
some objects are unsuitable for aesthetic depiction. “Who is this aesthetic Moses, the 
citizen of a free state, to prescribe weak and wretched principles (which say there: you 
shall not grasp that, you shall not taste this, you shall not touch that. Many things in 
nature are impure and mean for an imitator – including everything that’s possible, don’t 
let yourself be overcome with desire!).”492 The  polemic culminates in the conclusion that 
reason should play at most a subdued role in aesthetic matters. Reason has no right to 
constrain the emotions or their expression: “How could reason wish to proscribe the 
passions? Why do you [Sie] want to subject the firstborn affect of the human soul to the 
yoke of circumcision [Beschneidung]? Can you [du] play with it as with a bird? Or bind 
it with your [deinen] rules? Don’t you [Sie] see that in this way you tear down the only 
lighthouses that can serve as guides for both you and others?”493 
Mendelssohn’s reply is comprehensive, but its central point is that Hamann is 
dead wrong to think that the rationalist critics judge works on the basis of abstractions. 
Rather, even they judge works first according to feeling and sentiment, and only then, 
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post facto, supply abstract reasons which attempt to account for and explain these 
feelings. “If the aesthetic magician wants to show me his miracle, then his first miracle 
must be to secure my belief… He must either enchant my sentiments, or I am 
incredulous. He may even foam and cry: I see apparitions rising up from the earth! I must 
see them myself, or I’ll believe they only inhabit his head [es geht in seinem Gehirne 
um].”494 Only then, after she has already felt incredulity, does the critic “have a right… to 
bring mistrust into [the author’s] secretive arts” (ibid.) and attempt to analyze where 
and why the illusion went wrong.  
Mendelssohn explains what he finds so repugnant about Hamann’s defense of 
Rousseau in the following passage: “See! I was in a magical world, where I grasped 
nothing, found little plausible, and was supposed to believe everything all the more 
strongly. My spirit was not sufficiently prepared for this sublime ecstasy, in which we 
see what no eye has yet uncovered, grasp with our hands where there is nothing—hear, 
taste, believe—and are ashamed to ask: why?”495 The primary objection here is not that 
Hamann lacks articulable reasons for his high estimation of Julie. Rather, Mendelssohn is 
arguing that it is incoherent for Hamann to claim he is somehow deficient for not feeling 
a certain way upon reading Julie. Only with respect to this observation does 
Mendelssohn complain that Hamann refuses to provide any reasoned explanation of his 
perspective.496 
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Although Mendelssohn does not directly address Hamann’s objection to his 
claim that some objects are unsuitable for aesthetic depiction, it is straightforward to 
reconstruct a plausible response. Hamann had rather offensively compared 
Mendelssohn’s “prohibitions” on aesthetic depiction to those of Jewish dietary law, 
implying that they are both arbitrary. But whatever account might be given about 
Kashrut itself, its prohibitions are different from Mendelssohn’s proposed aesthetic 
boundaries in two salient ways. First, the prohibitions of Kashrut are categorical, while 
Mendelssohn’s proposed restrictions are relative to human sentiment and feeling. 
Mendelssohn does not claim there is anything wrong with extravagant outbursts per se. 
It is only insofar as they do not convince readers of the characters’ underlying passions 
and stimulate their interest that their claim to being represented artistically is dubious. 
This alone would make them non-arbitrary, provided we assume some affinity among 
human sentiment. Second, Kashrut has to do only with reality, not fiction. Since we 
know that Mendelssohn was generally very permissive about which natural objects 
merit artistic representation, it is reasonable to restrict statements about the 
representational unsuitability of some objects to fictions. While real objects can always 
be depicted in various ways, fictional objects have no real existence independent of the 
way in which they are depicted. For this reason, if a fictional object is tasteless and 
uninteresting, then quite plausibly it ought not be represented aesthetically at all. 
Notwithstanding this subtlety, Mendelssohn could not help but include an ironic jab at 
                                                                                                                                                 
review of Hamann’s “Urtheil des Geschmacks,” Mendelssohn writes that it is “better not to judge at 
all, than to bring out judgments without reasons” (JubA, 5.1:564). 
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Hamann’s “microscopic” style: “Does nature have no objects that are more worthy of 
imitation than mold?”497 
Mendelssohn next turns the tables on Hamann, accusing him of judging 
according to abstractions. Of course there is a difference between a drama and a novel, 
he concedes. But that simply means that there is a generally “novelish [romanhafte]” 
way of expressing truth, not some sui generis “true nature of the novel.” Since the novel 
form is conventional, it has no nature in itself – unless of course Rousseau created this 
nature ex nihilo through his supposedly divine power. Since (presumably) Rousseau 
cannot really do this, the “true nature of the novel” cannot be anything but an 
abstraction. It is far more legitimate to demand, as Mendelssohn does, that the novel be 
judged according to the general aim of all art, namely, to represent rational truths 
aesthetically.498 
Mendelssohn also admits that the critic cannot rightly forbid lovers from 
expressing their love how they wish, but that doesn’t make every possible expression 
worth reading about.499 Mendelssohn ridicules Hamann for assuming that he cannot 
understand any language but the critical.500 The irony here is especially rich because, 
even while Hamann accused Mendelssohn of having an “ice-cold heart” and not truly 
understanding love, Mendelssohn was busy exchanging Liebesbriefe with his fiancée in 
Hamburg, with whom he had fallen in love less than six month prior! (She had blue 
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eyes, not black). So, unbeknownst to Hamann, Mendelssohn was actually in the best 
personal position to know that one need not speak with the excess and extravagance of 
Rousseau’s characters in order to feel and express real passion. By implication, 
Mendelssohn again accuses Hamann of judging according to abstractions – this time by 
assuming that a critic must judge according to some self-alienated ideal of “the critic’s 
role” instead of according to his own lived feelings. 
Mendelssohn’s response culminates in a parable about Socrates, which he 
borrows from Hamann’s own Sokratische Denkwürdigkeiten [Socratic Memorabilia].501 “It is 
true,” Mendelssohn writes, “Socrates the sculptor clothed the Graces in order not to 
expose their naked charms to every unchaste eye; but if I can draw conclusions from the 
works of philosophy to the work of the artist; he will have clothed but not hidden the 
fair beauties. The gown must let the stature, the agility and the free swing of the limbs 
shine through without envy, so that the eyes of the spirit enjoys what is removed from 
the fleshly eyes.”502 The message of the parable is clear: Hamann is wrong to exclude 
reason altogether from aesthetic matters. By means of feeling and passion alone, creation 
remains raw, and if not distasteful, then at least not as pleasurable as it could be 
otherwise. By cutting out reason, Hamann wrongly denies aesthetic experience to one 
essential part of our humanity. 
No doubt as a result of Hamann’s obscurity and thinly-veiled hostility, 
Mendelssohn was uncomfortable providing his usual careful and deliberate analysis of 
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the issues dividing them. This is truly unfortunate, for it meant that Mendelssohn never 
adequately engaged with the real core of Hamann’s views, even though he easily 
parried the Stürmer und Dränger’s clumsy attacks on rationalism. Hamann’s deeper view 
is only hinted at in the “Abelaerdus” essay in the famous line, “all the aesthetic 
thaumaturgy in the world is no substitute for immediate feeling, and nothing but the 
hellish journey of self-knowledge paves the way to our apotheosis.”503 In the Aesthetica in 
nuce, a later essay which Hamann basically addressed to Mendelssohn, the implications 
of this pronouncement become clearer:  Hamann does not think art ought to represent 
universal truths at all. Rather, he thinks that art is primarily an expression of one’s 
individuality, which transcends all universal principles. His attack on abstraction also 
becomes more sophisticated in this later work. He does not simply accuse rationalists of 
judging according to abstraction. Instead, he suggests that their use of abstraction in 
deriving aesthetic rules has actively corrupted feeling.504 This is a far more cogent 
objection than anything found in “Abelaerdus.” Yet in his review of the Aesthetica in 
nuce, Mendelssohn, frustrated by the obscure style and doubtless annoyed at the 
author’s lack of basic civility, limits himself to criticizing Hamann’s obscure and 
extravagant style and does not attempt to address these concerns. The debate had come 
to a sadly premature end. 
Overall, while Mendelssohn defended a coherent view of the relation between 
genius and rules, he failed to support, let alone defend, his thesis that explicit and 
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discursive knowledge of rules tends to improve the creation of art.505 Even if Hamann is 
wrong to say that abstraction corrupts feeling, it might still be useless for improving it. 
Nor is it enough to say that feeling is confused reason, for it does not follow directly 
from this that by analyzing that feeling, making it more distinct and bringing it under 
rules, we can someday hope to “surpass the ancients” in the actual creation of beautiful 
art.  
Mendelssohn’s response to Resewitz’s Versuch über das Genie 
 In 1755 a certain intellectual society was founded in Berlin. Its theme was coffee 
and billiards, and every four weeks one of its number would present a paper they had 
written. Among its illustrious members were Lessing, Nicolai, the great mathematican 
Leonhard Euler, Mendelssohn, and a theologian and philosopher by the name of 
Friedrich Gabriel Resewitz, who had studied under Baumgarten and Meier in Halle. In 
this society, Nicolai reports decades later, Resewitz’s work Versuch über das Genie [Essay 
on genius] first came to light.506 The essay, which was presented in two parts, was 
subsequently published in a (now) little known series of Nicolai’s personal imprint 
entitled Sammlung vermischter Schriften zur Beförderung der schönen Wissenschaften und 
Künste [Collection of various writings for the advancement of the beautiful sciences and arts]. 
Mendelssohn, in turn, published reviews of each part of the work in the Briefe, die neueste 
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Literatur betreffend [Letters concerning the most recent literature], a periodical that he ran 
with Lessing and Nicolai.  
Versuch über das Genie, Part 1 
In this first half of his essay (“Versuch 1”), Resewitz explains that genius is a 
special quality responsible for the aesthetic value of the best art. He worries, however, 
that this concept is not well understood, and might be wrongly invoked in order to 
inflate the value of mediocre works. Since artists themselves think of genius as a feeling 
– “a fire, an inspiration, an I-know-not-what” – the philosopher needs to step in and 
provide a distinct analysis of the concept to prevent this sort of abuse.507 In Versuch 1, 
however, Resewitz says little that had not already been argued by Dubos and Trublet. 
He even seemed infected by the same ambiguity about the role of rules in the creation of 
art. On the one hand he writes that “the knowledge of the rules of proportion still 
provides no knowledge of the true bearing, light, expression, and appropriate contrast 
in a painting, etc… These rules do not make up genius, they don’t even develop it, 
rather they merely teach the genius – which is already there and which already works – 
the correct and harmonious composition of his work.”508 But he claims immediately 
afterward that great artists often break rules, “either to sacrifice them to a more 
important rule or to bend them so that they better apply to the present case,”509 which of 
course sounds like an endorsement of rules in artistic creation after all. Indeed, Resewitz 
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goes on to admit explicitly that rules are necessary but not sufficient for the creation of 
art.510 
In his largely neutral review of this work, Mendelssohn correctly recognizes the 
ordinariness of the essay, and only takes issue with Resewitz’s claim that genius does 
not apply to the “higher [i.e., intellectual] sciences” because work in these sciences lacks 
passion and fire.511 According to Mendelssohn, all sciences require a good use of the 
understanding to properly address their objects. Since (following Baumgarten) genius is 
a certain proportion of the mental faculties, all objects of creation and cognition should 
have a genius particularly suited to them. For the sciences, Mendelssohn suggests that 
there is a genius for each kind of cognition in the Wolffian scheme: a historical genius 
(who is unusually capable of knowing particular facts), a philosophical genius (who 
knows the reasons for these facts unusually well), and a mathematical genius (who is 
unusually capable of knowing the relations among quantities). 
Versuch über das Genie, Part 2: First half 
In the second and far more interesting part of the essay (“Versuch 2”), Resewitz’s 
goal is to explain what he considers to be the most essential aspect of genius – its ability 
to invent [das Genie der Erfindung]. He goes on to vigorously defend the novel thesis 
that genius, especially insofar as it invents, consists specifically in a great power of 
intuition. This, along with claims toward the end of the work that human beings are 
capable of an intuition of God and the souls of others, has led commentators to read 
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Resewitz as a Stürmer und Dränger, i.e. as one who agrees with Hamann that intuition 
can provide us with direct insights into the supernatural.512 Yet this reading does not 
hold water, for Resewitz was no enthusiast. As we will see, his views about intuition 
begin from the works of the rationalists Wolff and Baumgarten, and he constantly 
strives to retain as much of the rationalist view as possible, even while attempting to get 
beyond it in a very specific way. Of course, this makes Mendelssohn’s extremely critical 
review of the work even more interesting. Why was Mendelssohn so wary even of 
Resewitz’s qualified panegyric to intuition? And what is the real target of his criticism? 
Is it right to say with Rosenthal that Mendelssohn “decisively attacked” Resewitz’s 
“unphilosophical mixture of cognition and sentiment?”513 As I will argue, things are not 
nearly so straightforward. Resewitz’s view turns out to be quite nuanced, and many of 
Mendelssohn’s objections fail to stick because Resewitz’s position is in many ways not 
so different from Mendelssohn’s own.  
In this section, I consider and reject several possible explanations for 
Mendelssohn’s negative appraisal of Resewitz’s work. I argue that the primary target of 
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Mendelssohn’s criticism, at least insofar as it is good criticism, is Resewitz’s idea that a 
form of intellectual intuition can lead us to novel intellectual truths. 
The second part of Resewitz’s Versuch 2 can be divided roughly into two halves. 
In the first half, Resewitz argues that genius consists in intuition. He begins with a 
strange question: why, he asks, are those who cannot understand the distinct truths of 
mathematics called stupid, even though we immediately forgive others who don’t 
bother to learn and understand metaphysics? The answer, Resewitz claims, is that the 
truths of mathematics are capable of being represented through simple intuitions, while 
the truths of metaphysics are not. Thus, those who are incapable of mathematics must 
lack a great capacity for intuition.514 Resewitz is presumably interested in stupidity 
because Baumgarten had defined stupidity as the opposite of genius, i.e. as a lack of the 
proportion of mental faculties which make up genius.515 Thus, by means of a kind of 
ordinary language argument, Resewitz hopes to give us prima facie reason for thinking 
that stupidity consists in lack of intuition, suggesting that genius consists in a great 
power of intuition. But what did Resewitz mean by ‘intuition’?  
Part of the answer is clear from the beginning of the work. Following Wolff’s 
standard definition, Resewitz writes that intuition is a direct and immediate 
representation “of the thing itself,” or, as he often puts it, a representation of something 
in concreto.516 Intuitive cognition is contrasted with symbolic cognition, in which we 
substitute a sign for the thing itself, generally in order to facilitate abstract thought. 
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Mendelssohn accepted this explanation of intuition as well, though as part of an 
expanded definition: “one calls a cognition intuitive when the object of the same is either 
immediately present to our senses, or represented through such signs which allow us to 
see the ideas of the designated more distinctly than the signs themselves.”517 This 
expansion allowed for imagination, especially as induced vividly by poetic discourse, to 
count as intuitive cognition. Resewitz seems to have accepted the expanded definition as 
well, writing that the “easiest and most visible intuitive cognition… [is one that] least 
requires signs.”518  
 In the remainder of the first half of Versuch 2, Resewitz attempts to establish a 
sharp contrast between abstract, symbolic thinking and intuitive thinking. Abstract 
thinking, he writes, operates symbolically on words instead of things. Those inclined to 
this type of thinking are able to churn out an infinite variety of empty and useless 
concepts by means of a “mechanical” process. This process can produce ideas that seem 
novel, but which in the end, like the doctrines of medieval scholasticism, have no 
relation to reality and are ultimately without value. Those with a high degree of intuitive 
cognition, on the other hand, build up their objects from experience, and “create in 
concreto” rather than in the abstract.519 Intuition ensures both a relation to reality, and 
real value and significance for all products of art, writes Resewitz. Since genius is what 
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gives value to works (as he had argued in the first part of his essay), he concludes again 
that genius consists in intuition. That explains, he says, why students of art cannot 
merely memorize rules; they must also study a variety of great examples and also watch 
their masters work.520  
Now, the attack on excessively abstract and mechanical thinking is relatively 
uncontroversial, and Mendelssohn himself immediately endorses it in his review.521 In 
fact, Mendelssohn had long held the same position. In a review of another work written 
more than year previously, he had approvingly cited Bacon’s comment about abstract 
scholastic system-building: “They are like spider webs: indeed fine, but also useless.”522  
But Mendelssohn seems much less sanguine about Resewitz’s claim that the 
proper contrast to mechanical and scholastic thinking is intuition. In his review, he 
disparagingly attributes to Resewitz the view that “the pictorial [bildliche] or intuitive 
cognition is the only means of grasping, discovering, and inventing truth, of becoming a 
genius.”523 This is something of an exaggeration on Mendelssohn’s part. Resewitz plainly 
does give credit to some abstract thinkers, writing “The more these [excessively abstract 
thinkers] deserve our ridicule and censure, the more fame those true philosophers 
deserve who are capable of bringing truths, which are in and for themselves abstract… 
to the sentiment of their fellow citizens, without harming their distinctness and 
correctness… who collect together abstract truths out of intuitive cognition, and then 
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know how to bring them back to intuition.”524 To this Mendelssohn responds that 
abstract thought need not be brought back to intuition in order to be valuable and the 
product of genius. Was Meier more of a genius than Baumgarten just because he 
supplied examples for the system of aesthetics that Baumgarten had developed? What 
about Newton’s discovery of the laws of motion, and Leibniz’s invention of calculus? 
Did they have less genius than those who applied their theories to particular cases?525 
Indeed, Resewitz himself admits elsewhere that the ability to see the universal in the 
particular requires and displays more genius than the ability to supply a particular for a 
given universal.526 And according to standard rationalist psychology, the former (the 
cognition of the universal in the particular) is a straightforwardly intellectual, non-
intuitive cognition derived from the distinct analysis of an originally confused intuition.  
From all this, Mendelssohn concludes that either Resewitz is operating with an 
excessively broad definition of intuition – one that really includes more abstractly-
oriented cognitive faculties – or he is inconsistent and does not really think that intuition 
is the specific essence of genius.527 This is a fair point. Resewitz, however, has yet to 
provide his more detailed analysis of intuition, which Mendelssohn considers in his next 
Literaturbrief. 
In the end, writes Mendelssohn in the first half of his review, “all the 
observations brought out by [Resewitz] prove at most that an unfruitful cognition, 
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whether it is singular or universal, indicates a lack of genius.”528 Yet this gloss does not 
seem to capture Resewitz’s position at all. Resewitz had pointed out that purely abstract 
thought can indeed be highly fruitful in the sense that it leads to a great variety of novel 
ideas, which often take on the (false) appearance of genius. He never complained that this 
sort of thinking was unfruitful, but rather 1) that it proceeded mechanically, which left 
its products without life and passion; and 2) that works created in this way often bore no 
relation to reality. And it does seem quite plausible both 1) that the way to avoid both of 
these pitfalls might be to focus on something like intuition rather than words and 
abstractions, and 2) that by exercising this power in a very high degree, one could 
achieve the opposite of lifeless, unnatural works – in other words, lively works that 
connect deeply to nature—works of genius. Thus Mendelssohn’s summing up of 
Resewitz’s position is at best uncharitable. 
Versuch 2, second half: the nature of intuition 
The second half of Resewitz’s Versuch 2 consists of an analysis of the cognitive 
power of intuition and a discussion of its possible objects. It is meant primarily to 
elaborate on, rather than argue for Resewitz’s claim that genius consists in intuition. 
Nonetheless, the extreme range that Resewitz attributes to intuition would, if correct, 
certainly become at least an important aspect of genius. This is where, according to 
Mendelssohn, Resewitz assigns to genius inappropriately transcendent powers. 
Unfortunately, as I will argue, this ends up being an extremely messy dispute without a 
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clear resolution, and does more to exhibit an unmet challenge to Mendelssohn’s view 
than to shed light on it.  
Resewitz begins by describing the act of intuition in this way:  
The more relations, connections, and modifications one views in an object, the 
more various cases one thinks about it, the more perspectives one can see in it – 
thus the more genius one has to work on that object…. He who has cognized an 
object intuitively must have seen it according to its position, according to the 
particular turn [Wendung] of his soul, and according to the turn [Wendung] of 
the object itself, or so that I might more tersely and completely express myself, 
according to his individuality and the individuality of his object.529  
 
The idea that viewing an object as an individual amounts to seeing it according to many 
determinations, relations and connections stems from Wolff and Baumgarten, both of 
whom held that the individual is ens omnimode determinatum, a thing determined in 
every way.530 Resewitz explains that all mental faculties, including distinct and abstract 
thinking, should be utilized in gaining a fuller understanding of a thing’s 
determinations. He emphasizes that in order to best consider a thing in its individuality, 
we must “frequently return from intuition [of the particular cases] to abstraction” 
although we “should not remain there, but rather return from the latter to the former” in 
order to see each thing “in its true light and natural position.”531 
Mendelssohn, too, accepted the idea that intuition characteristically represents 
individuals, especially beginning in his 1761 Rhapsodie, where he claims that intuition 
represents the “particular, determinate, and real.”532  He also agreed that an intuition 
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531 Resewitz, Versuch, 3:43. 
532 PS, 2:62; JubA, 1:422. 
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would be fuller and more satisfying if it encompassed more “relations and connections.” 
For example, he had described part of the enjoyment of beauty in the 1755 Briefe über die 
Empfindungen as follows: “Through the intuition of the whole [following an analysis of 
the parts], the parts will lose their bright colors, but they will leave behind traces which 
explain the concept of the whole, and give the pleasure which arises from it a greater 
liveliness.”533 For Mendelssohn, however, this process primarily makes the subsequent 
cognition of the whole more sensible, i.e. more “extensively clear.” (As Baumgarten had 
explained, the cognition of a thing is more extensively clear when its clarity is based on 
more determinations or notes of the thing, without regard to how well we perceive those 
notes).534 Being “sensible” has only to do with the degree of clarity in certain aspects of 
the perception and is logically independent from its being “intuitive.” So, it seems that 
Mendelssohn would have agreed that perceiving an object according to more of its 
relations and determinations is in some sense a “greater” or more effective cognition, 
but  perhaps he would not have agreed that this is explained by that cognition being 
more intuitive. Unfortunately, his exact position here is not clear from his review. 
In any case, Resewitz does provide a reason to think that the kind of cognition he 
has in mind is not just more sensible, but also more intuitive: namely, its focus on 
individuality. For Resewitz, intuition does not simply focus on any determinations and 
relations, which might be general or particular, but specifically on those that make up 
the object’s individuality. Looking at things in this way, he thinks, can guarantee the 
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novelty characteristic of genius. “One’s intuition cannot be perfectly the same as the 
intuition of others, but must in certain respects be one’s own, consequently new in 
relation to the others, and consequently flow from one’s own source.”535  In other words, 
if I begin by considering something in its fullness, along with many of its varying 
aspects which I grasp on the basis of my own beliefs and experiences, then my artistic 
representation of that thing cannot but be original. And this focus on individuality 
seems to qualify the cognition as intuitive even in Mendelssohn’s sense. Indeed, 
Mendelssohn does not seem to take issue with the claims Resewitz makes in this part of 
his essay. He instead reserves his condemnation for the next section of the Versuch über 
das Genie, in which Resewitz further expands the notion of intuition. Based on the texts, 
the exact direction of this further expansion and Mendelssohn’s criticism of it might 
seem to take several forms, which I next discuss in turn. 
Does Resewitz try to introduce a transcendent form of intuition? 
One might think that Mendelssohn is keen to attack Resewitz because Resewitz’s 
intuition amounts to a special mental faculty, one radically different in kind from 
reason. But this cannot be right, for Resewitz makes very clear that he considers his 
intuition a form of reason, and not something that transcends it. This comes out in his 
rather strange leading example of the exercise of intuition, that of Frederick the Great’s 
genius for battle and statesmanship in creating a plan for war. Resewitz employs a long 
series of rhetorical questions to describe his example, which he takes to show that: 1. 
Frederick’s imagination and wit take their command from his reason; 2. his plan 
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depends on his rational insight into the connection of the various elements involved in 
it; 3. this insight alone is the “inexhaustible source” of all the means for war-planning 
which his genius invents and connects toward his intended purpose; 4. most 
importantly, he claims that Frederick’s thought is no less a form of reason because it 
operates on individual things (troops, weapons, terrain, and so forth) with all of their 
manifold properties and relations. Rather, the fact that his reason can operate on such 
concrete objects specifically explains Frederick’s genius for warfare.536 Resewitz 
concludes that intuitive cognition is  rational in the wide sense, i.e. it is a perception of 
the universal principles in things.537  
This example is dubious for two reasons. First, it is not very plausible that 
Frederick would or could consider every troop and position in its individuality, instead 
of abstractly (as numbers, levels of force and resistance, etc.). Second, even if Frederick 
does perform some kind of intuitive survey, it is not clear that this act could be 
responsible for his production of the plan. These problems notwithstanding, it is very 
clear that Resewitz does not intend his intuition to transcend reason, and his 
subsequent, more detailed analysis of intuition bears this out. 
Is Resewitz trying to argue for the possibility of a perfect induction or a perfectly 
distinct intuition? 
According the Baeumler, one of (and indeed the main) goal of Resewitz’s work is 
to defend the possibility of a perfectly distinct intuition, i.e. a “perfect induction” in 
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which we would actually immediately intuit the universal law in a series of 
particulars.538 Resewitz does seem to argue for this possibility in some places. He begins 
with a claim that intuition can be intellectual. For Wolff and Baumgarten, he explains, 
the object of aesthetic cognition539 is strictly speaking sensible cognition, not intuitive 
cognition.540 But they also held that art is perceived through intuition, and the pleasure it 
gives us is based on the intuition of its perfection. Thus they concluded, explains 
Resewitz, that intuition is to be classed with the lower, sensible faculties, and excluded 
from the intellectual faculties.541  
But who proved, Resewitz asks, that the “higher faculties” deal only with 
generalities, or with “so-called intensive distinctness? Who really has a greater 
understanding? The one who grasps a universal truth distinctly, or the one who surveys 
it just as distinctly in thousands of connections, in thousands of different individual 
[aspects], and sees it as it were in a lively and effective way? Is the reason that connects 
universal truths more excellent than that which seeks out, finds, and sees the connection 
of this truth as it really is in nature…?”542 Resewitz’s claim that intuition is a form of 
reason is neither new nor controversial,543 but his apparent claim that intuition can be 
perfectly distinct appears very radical. 
                                                 
538 Baeumler, Das Irrationalitätsproblem, 237-238. 
539 With respect to Wolff, I mean the cognition of art objects like buildings; Wolff’s work actually 
predates the concept of aesthetic cognition, which was invented by Baumgarten. 
540 Resewitz, Versuch, 3:38. 
541 Resewitz, Versuch, 3:39. 
542 Resewitz, Versuch, 3:40. 
543 This is true not only in the sense that (for rationalists) intuition contains only rational content, but 
also in the deeper sense that rational truths inherently depend on the relation between the part and the 
whole. This is because “metaphysical truth” (on which all propositional truth ultimately depends) is 
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“Intensive distinctness” (actually “intensive clarity”) is Baumgarten’s term for 
cognition which primarily aims to discover the principles underlying a narrower set of 
determinations (i.e., greater distinctness), and is opposed to “extensive clarity.” 
According to Baumgarten, there is an inherent tradeoff in these capabilities, so that if we 
want to achieve greater distinctness, we need to abstract from the intuition of the object 
as a whole, and deal more with abstract rather than concrete universals. But Resewitz 
seems to deny this when he claims that a person with genius might understand a truth 
“just as distinctly” in concreto as in the abstract.544 A person capable of this would 
achieve a kind of intellectual intuition akin to a “perfect induction”: a distinct 
apprehension of a universal truth within the immediate intuitive cognition of one or 
several individuals. Resewitz terms this type of intuition an “intuition of the 
understanding.” 
Mendelssohn disagrees that such a cognition is possible for human beings on 
two grounds. First, he writes that even if an intuition could be maximally distinct, such a 
cognition would not have beauty as its object, for beauty is essentially a sensible or 
confused phenomenon. This is best illustrated by the fact that mathematical truths, 
which are intuitable by Resewitz’s own admission, cannot be beautiful – this is, 
presumably, because mathematical objects are intellectual, not sensible.545 But Resewitz 
has a ready response to this objection. He could simply concede that mathematical 
                                                                                                                                                 
an expression of perfection, and perfection is an agreement of the parts with the whole. See Wolff, 
Ontologia, §499, §503; Baumgarten, Metaphysica, §89, §94. 
544 Baeumler (Das Irrationalitätsproblem, 236) and Costazza (Genie und tragische Kunst, 80) view Resewitz 
as the “truest follower” of Baumgarten, but in this critical respect he went beyond anything 
Baumgarten had dreamed of. 
545 JubA, 5.1:487-488. 
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truths cannot be intuited in the right way after all, simply because they are not truths 
about individual things. This would leave Mendelssohn begging the question, for it is at 
least plausible that a fully distinct intuition could contribute to our experience of beauty, 
provided that the object of this cognition were an individual. And even if Mendelssohn 
is right to say that beauty is essentially sensible, Resewitz may still be right to say that 
intuition, which on his view can take both sensible and intellectual forms, is most 
essential to and characteristic of genius. 
Second, Mendelssohn argues that “abstraction is indispensable to the most 
complete induction” because “we cannot distinguish anything without the help of 
abstraction and therefore cannot learn anything even from a complete induction [of 
intuited individuals] alone.”546 That is, in order to perceive the universal in an 
individual, we need to abstract from its individual properties simply because of our 
inherent cognitive limitations. But to the extent that we abstract from the thing’s 
individuality, we no longer consider it intuitively, in concreto, but rather as a 
representative of a kind to which we have attached a name to represent it in thought. 
And this kind of cognition is symbolic, not intuitive. While higher beings may be able to 
perceive universals with relatively less use of symbolic cognition, Mendelssohn writes 
(clearly echoing Baumgarten547), “we must be content with the part [of knowledge] 
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granted to us, and make use of abstraction and symbolization [Bezeichnung] as well as 
we can.”548 
While Mendelssohn seems correct on this point, Resewitz himself heavily 
qualifies his original claim to the point that he seems to agree fully with Baumgarten 
and Mendelssohn anyway. As he writes, “Induction is the intuition of the 
understanding; the greater it is, the richer is the intuition, the more one approaches the 
intuition of the universal in all particular cases; the more extensive [ausgebreiteter] and 
greater is the understanding.”549 This seems more like the commonly accepted idea that 
we can approach but not achieve a perfectly distinct intuition of a universal. Thus when 
Resewitz wrote “just as distinctly [as in the abstract]” above, he plausibly meant merely 
that one could strive to give an intuition the same distinctness as an abstraction, not that 
one could actually achieve this.  
Resewitz does occasionally speak of a person having “achieved” the intuition of 
a conceptual truth, but explains what he means as follows: “As long as the 
understanding as it were rests above this survey [of many particulars, as particulars], or 
returns from abstraction to this survey, thus far it cognizes the universal concept and its 
truth intuitively.”550 This sounds more like a description of a cognition that involves both 
intuitive and conceptual elements – a symbolic grasp of the universal combined or 
juxtaposed with an intuitive survey of the individuals – not a “perfect induction” or 
„perfectly distinct intuition.” In the end, the disagreement between Mendelssohn and 
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Resewitz on the possibility of a “perfect induction” seems to be more rhetorical than 
substantive. 
The substantive disagreement: How far can rational intuition extend? 
Beyond the “intuition of the understanding” Resewitz posited yet a higher form 
of intellectual intuition. He describes this higher cognition as an intuition of the 
connection of universal truths—an “intuition of reason,” named after reason’s 
characteristic role in cognizing the connections among universal truths. This kind of 
intuition is intended to fill a very specific role in Resewitz’s psychology. As he explains, 
intuition grasps things in their individuality, so normally an object “must either be 
brought before the senses, or be depicted through the imagination, if one wants to 
achieve an intuition of it.”551 Does it follow from this that we cannot gain intuition of 
ourselves, other souls, and God? Remarkably, Resewitz answers that we can have 
intuitions of these things after all, “just not in the perfection, distinctness and certainty 
which we are able to achieve in relation to sensible objects.”552 He explains that we can 
achieve an intuition of these objects by collecting information from sources that are 
available to sense and imagination. Because an “intuition of reason” intuits the 
connections among truths, we can build up an intuition of our own soul through self-
reflection in conjunction with theories of psychology. And, he claims, we can also attain 
an “intuition of reason” of God and other minds.  
                                                 
551 Resewitz, Versuch, 3:51. 
552 Resewitz, Versuch, 3:53. 
 212       
To achieve these intuitions, we have two methods at our disposal. First, by 
observing uncontroversially intuitable effects of invisible causes – in the case of God, 
this is especially the wonderful in nature – we gain a sense of what the Creator or the 
invisible cause is like.553 Second, we can compare the thing we wish to intuit to 
something already sensible, and then think of the magnitudes of its properties as being 
appropriately increased, even to infinity. For some objects, like fantastical poetic 
descriptions of eternity and the creation of worlds, this latter path is the only way to 
reach intuition.554 Even though no object is of the same kind as God, Resewitz points out 
that all finite things share some similarity with the divine, so this method can contribute 
even to an intuition of God. 
Resewitz also claims in one isolated passage that revelation can help lead us to 
the “highest and best intuitive cognition of God.”555 He describes revelation carefully as 
consisting only in “[Christ’s] great and divine actions and motivations, which give us as 
it were a history of God and the Jewish people, things that we could discover ourselves 
only very defectively.”556 Thus it seems that miraculous and supernatural aspects of 
revelation played a relatively small role in Resewitz’s personal intuition of God. 
Nonetheless, by including revelation, he certainly left room for a more enthusiastic 
interpretation of his theory. 
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Resewitz next compares the intuitive consideration of God to the abstract in the 
following way:  
If I represent the omnipotence of God as a power to bring forth everything 
possible, then indeed I have a correct concept of omnipotence: yet this concept 
will not by any means have power over my soul. Nor will it make as lively an 
impression on my heart, than when I intuitively survey the uncountable works of 
God’s hands from the greatest to the smallest, seek to grasp them in a blink, and 
in this way awaken in my soul an admittedly obscure and non-pictorial 
[unausgemaltes], but nonetheless great and thrilling picture [Bild] of his power... 
the former leaves my soul empty, the latter enriches it with uncountable and 
manifold modified representations which have mastery over it; the former is 
only a shadow, the latter gives us as it were a picture [Bild] of the majesty of the 
divine, and raises our soul from the dust to the intuition of [God’s] majestic 
throne.557  
 
The tension between the pictorial nature of ordinary intuition and this kind of 
intellectual intuition is clear even from Resewitz’s strained invocation of a non-pictorial 
picture or impression [ein unausgemaltes Bild]. As Resewitz correctly surmises, it will 
be objected that this sort of intuition does not really allow one to represent the object 
intuitively, that it “does not actually paint for me a picture of the object itself.”  
Remarkably, Resewitz concedes the point: “This is true, I admit it.”558 Nonetheless, we 
must just be content with whatever cognition of these objects we can achieve, he writes.  
The intuition of the effects of God, or of another object whose inner powers 
cannot be intuitively perceived by us, does not cause any painted picture 
[ausgemaltes Bild] in us of its properties from which these effects flow: but it 
impresses in us an indeterminate, partly obscure, partly confused [undeutliches] 
picture of them, which fills our whole soul through its greatness, and at least 
through its power as a whole [qua totum] (since its parts remain undeveloped), 
thrills [erschüttert] all of our sentiments, and touches the foundation [fundum] of 
the soul; and this picture with all its powerful impressions, although it is 
obscure, is what we call the intuitive cognition of such an object whose inner 
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nature cannot be open to us. And nonetheless such an imperfect and obscure 
picture [Bild] of God, or one of his properties, effects a thrill, amazement, the 
feeling of our own powerlessness, in short, all the greatest and entirely 
indescribable sentiments.559 
 
Baumgarten had described the “foundation of the soul” as its lowest part, which consists 
of obscure representations and subconscious feelings.560 So, Resewitz seems to be saying 
that we can build up to an intuition of supersensible objects, but such an intuition will 
remain at the level of a mostly obscure yet powerful feeling, lacking the clarity 
characteristic of sense perception. 
Against this, Mendelssohn argues that Resewitz’s idea that an intuition is “the 
cognition of the thing in concreto together with its effects, accidents, changes, and 
relations” deviates from the usual definition of intuition.561 Though he isn’t especially 
clear, Mendelssohn seems to be pointing out that an intuition is supposed to be an 
immediate cognition, not one assembled from various sensible and intellectual properties 
known about the object. And Resewitz’s admission that the cognition resulting from the 
synthetic process he describes would be confused suggests that such a cognition, if 
possible, would be better classified as sensible than intuitive. Yet this initial gloss faces a 
difficulty: it was widely accepted, including by Mendelssohn, that it is possible for us to 
achieve intuition through a process of imaginative mental synthesis in some cases – 
particularly in the paradigm case of poetry, where we achieve an imaginative intuition 
of imagery produced by words.  
                                                 
559 Resewitz, Versuch, 3:63. 
560 Baumgarten, Metaphysica, §511. 
561 JubA, 5.1:488. 
 215       
To this it might be objected that Resewitz’s “intuition of reason” is not like poetic 
intuition. Poetry produces sensible intuitions which are more clear than the words used 
to represent them. By contrast, Resewitz is suggesting that we can achieve a highly 
obscure intuition which seems less clear than the underlying “data” used to generate it. 
This is true in a sense, but not in a way that affects Resewitz’s idea. For one, at the 
moment when we achieve this intuitive feeling of God or the souls of others, it 
presumably is more clear than the thoughts which led up to this intuition. The supposed 
intuition, after all, would be of such strength that it would tend to take over our 
attention and fully obscure our previous thoughts, a phenomenon described by 
Baumgarten.562 In addition, the thoughts that precede Resewitz’s intuition are not well 
characterized as signs, like the words on page. These thoughts do not signify the object of 
the intuition as much as suggest, collectively, the intuition to our minds. 
Mendelssohn’s complaint must not be, therefore, that Resewitz’s synthetic 
intuition is strictly impossible. He rather has something more specific  in mind – namely, 
he thinks that there is a barrier of sorts between this synthetic mode of intuition and the 
intellect. As he writes, the intellect must always operate symbolically:  
Without the help of language we humans cannot achieve any distinct cognition 
or use of reason… our cognition becomes lively and fiery, but also confused, as 
soon as we survey a number of notes at once, and if we wish to distinguish them, 
then we must separate them and assign to each a particular sign or name, out of 
which symbolic cognition arises. As soon as we return our glance to the thing 
and abstract from the signs, then the notes become confused among each other, 
the universal mixes with the particular, the essential with the contingent, and 
distinctness vanishes.563  
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In other words, even if the kind of intuition Resewitz describes is possible, it cannot 
contribute to distinct cognition, which yields intellectual knowledge. 
This passage is remarkable for two reasons. First, less than a year earlier  
Mendelssohn had claimed that we could achieve at the least a very basic level of 
distinctness without the use of language.564 Indeed, this seems to be a requirement of his 
rationalist theory of the origin of language which he had offered in response to 
Rousseau’s challenge some years earlier.565 It would be a somewhat shocking reversal if 
he now held, with Hamann and Herder, that language is a prerequisite for any exercise 
of intellect whatsoever. Did he feel so threatened by the possibility of any intuitive use of 
intellect that he reversed himself? That seems implausible, but we must set aside the 
issue for now. 
Second, it seems that, again, Mendelssohn has failed to meet Resewitz’s actual 
view.566 For Resewitz never claimed that unaided intuition could achieve distinct 
cognition. As he made clear, he intended his intellectual intuition to be a synthesis of 
various pieces of information, many of which, as he explicitly claimed (above), require 
frequent “return” to distinct symbolic cognition. Resewitz’s point is not that intuition 
can give us an entirely distinct intuition of God or other souls – in fact he explicitly 
denies that. Rather, Resewitz wants to say that we can achieve some kind of intuition of 
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of reason.” However, Mendelssohn’s central claim here that the intellect cannot be intuitive seems 
directly relevant. 
 217       
the connection among metaphysical truths, which he thinks can amount to a mostly 
obscure intuition of unsensed individuals. 
Responding to Resewitz’s purported intuition of God, Mendelssohn next admits 
that although the “empirical cognition of God” (i.e. in the way Resewitz described) has 
“some value,” 
one must also consider that all the experience in the world cannot give us a 
concept of omnipotence. He who can do this or that still can’t do everything, and 
experience never proves more than that God can do this or that. If the concepts of 
omnipotence are to be awakened in me, then I must silently think the symbolic 
proposition to myself: He who can create this and that from nothing can also bring 
everything possible forth from nothing. The intuition of divine works does not give 
us any concept of the divine properties, but only awakens us to conclude the 
same [logically]… We must therefore give every cognition its worth, and not 
assign more to the empirical than it has fact has.567 
  
At first glance it seems that Mendelssohn has missed the point here as well. In the 
passage (above) which Mendelssohn himself cites in his review, Resewitz never claimed 
that the purpose of the intuition was to give us a distinct concept of God’s omnipotence, 
nor would he agree that the point of his intuition is to prove anything at all. Further, 
consider what Mendelssohn himself had written (and recently republished) in his Briefe 
über die Empfindungen, as a recommendation for experiencing intellectual pleasure:  
In short, think over everything that the naked eye, the telescope, reason and the 
senses have made known about the world. Consider the reasons… which prompt 
us to see our world-system multiplied in a myriad of fixed stars, and our home 
here on earth multiplied across innumerable planets [Kugeln]… gradually climb 
up the chain which fastens all beings to the throne of God, then swing yourself 
up with bold flights to the universal relation of all these parts to the 
immeasurable whole. What a heavenly delight will suddenly race over you!568 
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 The similarity with Resewitz’s description is remarkable. Is Mendelssohn guilty of 
inconsistency in addition to misunderstanding? 
 Looking at Mendelssohn’s criticism more closely, however, we can see that the 
target of Mendelssohn’s critique is not the possibility of a synthetic, confused cognition 
that is intuitive to some degree. After all, he freely admitted in his review that a similar 
sort of cognition (which he calls “empirical”) is possible and even “has some value.”569 
Mendelssohn denies only that such an intuition could yield novel, distinct concepts of 
God’s properties. For example, we must already have the concept of omnipotence from 
intellectual considerations if it is to be involved in our intuition of wondrous nature. 
That this was his concern comes out even more clearly in the passage which 
immediately precedes the above:  
Perhaps geniuses have an advantage here, and can feel with the understanding? 
No one who does not [actually] possess that means can decide this. I must 
therefore leave the question unanswered. But this much is certain: according to 
that presupposition, it can be understood what a true genius recently wanted to 
assert: namely, that one could, in a condition of fiery sentiment, better feel newer 
truths about God and his properties than could be proven with the help of frosty 
reason. Our author [Resewitz] has a similar thought on this topic.570 
  
                                                 
569 The phrase “has some value” is an ironic play on Klopstock’s  “admission” that the “cold 
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Mendelssohn is only being cautious; the sense of “possibility” he endorses is obviously extremely 
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 219       
Resewitz as proxy for Klopstock 
The reference in this passage to “a true genius” is highly significant. It points to 
Resewitz’s description of Klopstock,571 and the idea of “better feeling than proving novel 
truths about God” comes from Klopstock’s 1758 essay “Von der besten Art, über Gott zu 
denken” [“Of the best way to think about God”].572 In that short essay, Klopstock had, 
like Resewitz, attacked what he called the “cold metaphysical” consideration of God. He 
described the “highest level” of thinking about God in terms similar to Resewitz, as “a 
condition of the soul in which so many thoughts and sentiments affect it all at once and 
with such strength that what occurs in it would exceed every description.”573 
Consequently, wrote Klopstock, “out of the throng of these quickly running thoughts, 
these thoughts of such exact determinations” we can “extract some in coldness 
[Kaltsinn] and bring them into brief propositions [kurze Sätze]; what new truths about 
God would be among these!”574  
While Klopstock does not invoke the concepts of rationalist psychology, the 
process he has in mind is clear enough. We can, he claims, arrive in two steps at novel 
truths about God. First, we put ourselves into a certain state of profound feeling by 
opening our mind, as it were, to a vast number of “thoughts and sentiments” about the 
divine. Once we are in this state, we will be able to “extract” some propositions from it 
and thereby attain new, distinct knowledge about God. Mendelssohn’s main target here 
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572 Klopstock, Werke, 9:155-161. I am indebted to Rosenthal (Geniebegriff, 70) for this important 
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therefore seems to be this view of Klopstock’s, and he reads Resewitz as adopting 
Klopstock’s view and then attempting to explain it in terms of the standard rationalist 
psychology. Was this fair? Although Resewitz praises Klopstock highly several times in 
his essay, he never explicitly references that particular work (though its influence is 
apparent), nor does he decisively and explicitly endorse the idea that intuition can 
directly discover new distinct truths not accessible to reason. Instead, he constantly 
emphasizes the use of distinct and analytical cognition in achieving an intuition, not 
(explicitly) the possible use of intuition in producing novel distinct truths.  
Still, there are several reasons to think that it was not unfair of Mendelssohn to 
attribute Klopstock’s view to Resewitz. The entire Versuch 2 is ostensibly about the 
genius’s power of invention (though that thread seems to get lost rather quickly in 
Resewitz’s muddled prose), and Resewitz does not deny that intuition can produce novel 
truths. In fact, as we saw, he strongly identifies intuition with novelty and the 
production of new, individually conditioned representations. And it must be 
remembered that Mendelssohn had heard Resewitz present his work orally and almost 
certainly discussed it with him in person. Significant misunderstanding on a point left 
tacitly open in the published work is unlikely. In the end, whether or not it was unfair 
for Mendelssohn to ascribe Klopstock’s view to Resewitz, there is certainly a deep issue 
at stake here: whether novel truths can be discovered through intellectual intuition. 
Where Klopstock had merely asserted this possibility, Resewitz perhaps went some way 
toward establishing it on the basis of rationalist psychology. 
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On the possibility of intuition yielding novel truths 
In order to evaluate the dispute between Mendelssohn and Resewitz here, we  
need to revisit the concept of intuition. As we saw, intuition was understood by both 
Mendelssohn and Resewitz in two ways: one, as a manner of cognition which 
represented “the things themselves” more immediately and distinctly than signs; and 
two, as a type of cognition having a characteristic object, namely individuals rather than 
abstractions. Resewitz begins plausibly enough with the idea that we can generate non-
symbolic cognitions out of a mixture of intuitive and symbolic cognitions. This way of 
thinking involves a combination of feeling and imagining inspired by discursive 
propositions, but accompanied by a constant return to individuals, and an avoidance of 
the use of the discursive signs in thought. In other words, we can arrive at an intuition 
by proceeding in our thought according to the usual manner of intuition. This much is 
consistent with Mendelssohn’s views and examples. Resewitz, however, seems to think 
that  a thought generated in this way can yield a completely novel intuition in its 
objective sense, i.e., a novel representation of something robustly individual. Because an 
individual is determined in every way, if we were able to achieve such a cognition, we 
might be able to derive novel intellectual truths from a subsequent analysis of it. 
Both in the review and later in his 1763 prize essay Abhandlung über die Evidenz in 
Metaphysischen Wissenschaften [Treatise on evidence in the metaphysical sciences], 
Mendelssohn emphatically rejects this latter possibility. According to both works, 
intuitions are only and always given confusedly to sense. While we can make these 
given intuitions more distinct through intellectual analysis, the intellect cannot add 
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anything new or produce novel intuitions in the objective sense.575 Thus Mendelssohn’s 
description of contemplating God and nature is different from Resewitz’s after all. For 
Mendelssohn, the intellectual content of this contemplation, even if intuitive in some 
sense, can include only what the intellect had previously discovered through its analysis 
of originally sensed intuitions. Resewitz, following Klopstock, seems to thinks that a 
similar sort of contemplation, through its return to (intellectual) intuition, can actually 
produce intellectual content within radically novel intuitions, and subsequently yield 
new intellectual truths. 
While Mendelssohn’s took a firm position on this issue, he never entirely 
clarified the relation between the two meanings of intuition. That is, he never explained 
exactly why or how non-symbolic representation, and exclusively non-symbolic 
representation, can directly represent real individuals. According to rationalist doctrine, 
the individual does not transcend universal law but is simply an entity that is 
completely determined through universal laws. Standardly, intuition perceives such an 
individual clearly but confusedly. And it is uncontroversial that we can also achieve a 
clear but confused cognition synthetically, by combining information from various 
sources. So what exactly bars such a synthetic cognition from being a cognition of a 
novel individual? Why could not novel intellectual truths be derived from this 
contemplation? Why should it not be possible, in other words, that a representation 
which proceeds in the usual manner of intuition, i.e., avoiding signs, could yield the 
                                                 
575 JubA, 2:274-276. 
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usual object of intuition, i.e. the representation of a concrete individual? Mendelssohn 
does not seem to provide answers to these questions. 
It might be suggested that a synthetic cognition like Resewitz’s “intuition of 
reason” can contain no more content than its constituent parts, so it could never 
generate a representation of an individual not already given to sense. But it is essential 
to rationalism that the mind is an active faculty – a vis representativa. It is inherently able 
to discover truths that go beyond the given (an obvious example being the development 
of mathematics). Much more would need to be said about why it does not have a similar 
power with respect to the intuition of individuals. 
Another way to resolve the difficulty might be to invoke the genetic aspect of 
intuition, a factor which was not clearly distinguished from its other properties during 
the debate. Perhaps it is essential to intuition (in the sense of having the individual for its 
object) that the representation originate entirely from sense, and not at all through 
abstract intellectual considerations. This would indeed bar Resewitz’s intellectual 
intuition, if only by something of a fiat. But Mendelssohn does not actually make this 
claim, and it is not clear how he would have defended it. As it stands, it is hard to see 
how Mendelssohn’s denial amounts to much more than a bare assertion. Although 
Resewitz also failed to give a fully convincing argument for his view, the possibility he 
suggested needed a more careful treatment from Mendelssohn. 
We can best sum up the significance of this unfinished debate by returning to a 
much earlier dispute between Resewitz and Mendelssohn. In 1756, Resewitz had 
objected to Mendelssohn’s argument against the rationality of suicide partly on the 
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ground that distinct rational argument could never dissuade someone actually 
contemplating the act.576 Mendelssohn had responded by dividing the theoretical issue of 
the morality of suicide, with which his argument was concerned, from the practical issue 
of how best to prevent people from taking their own lives. Theoretical arguments, he 
admitted, were not moving, and he implied that others could step in and provide more 
sensible, persuasive, and moving works to help prevent suicide now that he had 
established the rightness of that end.577 But Mendelssohn’s reply here presupposed a 
distinction between the ends of philosophy and poetry, something it seems Resewitz 
would have denied. The latter’s development of intellectual intuition was in part an 
attempt to make poetry, qua rational instrument, no less important for the discovery of 
truth than abstract analysis. While Mendelssohn did not appreciate the full implications 
of this idea in their exchange, and both the original treatise and the review were messy 
and inconclusive, their discussion nonetheless marked one of the first debates over 
intellectual intuition and the significance of returning philosophy to intuition. These 
ideas would reach a culminating point in the Romantic era some 40 years later. 
Additional comments on genius 
 Beyond the three major reviews covered above, Mendelssohn offers us only a 
few more scattered comments on genius. In his review comparing editions of Lichtwer’s 
fables, Mendelssohn writes that “genius alone [without taste] brings forth great but 
formless beauties, and no one has ever seen a fully developed piece come from a mere 
                                                 
576 This led Altmann to claim that Resewitz “seems to have had an aversion to abstract reasoning” 
(Moses Mendelssohn, 81). That assessment is unfair and simply not supported by the text. 
577 JubA, 11:48. 
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genius, in which a master could have found nothing to polish.” He goes on to reiterate a 
claim he had made in the Briefe über die Empfindungen: “But no distinct cognition of rules! 
This is perhaps of entirely indispensable use for a healthy genius. Just as a body is 
healthier the less it feels the natural life processes which occur in it, it may also be better 
for a genius when he does not feel too distinctly everything that happens in him. – But 
taste is the more necessary for genius… without taste one will never be able to complete 
a work which completely meets all its ends.”578 As in the Briefe, Mendelssohn’s warning 
against the distinct cognition of rules is not an attack on rules per se.579 Rather, it is a 
psychological rule of thumb: if one is too intent on following specific rules, then one will 
as a matter of fact tend to lose sight of the whole, which must always be the true end of 
the work. Far from rejecting rules, Mendelssohn’s point here is that lack of knowledge of 
them (i.e. lack of taste) will produce an equally serious defect – failure to create a 
coherent whole. The correct, middle path is indicated in Mendelssohn’s Rhapsodie, where 
he explains how one can transform abstract knowledge of rules into a kind of second 
nature, a skill, through practice, experience, and reflection.580 
In his review of Hamann’s works written a few months later, Mendelssohn 
expands a bit on the relation between taste and genius. Genius, he writes, measures 
everything according to its own power, without considering how it will be received by 
others. If it happens that the artist presupposes no more than readers know, the result 
                                                 
578 JubA, 5.1:530. 
579 Nor is there any evidence that Mendelssohn meant set up an opposition between “natural” and 
“conventional” rules, as Segreff holds (Moses Mendelssohn, 66), or between rules pertaining to the 
object and rules pertaining to our subjective response, as Rosenthal believes (Geniebegriff, 83).  
580 JubA, 1:417-419. 
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can be a wonderful easiness. But where it flies beyond the reader’s understanding (a 
particular problem with Hamann’s style), “it becomes obscure, and where it is left to its 
fire, extravagant and confused.” Taste, by contrast, teaches us to direct our powers to the 
minds of readers, in order to produce works “about which the least [reader] thinks no 
less, and the most enlightened [reader] thinks far more than what is written.” Nothing is 
more likely to “seduce” a writer like Hamann away from this middle path than “the 
desire to make one’s own way, in order to be an Original.”581  
Yet, in a 1765 Literaturbrief on the works of J.E. Schlegel, Mendelssohn seems to 
cast away his wariness about genius. “With taste, reason, and critique one can become a 
very good poet, but one does not thereby possess any poetic genius. Now, in a poet I 
regard genius more highly than taste, reason and critique…”582 Wolf sees this as 
evidence of Mendelssohn’s inchoate radicalism, an admission of the absolute right of 
genius against rules.583 However, the rest of the sentence reads, “… namely, if I am 
supposed to be choosing and not finding all excellent properties together.”584 
“Choosing,” of course, is a reference to the first step in Mendelssohn’s prescription for 
aesthetic enjoyment described in the Briefe über die Empfindungen.585 Mendelssohn’s point 
here is simply that genius deserves the most attention at the initial and superficial stage of  
                                                 
581 JubA, 5.1:558-559. 
582 JubA, 5.1:652. 
583 Wolf, Geniebegriffs, 140. 
584 JubA, 5.1:652. 
585 JubA, 1:54. 
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choosing among various objects. It does not necessarily merit the greatest weight in the 
enjoyment of art works, which constitutes their purpose. So, there is nothing truly radical 
here at all. 
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Chapter 5: The sublime586 
“Even if the author’s principles aren’t good for much, his book is still unusually useful 
as a collection of all the happenings and perceptions which philosophers must accept 
without argument in the course of these investigations… [and] no one will better know 
how to use them than you.”587 
 
With this comment, Lessing presented to his friend Mendelssohn a copy of 
Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful. By 
all accounts,588 Lessing did not underestimate the impact Burke’s work would have on 
Mendelssohn’s thought. But what exactly was this impact? It is commonly thought that 
Burke’s treatment of the sublime pushed Mendelssohn toward a decisive break from his 
early Wolffian perfection-aesthetic and toward the supposedly “emotionalistic” aesthetic 
of the sublime in his later writings.589 In this chapter, I challenge that reading. Just as 
Lessing expected, Mendelssohn vehemently resisted Burke’s general theory of the 
sublime even while accepting his examples and observations as uncontroversial data. 
Burke induced Mendelssohn to flesh out his view rather than to transform it, and under 
this influence Mendelssohn developed a plausible but incomplete theory of the sublime. 
The initial clash 
When Mendelssohn first read Burke’s Enquiry, he had already written his own 
treatise on the sublime, Betrachtungen über das Erhabene und das Naïve in den schönen 
                                                 
586 I wish to think Reinier Munk and the Center for Jewish Philosophy of the Faculty of Philosophy, 
VU University Amsterdam for organizing and supporting the Mendelssohn Colloquium at which I 
first presented a version of this essay.  
587 JubA, 11:178. 
588 E.g., Braitmaier, Geschichte, 146, 171; Segreff, Moses Mendelssohn, 34, 38; JubA, 1:400. 
589 Bamberger, introduction to JubA, 1:XLII-XLIV. For an opposed reading which broadly concurs with 
my own, see Beiser, Diotima’s Children, 221-224. 
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Wissenschaften (hereafter Das Erhabene).590 In that work, Mendelssohn claims that a thing 
is sublime which “is capable of arousing wonder through its extraordinary degree of 
perfection,” and that the sublime in the arts specifically591 “consists in the sensible 
expression of such a perfection that arouses wonder.”592 Since Mendelssohn understood 
beauty as sensible perfection, he basically took the sublime to be the extraordinarily 
beautiful, although the requirement that it produce wonder meant that it must be novel 
and presented suddenly or unexpectedly.593  
In explaining the sublime as an extreme form of beauty, Mendelssohn was 
attempting to give a theory of the sublime which made it in principle amenable to 
rational analysis. Of course, as he had already argued concerning beauty in his Briefe 
über die Empfindungen, we do not find the analysis of the beautiful or sublime itself 
pleasurable, since pleasure is intuitive and the intuition of a manifold is necessarily 
confused for human beings.594 As in the case of beauty, pleasure in the sublime would 
occur only at its sensible apprehension. 
In Burke’s work, Mendelssohn encountered both a background theory of 
aesthetics and a view of the sublime radically opposed to his own. Where Mendelssohn 
attempted to give an account of the beautiful and sublime primarily based on the 
                                                 
590 The work was pending publication. See Mendelssohn’s letter to Lessing, 25 October 1757, JubA, 
11:164. 
591 In this early treatise Mendelssohn does not seem to consider natural sensible objects, but there is no 
particular reason to exclude them from sensibly expressing some great perfection.  
592 JubA, 1:193-194. 
593 JubA, 1:196. 
594 JubA, 1:50. 
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rational property of perfection in the object,595 Burke denied perfection any role.596 He 
focused instead on the emotional effects that certain objects produce in us, which effects 
he held were simple and unanalyzable.597 While Mendelssohn, following Boileau and 
pseudo-Longinus, takes the paragon case of the sublime to be the Biblical “let there be 
light” and chooses examples of the sublime involving feelings of amazement, soaring 
elation, deep despair, or pity, Burke’s examples focus on pain, fear, danger, darkness, 
rawness, and disorder. In Burke’s view, “terror is in all cases whatsoever, either more 
openly or latently, the ruling principle of the sublime.”598 Burke also holds that the 
sublime differs from the beautiful in kind, and although in his view the sublime is based 
on terror, he nonetheless sets the sublime above the beautiful in its effect on us as well as 
its general significance.599 These stark differences in perspective initially led 
Mendelssohn to admit to Lessing, “Perhaps I do not properly grasp [Burke’s] thoughts, 
because it is still unknown to me what he understands by beautiful and sublime.”600  
Despite the incongruity in their attitudes and favored examples, the two 
philosophers shared a more fundamental view about the sublime as we actually 
experience it: Both agreed, as Boileau had influentially put it, that the sublime is 
something “extraordinary and marvelous that strikes us… and makes a work elevate, 
                                                 
595 This is not to say that the subjective act of cognizing the object does not also come into play. But for 
Mendelssohn, the pleasure of the sublime nonetheless requires some basis in the perfection of the 
object, (JubA, 1:193). 
596 Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, ed. J. T. 
Boulton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), §3.10. 
597 “Pain and pleasure are simple ideas, incapable of definition,” Burke, Enquiry, §1.2. For 
Mendelssohn’s explicit rejection of this idea, see his 1758 commentary on Burke at JubA, 3.1:237. 
598 Burke, Enquiry, §2.2. 
599 Burke, Enquiry, §3.27, §1.7. 
600 JubA, 11:182. 
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ravish, and transport us.”601 Experience shows that both Mendelssohn and Burke’s 
favored examples of the sublime could be powerfully moving in just this way, 
producing a feeling at least somewhat wonder-like, as well as a sort of pleasurable thrill 
in the body. Thus the objects of their respective inquiries are not really so different as it 
might seem. But Burke’s account, unlike Mendelssohn’s, places the sublime in the realm 
of fundamentally unanalyzable passions, outside the jurisdiction of reason. This was not 
lost on Mendelssohn, who quickly came to recognize the significant threat that Burke’s 
theory posed – not just to rationalist aesthetics, but to the project of Enlightenment 
rationalism in general. Certainly it was true, as Mendelssohn complained, that Burke 
was unfamiliar with Wolffian philosophy and did not give direct arguments against it.602 
Yet Burke’s vivid descriptions of actual emotional experience are compelling in their 
own right, and they required a response. 
Mendelssohn had already addressed this empiricist perspective to some extent in 
his Briefe über die Empfindungen, but Burke pressed his case much harder than 
Euphranor,603 particularly with respect to the role of negative passions and experiences 
characteristic of the terrible sublime.604 For Burke, our greatest and most profound 
                                                 
601 Nicolas Boileau-Despréaux, Oeuvres de Boileau ed. M. Amar (Paris: Lefèvre, 1824), 3:10. 
602 JubA, 11:181. 
603 Euphranor is the youthful character in the correspondence who defends a sensualist/emotionalist 
perspective on aesthetic pleasure. 
604 Euphranor does raise the issue of pleasure in terror in the eighth letter: “It is no more the beautiful 
nature; no! The fearsome, terrible nature. And you find pleasure in it!” (JubA, 1:74). But, perhaps 
because of particular example chosen – of a depiction of sailors trying to resist terrible nature, rather a 
direct experience of terrible nature – Euphranor lets Palemon get away with an inadequate 
explanation, namely, that “Every painful delight of which pity has no part grounds itself on nothing 
but the skill of the performing person or animal” (JubA, 1:108). As discussed below, Mendelssohn 
recognized the inadequacy of this response in 1756. 
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pleasures arise from fear, darkness, rawness, and pain. But in the Wolffian tradition, the 
feeling of pain is explained as the intuition of imperfection, fear and other negative 
emotions as modifications of pain, and darkness as a cognitive imperfection. In other 
words, these emotions arise from the consideration of disorderly objects whose parts are 
not governed by rules of the whole. That they could be pleasurable, as Burke not only 
claimed but also vividly described, seemed to run directly counter to rationalist 
psychology. Mendelssohn’s first task, therefore, was to reconcile Burke’s descriptions of 
these seemingly negative pleasures with his own view that pleasure is the intuition of 
perfection. 
There are in general two ways to read Mendelssohn’s attempt at reconciliation. 
First, one could read Mendelssohn as accepting the Burkean sublime objects and 
psychology largely on Burke’s terms. On this reading, which I will call the “weak” 
reading, Mendelssohn handles the Burkean sublime entirely through his new theory of 
“mixed sentiments.”605 According to that theory, we can take pleasure even in imperfect 
objects because the positive activity of our minds involved in considering them counts 
as a subjective perfection. So, even though a massively raw mountain or a threatening 
storm might be highly imperfect in itself, we can still take pleasure in viewing it simply 
because it provides an occasion for vigorous mental activity.606 The “aesthetic illusion” 
created by artistic representations of such objects further distances us from the objective 
                                                 
605 Mendelssohn credits Burke’s Enquiry as the inspiration for his new theory (PS, 2:17-19), but 
Mendelssohn had already begun to discuss sentiments involving a mixture of pleasure and 
displeasure in his various treatments of tragedy (see Chapter 3). 
606 For this reading, see Bamberger, JubA, 1:XLIII-XLIV. Bamberger regards this development as a great 
improvement in Mendelssohn’s theory. 
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imperfection, so that we are left free to enjoy our subjective activity.607 Such a subjective-
tending view about the sublime is plausibly understood as an anticipation of Kant’s full-
blow subjectivism.608 
According to the other reading, which I will label the “strong” reading, 
Mendelssohn retained the core of his original view that pleasure in the sublime is 
primarily based on great objective perfection. He sought ways to account for Burke’s 
examples and observations within the framework of the rational-perfection theory. The 
strong approach does not exclude the theory of mixed sentiments from partially 
explaining the feeling of the sublime, but it retains the idea that the sublime is always 
based on an extremely great objective perfection. In the remainder of the paper, I defend 
the strong reading against the weak reading on both exegetical and substantive grounds. 
The early response to Burke 
The unpublished Anmerkungen zu Burkes Enquiry, written in 1758, clearly 
illustrates Mendelssohn’s struggle to preserve his basic view in Das Erhabene. Through a 
series of reflections claimed to be written down “as I thought of them,”609 Mendelssohn 
first attempts to explain Burke’s concept of the sublime by suggesting that it may be a 
more specific category, namely the so-called “sublime in the passions.”610 But this 
suggestion is implausible, because Mendelssohn’s examples of “sublime in the passions” 
involve third-person depictions of strong passions, e.g. those aroused by seeing Jocasta 
                                                 
607 Segreff, Moses Mendelssohn, 36. 
608 E.g. Bamberger, introduction to JubA, 1:XLVII. 
609 JubA, 3.1:253. 
610 JubA, 3.1:238. 
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in Oedipus Rex. Therefore he does not account for the more immediate, first-person 
passions evoked by a threatening storm or an overhanging mountain peak. This idea is 
also unhelpful, because it does nothing to account for the imperfection allegedly lying at 
the basis of these examples. Fortunately, by the time he had reached the conclusion of 
his commentary, Mendelssohn had hit on an improved response, which runs as follows: 
Some representations are primary-sublime, insofar as they present wonder-
worthy perfections, but others are merely secondary-sublime, insofar as they 
cause the representation to affect us more strongly, and suddenly rush over us, 
or insofar as they manage to achieve in some mechanical fashion a thrill in the 
outer limbs. For since the sudden enrapture of attention in the soul is connected 
with a thrill in the outer limbs of the body, they must reciprocally bring forth 
each other, as was noticed about all effects and causes in animal nature. As in my 
treatise [Das Erhabene], I would seek the originally sublime solely in wonder. The 
secondary- sublime, or the means of encouraging of the sublime, I would ascribe 
to all representations, which are terrible, wild, raw, monstrous and such like, and 
at this opportunity [if I were now to write a treatise on the sublime] I would 
make use of the excellent comments of our author [Burke], and seek to connect 
them with my general principles.611  
 
At least in this commentary, then, Mendelssohn does not consider Burke’s 
sublime to be a new, separate, and independent kind of sublime. Instead, he aims to 
subordinate the Burkean concept to his own. The sorts of things Burke takes to be 
sublime are according to Mendelssohn only means for promoting the Mendelssohnian 
“primary” sublime, and they work in two ways: by “framing” the object so that it 
produces a greater psychological effect, and by directly causing the same physical effects 
which are normally produced directly by the mind when we contemplate something 
“originally sublime.” The idea that the bodily effects of the sublime could be produced 
directly was actually suggested by Burke in his discussion of terror, which Mendelssohn 
                                                 
611 JubA, 3.1:252. 
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praises.612 Along with the first part of the strategy, this opens up a way for Mendelssohn 
to explain how the Burkean examples are significantly related to the sublime, without 
admitting them as being sublime in their own right. Mendelssohn concludes the passage 
by suggesting that the value of Burke’s “excellent comments” lies in the “use” to which 
they could be put in promoting the sublime in the sense of unusually great perfection, 
i.e., the sublime according to “my general principles.” 
Mendelssohn had already begun to carry out this strategy in the course of the 
commentary. He writes, “Greatness seizes our attention and holds it fast to an object. 
The raw and monstrous arouse fear [Schrecken] and astonishment [Erstaunen]. The 
uneven in the small parts draws our attention away from the parts and turns it to the 
whole. The straight line pleases only in sublime buildings, by which occasion they 
indicate inattention to outer ornamentation. The sudden transition from light to 
darkness, and the reverse, arouses amazement.”613 Thus, one important and plausible 
way of promoting the sublime qualities of an object involves drawing attention to its 
qualities, its wholeness, or the perfections it represents. This idea is not new - 
Mendelssohn had already employed it in his original treatise614 to explain the 
requirement of novelty and the value of poetic devices such as incomplete inferences 
                                                 
612 Burke, Enquiry, §§4.2-5; JubA, 3.1:248. 
613 JubA, 3.1:247. 
614 Baumgarten had also used a similar strategy to explain the wonderful (Reflections on poetry, §46). 
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and sequences of one-syllable words,615 but thanks to Burke he was able to conceive of 
these enhancing elements much more broadly. 
The exact way in which astonishment and fear can enhance the primary-sublime 
requires more explanation. On Mendelssohn’s view in Das Erhabene, “[The sublime] 
fastens our attention through [its] novelty… in such a way that we linger on it a while, 
without wandering to other objects, and when this lasts for a time, it becomes a 
condition of the mind called astonishment [Erstaunen].”616 Since astonishment is an 
effect of the sublime, and “everything in animal nature” must “mutually bring forth 
each other,” whatever can serve to cause or promote this astonishment will promote the 
sublime. But being astonishing itself is neither necessary nor sufficient to make 
something sublime. As for fear [Schrecken], Mendelssohn holds that it shares important 
features with wonder, specifically its sudden onset and its production of trembling and 
related bodily effects.617 For these reasons, the fearful can support and enhance the 
sublime, but again, fear itself is neither necessary nor sufficient for the sublime. As 
Mendelssohn goes on to explain, only perfection can produce the wonder characteristic 
of the primary-sublime. Fear, as such, is always produced by the cognition of 
imperfection. If we consider these affects separately and in themselves, the one is 
pleasurable and the other displeasurable.618 
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Still, one might ask how what is frightening can be sublime at all on 
Mendelssohn’s view, given that the former feeling has its basis in imperfection and the 
latter in great perfection. Mendelssohn does write in his commentary that the 
unpleasantness of fear disappears in imitation.619 But it does not follow from this that for 
Mendelssohn only artistic imitations can be sublime.620 A more complete answer, which 
can also account for the sublime in nature, is that the sublime object need not be perfect 
and imperfect in the same sense, or perhaps more importantly, need not be presented in 
a way that brings imperfection to the fore. As Mendelssohn explains, in the sublime “the 
pleasantness is an effect of the perfection, which can lie either in the thing itself, or in the 
way in which it is represented.”621  To take one often-used example, our perception of a 
hero’s virtue is actually enhanced through our fear and pity at his suffering – not 
because the suffering itself is a perfection, but because the shock of his pain provides a 
contrasting background which calls to mind and brightens the hero’s virtue.622 The more 
Burkean case of fear for our own personal destruction can be understood in a similar 
fashion, except that the fear comes first temporally. For example, we are initially 
terrified and shrink back from the stormy sea, but if we are able to contemplate it a bit, 
we may then begin to notice its perfection, i.e. the powerful yet law-governed motion of 
the waves and peaks. The perfection rushes over us suddenly because it defies our 
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expectations, and then it shows itself more clearly against the background of the 
frightening destructiveness.623  
Now, Burke had also made a distinction between the frightening aspect of the 
sublime and the merely frightening, and likewise for other passions associated with the 
sublime. He writes, “if the pain and terror are so modified as not to be actually noxious; 
if the pain is not carried to violence, and the terror is not conversant about the present 
destruction of the person… they are capable of producing delight; not pleasure, but a 
sort of delightful horror, a sort of tranquility tinged with terror; which, as it belongs to 
self-preservation, is one of the strongest of the passions. Its object is the sublime.”624 For 
Burke, the distinction between the frighteningly sublime and the merely frightening is 
subjective, that is, based on the sum of our feelings and attitudes toward the object, rather 
than on the properties of the object itself. If our fear becomes too “noxious” or the pain 
becomes too severe, the object cannot appear sublime, but if these feelings are 
moderated then the object will seem sublime to us. Since for Burke these passions are 
unanalyzable, they need not have any constant or universal relation to the observed 
object itself. This differs markedly from Mendelssohn’s objective view, according to 
which the frighteningly sublime distinguishes itself from the merely frightening through 
the great sensible perfection contained in the object.  
                                                 
623 This view also comes out later in the 1761 edition of Briefe über die Empfindungen: “The imperfect, 
considered as imperfect, cannot possibly be pleasurable. But since nothing can be absolutely imperfect, 
but good is always mixed with evil, one can bring to bear the habit of abstracting from evil, and 
turning one’s attention to the good, with which it is connected” (PS, 1:141-142). 
624 Burke, Enquiry, §4.7. 
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Burke also claims in his Enquiry that darkness and obscurity greatly contribute to 
the feeling of the sublime.625 This raised a further problem for Mendelssohn, because 
what is obscure furnishes us with no information about the object’s perfection, and also 
creates a sensible uniformity that he claims we find tedious or even disgusting.626 To 
some extent, obscurity can serve to frame and contrast with a great and more clearly 
perceived perfection, playing a role similar to fear and astonishment in Mendelssohn’s 
theory. For example, as Mendelssohn writes in the 1771 edition of Das Erhabene, an artist 
might obscure the boundaries of an object with a blinding gleam – not because the 
obscurity itself is sublime, but because it makes the object seem immeasurably great, 
enhancing the sublime effect.627 But this response seems ineffective against the examples 
Burke provides in his own discussion of darkness: the “dark woods” and the “dark part 
of the hut” supposedly employed by druids and Native Americans in their religious 
rituals. In these cases the darkness seems central to the object, and they seem to draw 
their sublimity directly from their mystery and obscurity. 
Unfortunately, Mendelssohn does not provide any comment on this section of 
Burke except to say that it is “incomparable.”628 Nonetheless, there seems to be a ready 
rationalist reply available to him. Baumgarten had insisted that the perfection (or 
“greatness”) of the sublime need not be in the object itself, provided that the object is 
presented in such a way as to produce great and perfect thoughts, and Mendelssohn had 
                                                 
625 Burke, Enquiry, §2.3. 
626 “Uniformity, meagerness, fruitlessness is unbearable to taste” (JubA, 1:172). See also JubA, 1:398.  
627 Mendelssohn, JubA, 1:459. 
628 Mendelssohn, JubA, 3.1:241. 
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endorsed the same view in the original Das Erhabene.629 This seems to exactly capture the 
intended effect of the darkness in pagan temples: to emphasize the feebleness of the 
petitioners, encouraging them to think of the greatness and perfection of the gods 
without distraction. The darkness itself is not sublime, but it does encourage 
appropriately acculturated observers to think sublime thoughts which have been 
associated with the obscure object. If there were no such great thoughts to think – if the 
darkness were not encountered within the context of religious doctrine and ritual – then 
it would be annoying or perhaps frightening, but not sublime.  
The sensibly immeasurable and the later response to Burke 
Although it seems clear enough that Mendelssohn initially defended his early 
view against Burke, it is possible that this strong reaction later gave way to acquiescence. 
Beginning with the 1761 Rhapsodie, Mendelssohn begins to connect the sublime closely to 
what he terms “the sensibly immeasurable.” To a large extent this shift was certainly 
due to Burke, who had included several sections on “Vastness,” “Infinity,” and “The 
artificial Infinite,” although other, less clear influences must have been at work as well.630 
                                                 
629 Baumgarten, Aesthetica, §203. See also Baumgarten’s German commentary on that section, in 
Bernhard Poppe, Alexander Baumgarten: Seine Bedeutung und Stellung in der Leibniz-Wolffischen 
Philosophie und seine Beziehungen zu Kant. Nebst Veröffentlichung einer bisher unbekannten Handschrift der 
Ästhetik Baumgartens (Leipzig: Robert Noske, 1907), 163. For Mendelssohn’s endorsement, see JubA, 
1:197. 
630 Likely sources are Richard Addison, Spectator, Nos. 412-413, pp. 6:76-87, and Johann Jakob 
Bodmer’s 1741 Kritische Betrachtungen über die poetische Gemälde der Dichter (Frankfurt am Main: 
Athenäum, 1971), 211-215. But these works were known to Mendelssohn from the time of the Briefe (he 
refers to the Spectator in a 1756 essay, JubA, 1:534), and his 1758 commentary on Burke does not evince 
any particular interest in the infinite or the sensibly immeasurable. Abbt emphasized the infinite in his 
letter to Mendelssohn on the sublime, (7 March 1761, JubA, 11:198-199), but Mendelssohn received the 
letter after he had completed the first edition of the Rhapsodie. And Abbt’s evidently poor 
understanding of Mendelssohn’s previously published views in that letter suggests that they had not 
conversed extensively on the subject. It is also puzzling that Mendelssohn neglected to work the 
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Burke’s legacy becomes even more apparent in the 1771 reworking of Das Erhabene, in 
which Mendelssohn directly borrows many of Burke’s suggestions for depicting the 
immeasurable in art.631 In this later edition, Mendelssohn also drops his explicit claims 
that the sublime differs from the beautiful only in degree.632 
  One might read this as evidence that Mendelssohn had adopted an entirely new 
“mark” of the sublime, now explaining it through the mental effort required to 
apprehend the infinite rather than through the objective property of perfection.633 This 
weak reading would have Mendelssohn providing a subjective, psychological basis for 
explaining why, for example, a mountain range is sublime but Gothic architecture is 
merely ugly: namely, only objects immeasurable in either extent or internal goodness 
can be sublime, because only such objects offer the mind the right kind of kind thrilling 
activity. It would bring Mendelssohn much closer to Burke, who had also explained the 
pleasure of the sublime through the exercise of our faculties.634 And it would also lend 
weight to the idea that Mendelssohn’s theory merely anticipates Kant’s, since Kant takes 
up the idea that the mathematically and dynamically infinite are the marks of the 
sublime.635 
                                                                                                                                                 
immeasurable into Das Erhabene until the 1771 edition, even though the concept is discussed in the 
1761 edition of his Rhapsodie.  
631 Mendelssohn, JubA 1:455-458, cf. Burke, Enquiry, §§4.11-12. 
632 Mendelssohn, JubA 1:193, 210. 
633 Bamberger claims that under the influence of Burke, Mendelssohn accepted “the dissolution of the 
sublime from the concept of perfection and its equivalence with the ‘immeasurable’” (introduction to 
JubA, 1:XLIV). 
634 Burke, Enquiry, §§4.6-7 
635 E.g., Goldstein, Moses Mendelssohn, 148, 152-153; Sommer, Geschichte, 134. 
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But this reading is mistaken. For one, Mendelssohn explicitly endorses the 
objective perfection view in a letter to Abbt written just after the Rhapsodie had gone to 
the printer: “An unexpected perfection lies at the basis of everything sublime in the 
beautiful sciences.”636 More importantly, Mendelssohn does not equate the sublime with 
the sensibly immeasurable, as this reading requires. Instead he carefully distinguishes 
them. Consider the key passage from the Rhapsodie: 
The great world-ocean, a far-extended plain, the uncountable army of stars, the 
eternity of time, every height or depth which tires us, a great genius, great 
virtuous people whom we admire but [whose virtue we] cannot attain, who can 
behold these without shuddering, who can proceed to consider them without a 
pleasant dizziness? This sentiment is composed from pleasure and displeasure. 
The greatness of the object provide us with pleasure, but our inability to 
comprehend its boundaries mixes this pleasure with some bitterness, which 
makes it all the more charming… If the great object offers no manifold for us to 
consider in its immeasurableness, as the still sea, or an unfruitful plain not 
broken by any objects, then the dizziness is transformed at last into a kind of 
disgust at the uniformity of the object, the displeasure wins out, and we have to 
turn away from the confused sight of the object…. On the other hand, the 
immeasurability of the world structure, the greatness of a genius worthy of 
admiration, the great sublime virtuous one, are just as manifold as great, just as 
perfect as manifold, and the displeasure which is connected with its 
consideration is grounded on our weakness; for that reason it offers an 
unspeakable pleasure of which the soul can never be full.637 
 
                                                 
636 Mendelssohn to Abbt, 9 March 1761, JubA, 11:202. Admittedly this statement is restricted to the 
“beautiful sciences” – strictly speaking, fine arts which make use of artificial signs – but the whole 
correspondence treats the sublime in general.  
637 PS, 2:10-11; JubA, 1:398. Here Mendelssohn is also specifically taking issue with Bodmer, who had 
claimed that greatness of extent in itself produces the sublime feeling of “Bestürzung und Stille,” and 
that manifoldness (required for perfection) is antithetical to this greatness. Consequently, according to 
Bodmer, the most moving great objects are a clear sky and a still ocean. See Bodmer, Kritische 
Betrachtungen, 212-218. 
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According to Mendelssohn, then, while we can get some pleasure from an immeasurable 
object simply from its vastness,638 that is not enough to produce the sublime feeling.639 In 
order to attain the “unspeakable pleasure” of the sublime, the thing must be “just as 
manifold as great” and “just as perfect as manifold.” And Mendelssohn’s most explicit 
published judgment of Burke’s work follows soon after in the text: 
[Burke] assumed that the principle ‘the intuitive cognition of perfection provides 
pleasure’ is a mere hypothesis, and the least experience which seemed to 
contradict this hypothesis was for him reason enough to reject it. But one who is 
convinced that this principle of sentiments is no hypothesis, but an established 
and unshakeable truth, cannot be made wrong by any experience, no matter how 
much it seems to present the opposite. He will consider the matter further and 
find the most exact correspondence between reason and experience, which is 
often hard to find, but is nonetheless always there.640 
  
Later, in describing the additions to Das Erhabene in the preface to the 1771 
edition of his Philosophische Schriften, Mendelssohn explains that the feelings of the 
sublime, great, and strong “approach the thrilling and fearful, and are therefore related 
to each other as far as that goes. From this it can be grasped why the sublime is often 
accompanied by the fearful, and tends to be supported by it.”641 Mendelssohn evidently 
retained his early view that the great and strong are not themselves sublime, but can 
                                                 
638 Mendelssohn never adequately explains the source of this pleasure in mere vastness. Most likely, he 
would have held it to be a combination of 1) pleasure in the exercise of our faculties, before they are 
completely exhausted; and 2) a similarity with the actual sublime insofar as the object is 
immeasurable. Because of this similarity, the vast object will be associated with the sublime in the 
imagination and produce a similar feeling, much as artificial depictions of the immeasurable do. See 
the quotation from the Preface to the 1771 edition (below) for evidence supporting this idea. 
639 Cf. Henry Home’s similar view of the matter in his 1761 Elements of Criticism: “But, though a plain 
object of that kind [i.e. of vast size] be agreeable, it is not termed grand; it is not entitled to that 
character unless, together with its size, it be possessed of other qualities that contribute to beauty” (ed. 
Rev. James R. Boyd, New York: A. S. Barnes & Burr, 1863, §212). Apparently, Mendelssohn did not 
read this work until 1763 (letter to Iselin, 5 July 1763, JubA, 12.1:15-16).  
640 PS, 2:18; JubA, 1:400-401. 
641 JubA, 1:231-232. 
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serve to support it by producing similar emotions and bodily effects. Further, the 
deletion of the claims that the sublime differs from the beautiful only in degree in this 
edition does not show that Mendelssohn abandoned the perfection aesthetic with 
respect to the sublime. It rather indicates his new recognition that the sublime is a more 
specific phenomenon than the extremely sensibly perfect in general, as he had previously 
claimed. Accordingly, in the 1771 edition Mendelssohn amends his earlier definition of 
the sublime to the following: “One could say in general that each thing, which is or 
seems immeasurable according to the degree of its perfection, is called sublime.”642 
Clearly, Mendelssohn understands immeasurability here more as the ultimate source of 
his so-called “secondary-sublime,” the one ingredient (in addition to great perfection) 
perhaps required to produce a feeling strong enough to earn the label of sublime. While 
the appearance of immeasurability may be a necessary ingredient of the sublime, it is 
not sufficient; objective perfection is also fundamentally required. 
Nonetheless, the view that the sublime characteristically appears to be 
immeasurable gives rise to other difficulties, because sensible immeasurability and 
sensible perfection seem incompatible in three different ways. Cognitively, it seems that 
the totality and thus the perfection of an apparently immeasurable object cannot be 
sensed, precisely because the object is too great for our senses to grasp. Metaphysically, 
it seems that some objects need not have sensible perfection in order to arouse the 
feeling of the sublime: e.g., what perfection do the scattered “uncountable army of stars” 
offer to the senses? And psychologically, our inability to grasp the immeasurability is a 
                                                 
642 JubA, 1:457-458. See also JubA, 1:193-194. 
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subjective imperfection. So why do we find the sublime so wonderful and pleasurable - 
even more so than the merely beautiful? Although Mendelssohn does not address all of 
these issues thoroughly, we can reconstruct plausible responses from the limited text.  
The cognitive problem of the sublime as sensibly immeasurable yet sensibly perfect 
As a preliminary matter, the notion of perfection must be made somewhat more 
explicit. Perfection is the agreement of a variety or manifold to unity, according to 
general rules of the whole.643 “Unity” here need not be essential, as in the case of 
monadic souls, but can also be accidental and relational, as in a work of art.644 It is best 
understood as the “togetherness” or “belonging-together” of the manifold.645 A painting, 
for example, has perfection to the extent that its various parts (its manifold) are sensed 
as belonging together (its unity) in a way that is explained chiefly through common 
universal principles of the whole (i.e., harmony). The principles of a particular painting 
flow from the fact that the whole represents something – a person, a thing, an idea, an 
event, etc.646 In this way, its various sensible parts fit together in such a way that they all 
contribute to a single whole representation.647  
                                                 
643 For perfection as agreement of the manifold to unity, see Wolff, Ontologia, §503; Baumgarten, 
Metaphysica, §94. For the requirement that this agreement must be determined by general rules or laws 
of the whole, see Wolff, Ontologia, §505; Baumgarten, Metaphysica, §95. That Mendelssohn shares this 
view is evident from his Briefe über die Empfindungen (JubA 1:59-60, 113, 118), his Über die Quellen und 
die Verbindungen der schönen Künste und Wissenschaften (JubA 1:171), and his Rhapsodie (JubA 1:384-385). 
644 Wolff, Ontologia, §528; Baumgarten, Metaphysica, §98. 
645 On this see e.g. Wolff, Ontologia, §532. 
646 Baumgarten called this something which all parts agree in representing the theme of the work 
(Reflections, §66). See also Wolff, Psychologia empirica, §512 and Aristotle, Poetics, §8. 
647 The “affirming notes” which Mendelssohn claims constitute perfection in the Rhapsodie (JubA, 1:384-
385) should be understood as affirmations with respect to the principles of the whole. In this way his 
explanation conforms closely to Wolff’s and Baumgarten’s. 
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Now, the whole of a sensibly immeasurable object cannot be sensed, by 
definition. How then is it possible for us to cognize the extent to which the parts are 
governed by principles of the whole? This is the cognitive problem of the immeasurably 
sublime, which Mendelssohn discusses in the following passages: 
The immeasurable, which we indeed consider as a whole, but cannot grasp 
[umfassen] arouses likewise a mixed sentiment of pleasure and displeasure—in 
the beginning, a thrill, and when we proceed to consider it, a kind of dizziness.648  
 
[Vast objects] have something adverse for well-brought-up minds who are 
accustomed to order and symmetry, since the senses finally perceive their 
boundaries, but can grasp [umfassen] them and bind them into an idea only with 
difficulty. – When the boundaries of this extension are posited ever further, they 
finally disappear for the senses entirely, and then the sensibly immeasurable 
arises. Sense, which perceives something belonging together, roams about, 
seeking to grasp the boundaries, and loses itself in the immeasurable.649 
 
Precisely what Mendelssohn means by “considering” an immeasurable object as 
a whole without “grasping” it is not entirely clear. The following explanation, taken 
from the original (1755) Briefe über die Empfindungen, is one possibility: 
Even this immeasurable All [the whole universe] is not a visibly beautiful object. 
Nothing deserves this name that does not fall clearly to our senses all at once. For 
that reason one only says that the world-structure is beautiful when the 
imagination orders its main parts into the same harmony in which reason and 
perception teach it to be ordered outside us. If this happens, then one perceives 
just the general relations of the parts of the universe to the whole, and the 
beautiful achieves the required magnitude in the imagination which it lacks in 
nature. The power of the imagination can as it were limit every beauty between 
the appropriate bounds, since it expands or contracts the parts of the objects until 
we can grasp [fassen] the required manifold all at once.650 
  
                                                 
648 PS, 2:10; JubA, 1:398. 
649 JubA, 1:456. This was added into the 1771 edition. 
650 JubA, 1:51. 
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Such a view, if applied to the sublime as sensibly immeasurable, is highly 
problematic. For the sublime is by its very nature more vast even than anything we can 
imagine, and if it is brought down as it were to human scale and captured as a smaller 
and inadequate whole in the imagination, it certainly loses most of its grand effect. But 
there is good reason to think that this does not represent Mendelssohn’s considered 
view about the sublime. In the 1761 edition of the Briefe, Mendelssohn added the 
following to this passage, immediately after “to our senses all at once:” “Indeed, the 
immeasurable, which exhausts our soaring imagination in reaching its boundaries, has 
its own charm, which occasionally surpasses the pleasure of measured beauty; but we 
can only call the world-structure beautiful in its actual sense [im eigentlichen Verstande] 
when the imagination… [etc.].”651 This addition suggests that Mendelssohn meant to 
introduce a distinction between the beautiful “strictly speaking,” which requires us at 
least to be able to imagine the whole, and the rather different experience of sublimity, 
which is not to be characterized in the same way. This does not entail that Mendelssohn 
now intends to sharply distinguish the beautiful from the sublime; in fact, we know 
from a review he published around the same time that he did not.652 More plausibly, he 
means to signal that his analysis of beauty as presented in the Briefe was to be restricted 
to objects either perceived or imagined as wholes, and that the sensibly immeasurable 
requires a further explanation. 
                                                 
651 PS, 1:17-18; JubA, 1:243. 
652 “[Curtius] did not notice that the boundaries of the beautiful and the sublime really lose themselves 
in each other, for the highest degree of beautiful arouses wonder” (JubA, 5.1:352). 
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Moreover, the passages directly concerning the immeasurable in Rhapsodie and 
Das Erhabene (above) make no explicit mention of this forced imagining of a whole. In 
fact, in the Rhapsodie, Mendelssohn denies that we can grasp [umfassen] the whole of a 
sensibly immeasurable object – but this grasping [fassen] of the whole is precisely what 
the imagination was said to do in the Briefe. And, his talk of sense “roaming about, 
seeking to grasp the boundaries, and losing itself in the immeasurable” in particular 
seems distinctly opposed to the mere imagination of a whole. It is therefore reasonable 
to suppose that Mendelssohn did not intend his idea about imaginative grasping to 
apply to the sensibly immeasurable. 
What then does Mendelssohn mean by “considering” an immeasurable object 
“as a whole?” One plausible possibility is that in considering an immeasurable object we 
confusedly posit principles of some whole that give harmony to the manifold, rather than 
forming an inner sensible image of the whole. Since perfection only requires agreement 
of the manifold according to principles of the whole, we can perceive it (at least 
confusedly) without actually sensing or imagining the totality itself. This reading is 
suggested by Mendelssohn’s claim that we seek to form an idea on the basis of what we 
sense as “belonging together” in the immeasurable manifold. This “belonging together” 
would provide a basis for positing common principles flowing from some vast whole 
that exceeds our perception and even our imagination.  
Even though they are to some extent produced on merely subjective grounds, 
such confusedly posited principles of the whole have a definite basis in the whole object 
as it really is. This is because the parts of an object, at least to the extent that it is perfect, 
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really do reflect the properties of its whole. As a result, my reading of Mendelssohn’s 
view here does not amount to a subjectivistic “free play” theory, where the object simply 
gives us occasion to exercise our mental faculties in a certain way. Nor does it amount to 
a radical departure from the standard rationalist view. According to Wolff, Baumgarten, 
and also Mendelssohn himself, the principles of the whole are never merely “given” to 
the senses as something over and above the manifold. Even in the standard case when 
all the parts of the thing can be grasped together by the senses, the principles must be 
posited through reflection, by dialectically comparing the manifold to the purported 
whole.653 In the case of the immeasurable, we cannot grasp the whole at all, but we are 
still able to dialectically compare the parts with common principles of the whole, which 
we suppose are governing them. 
Now, it may still be objected that the pleasure we take in the sublime consists 
precisely in the fact that the object transcends any principles that we might posit as 
governing it.654 True, a sensibly immeasurable object goes beyond our cognitive 
capacities in two ways: first, not all of its manifold is available to us, and second, any 
principles of the whole which we posit are highly confused and insufficient, since we 
form them on the basis of incomplete information. But it does not follow that the 
pleasure we take in these objects is due to the transcendence of the object as compared to 
our understanding of it. Rather, the pleasure is plausibly construed as flowing from 
whatever imperfect degree of understanding of the object’s perfection we have, along 
                                                 
653 Wolff, Psychologia empirica, §§257-260, Metaphysik, §136; Baumgarten, Metaphysica, §626; 
Mendelssohn, JubA, 1:51. 
654 Beiser raises this objection without resolving it: “The pleasure of the sublime seems to arise 
precisely from our incapacity to grasp the object as a whole” (Diotima’s Children, 219). 
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with the feeling at every passing moment that the object offers yet more perfection to 
our continued contemplation of it. In this case “the source of pleasure is just as 
inexhaustible as before.”655 We then lose ourselves in the object and its as-yet 
inaccessible but hoped for further perfection – almost as we fall in love with a person, 
where our pleasure is based not only on the good that we explicitly recognize but also 
on further perfection of which we currently have only the slightest intimation.  
The metaphysical problem of the sublime as sensibly immeasurable 
The problem of why apparently imperfect but very massive objects provide 
pleasure had bothered Mendelssohn from the beginning of his aesthetic career. In the 
eighth letter of the Briefe über die Empfindungen,  Euphranor raises the example of the 
pleasure we take in experiencing massive, dizzying heights and depths.656 Palemon does 
not adequately respond to this example, and in the essay “Sendschreiben an einen 
jungen Gelehrten zu B.” published anonymously by Mendelssohn in 1756, he admits 
that Palemon was “criminally negligent” in not addressing the cases of “people… 
wondering at great and immeasurable objects.”657 His tentative suggestion in that 
essay—that these objects make up in diversity of perfection what they lack in unity658—
could not really have satisfied him. Perfection, for one, is not a mere aggregation of 
unity and diversity but a certain relation of diversity to unity. And sheer diversity is in 
any case insufficient to explain the pleasure, because excessive diversity is also a feature 
                                                 
655 JubA, 1:399. 
656 JubA, 1:83-84. 
657 JubA, 1:534. 
658 Ibid. 
 251       
of what we consider ugly, as he already had argued in the Briefe and indeed repeated in 
the very same “Sendschreiben.”659  
Ironically, Burke himself led Mendelssohn to a new explanation. Although the 
Irish philosopher had rejected the role of perfection in aesthetics, he felt he needed to 
explain why we only take some things to be single vast objects, even though “the eye 
generally receives an equal number of rays at all times.”660 Burke argues that only a 
single unified object, rather than many distinct objects, can produce the right kind of 
“uniform labour” and “attention” needed to experience the sublime. In his commentary, 
Mendelssohn responds: “If it is true that a number of small objects without unity scatter 
the imagination, where it otherwise will be made busy through unity in the manifold, 
the consequence is entirely easy to draw that unity in manifold or sensible perfection is 
the source of the pleasant sentiment.”661 But Mendelssohn is being a bit too quick here. 
The whole of a vast object may indeed contain some shared principles through which 
we perceive it as a single vast unity, even though at the same time no principles of the 
whole govern the order and arrangement of the parts. For example, it is true that we 
would perceive a massive garbage heap as a unity because of some shared properties in 
the manifold – say, a common teleological origin and close spatial proximity – but that 
makes the heap perfect only in the slightest degree. For the specific parts and 
arrangement of the garbage heap are just arbitrarily thrown together without much basis 
in universal principles of the whole. Simply because there must be some objective basis 
                                                 
659 JubA, 1:58, 1:530. 
660 Burke, Enquiry, §4.10. 
661 JubA 3.1:249. 
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for our perceiving a thing as one unified vast object does not mean that that object has 
much perfection. 
Yet Mendelssohn’s explanation seems much more plausible if we restrict it to 
natural objects. In nature, the principles that result in a particular arrangement of parts 
largely overlap with the principles that govern the unity of the object: both are just the 
universal laws of nature. In other words, we perceive the object as one because of some 
perceived similarity in the manifold which is due to the laws of nature, and those same 
natural laws are also responsible for the specific existence and arrangement of the parts. 
In this way we can perceive the reasons for the disposition of the parts through the 
principles of the whole, which is just to perceive the perfection of the object.  
But what exactly is the focus perfectionis of such an object, that is, the unity in 
which all the various laws of nature seem to agree in relation to our senses? The 
perfection of fine art objects primarily consists in the arrangement of the parts of a work 
such that they all together contribute to the sensible representation of some one thing.662 
This same explanation holds in the case of natural objects: the unity of these majestic 
natural objects consists in the fact that they represent the lawful power, vastness, and 
order of nature – in other words, nature itself – in especially grandiose fashion.663 
Although a vast mountain range is chaotic in some sense, it is also orderly in that nature 
“conspired” through its laws to produce a multitude of massive peaks and crags. It is 
                                                 
662 See the Appendix for discussion of this claim. 
663 Like Wolff and Baumgarten, Mendelssohn held that perfection is the order which exemplifies 
metaphysical truth, which is basically the unified lawfulness of the variety in nature (JubA, 1:384-385). 
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plausibly the order, not the disorder, which we behold with wonder.664 Of course, while 
all objects obey the laws of nature, only some reveal them to our senses in such 
spectacular fashion.665 On this basis, artificial objects can be sublime either insofar as 
they represent this natural sublimity (as in a poem or painting), or insofar as they are 
actually similar to it (as in architecture). 
Still, some sublime objects seem difficult to square with this explanation. The 
starry night may seem to be a vast canvas scattered with points of light in which there is 
no apparent exhibition of power or order. But perhaps our wonder at the heavens 
requires that we view these points of light as representing something substantially 
grand and massive, and not as subjective sense-data, mere points of light. In any case, 
while these or similar replies were surely available to Mendelssohn, he does not make 
them explicit.666 
There also seem to be cases where we take pleasure in massive violence and 
disorder. In the Rhapsodie Mendelssohn writes the following: 
Lisbon, destroyed by an earthquake, charmed an uncountable multitude people 
who wished to have a look at the terrible devastation. After the bloodbath at … 
all of our citizens rushed onto the corpse-sown battlefield. Even the wise, who 
would have gladly given their lives to prevent this evil, waded through human 
                                                 
664 Bodmer, by contrast, saw the violent (das Ungestüme) as source of pleasure in the sublime that is 
sharply distinct from beauty. But he did not consider the possibility that the violent per se is not the 
cause of our pleasure. Further, Bodmer’s own view is incomplete, because he claims that the ground of 
the pleasure we get from the violent is located in the object (Kritische Betrachtungen, 155), but never 
adequately explains what this ground is. 
665 Importantly, this does not require that we understand natural laws to have a teleological ground. 
Cf. Kant, Kritik der Urtheilskraft, 5:270. 
666 Cf. Bodmer, Kritische Betrachtungen, 223-224 for an earlier discussion about the source of pleasure in 
the starry night.  
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blood after the fact and felt a thrilling delight at the consideration of the terrible 
site.667  
 
It is remarkable that Mendelssohn even admits such a scene could cause a feeling of 
pleausure. But he is careful to explain that the object of this “thrilling delight” is not the 
external thing being considered, but rather a specific aspect of the self: “The cognition of 
the evil, and the lively revulsion against it, is a human perfection, and must necessarily 
provide one with pleasure. We detest the imperfection, but not the cognition of it; we 
flee the evil, but not the faculty for cognizing it, and condemning it.”668 Moral 
condemnation is not merely pleasurable as a subjective activity, but also as a perfection 
which we perceive reflexively in ourselves. Thus, the explanation remains within the 
objective perfection aesthetic. The sublime object here is not the devastation, but the 
seemingly limitless power of moral disapprobation we perceive in ourselves. 
The psychological problem of the sublime as sensibly immeasurable 
The psychological problem is a consequence of Mendelssohn’s theory of mixed 
sentiments, first published in the Rhapsodie of 1761 but conceived in 1758.669 According to 
this theory, the pleasure or displeasure we feel from our own perfection or imperfection 
mixes with that of the object under consideration, creating a complex overall sentiment. 
In the case of the immeasurable, our inability to fully grasp the object is a cognitive 
imperfection which we find frustrating, and in the case of the sublime, the perception of 
                                                 
667 Mendelssohn, JubA, 1:383 (ellipsis in original). This passage underwent some minor changes from 
the earlier edition, cf. PS, 2:14. 
668 PS, 2:15. For a less clear expression of the same idea in the 1771 edition, see Mendelssohn, JubA 
1:385-386. 
669 See note 23 above. 
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our own weakness in relation to the object is a further source of displeasure.670 As a 
result, the pleasure we take in the sublime involves displeasure at our own inadequacy. 
What then is the source of the superlative character of the sublime? 
Some commentators have suggested that Mendelssohn’s “moment of subjective 
displeasure” is an anticipation of Kant’s three-moment phenomenology of the sublime 
from his Critique of Judgment.671 According to Kant, the subjective displeasure we take in 
our own apparent inadequacy gives way to a higher feeling of pleasure at our own 
superiority over mere phenomenal nature, on the basis of our reason and the moral law 
within us. Kant writes, “Sublimity is not contained in anything in nature, but only in our 
mind, insofar as we can become conscious of being superior to nature within us and 
thus also to nature outside us (insofar as it influences us).”672 Because Kant explains how 
the experience of the sublime culminates in great pleasure, these commentators see 
Kant’s psychology as a completion of Mendelssohn’s.  
But Mendelssohn’s view is an appealing theory in its own right. It, too, involves 
a “third moment” of pleasure, though it is directed back at the object instead of at the 
subject’s rational power. “The displeasure connected with the consideration [of sublime 
objects] is grounded on our weakness; for that reason they [the objects] offer an 
                                                 
670 JubA, 1:398. 
671 Braitmaier praises Mendelssohn for coming closer to Kant’s mature view than Kant himself had in 
his Beobachtungen (Geschichte, 2:173). Goldstein calls Mendelssohn a precursor to Kant in his 
psychology of the sublime, but criticizes him for not giving Burke’s “moment of terror” sufficient due, 
a task completed by Kant (Goldstein, Moses Mendelssohn, 148, 152). 
672 Translation from Immaneul Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, tr. Paul Guyer and Eric 
Matthews (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005), 147 (Kritik der Urtheilskraft, 5:264). See also 
Kant, Kritik der Urtheilskraft, 5:257 and 5:271. 
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unspeakable pleasure of which the soul can never be full.”673 A sublime object seems 
great even at first glance, but when we compare it to our own inadequacy (which we 
soon feel upon contemplating it), the object appears even more magnificent.  
Of course, just because it is the object, not our subject, which seems to carry us 
away, it is possible that the ultimate source of our pleasure may actually be within us, as 
Kant claims,674 for we are often mistaken about the objects of such highly confused 
emotions.675 But there are nonetheless some considerations which lend Mendelssohn’s 
theory greater plausibility. Kant’s explanation of the sublime requires too much 
acculturation and reflection,676 and the sublime often feels too overwhelming to be based 
on even unconscious reflection about ourselves. If it were, then it seems we would 
experience a relative diminishing of wonder at the object itself, and feel a kind of lording 
over it. But this runs counter to experience.677 Mendelssohn’s description of the sublime 
                                                 
673 JubA 1:398, emphasis added. 
674 Kant, Kritik der Urtheilskraft, 5:262. 
675 Indeed, Bodmer had already suggested yet another third moment in his analysis of pleasure in “das 
Große”: “Dazu kömmt denn die darauf folgende Betrachtung, welche die Wiederkunft seiner 
würksamen Kräfte bey ihm verursachet, wenn sie ihm vergewissert daß er in diesem unermeßlichen 
Ganzen beständig im Wesen ist, und wenn er vornehmlich den Grund und Ursprung, warum alles ist, 
und in welchem alles dieses ungemessene Ganze enthalten ist, bey sich ermißt” (Kritische 
Betrachtungen, 230).  
676 “Without the development of moral ideas, that which we, prepared by culture, call sublime will 
appear merely repellent to the unrefined person” (Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 148 (5:265), 
translation by Guyer and Matthews). It is possible, however, that this opinion is not essential to Kant’s 
theory. In any case, Mendelssohn seems more correct to say that universal appreciation (even among 
the uncultured) counts as strong evidence that something is sublime (JubA, 5.1:349-350). To some 
extent this is an empirical question, for which Kant cites only the flimsiest of evidence. 
677 One does on occasion sense a certain superiority when viewing certain sublime objects, but this 
seems to pertain more to a superiority of vantage rather than a superiority over the object itself. 
Accordingly, the feeling of superiority is characteristic of views from mountain summits but not of the 
night sky, etc. 
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object as “pressing us back into the dust”678 seems much more accurate: the object is all-
encompassing, we feel ourselves to be nothing in relation to it, and the implicit 
comparison makes the object seem all the more awesome and wonderful. 
                                                 
678 Mendelssohn, JubA, 1:398. This thought is borrowed from Bodmer, who had explained: “Dadurch 
wird zugleich alle Würcksamkeit des Gemüthes zu Boden geschlagen” (Kritische Betrachtungen, 229).  
Kant actually does consider this objection to some extent (Kritik der Urtheilskraft, 5:263-264), but his 
reply is inadequate. 
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Appendix: On a few key issues in rationalist aesthetics 
 This appendix aims to clear up some common misunderstandings about 
rationalist aesthetics in general. The first misunderstanding has to do with the sense of 
perfection relevant to beauty. In his Vernünfftige Gedancken von den Kräfften des 
menschlichen Verstandes [Rational thoughts on the powers of human understanding] (first 
published in 1712), Wolff explains perfection as the agreement of a manifold to a unity 
or a whole, giving the following example: “One judges the perfection of a clock from the 
fact that it correctly indicates hours and their parts. [The clock] is composed out of 
various parts, and both these all together as well as their connection account for why the 
hands [and the clock as whole] correctly indicate the hours and their parts.”679 The 
explanation relates the parts of a thing - the weight, pendulum, and gears of the clock – 
to the whole by virtue of correct function or purpose, namely telling time. This is all well 
and good for an instrument like a clock, but the concept of correct function certainly fails 
as an account of beauty. For beauty does not involve any determinate function – a point 
made forecefully by Kant some decades later. Does this mean that rationalist aesthetics 
describes beauty inappropriately, and cannot even get off the ground? 
 Fortunately, correct function of the whole is only one way in which the manifold 
parts of a thing can agree with each other to make up a whole. Another way, far more 
relevant to beauty, involves representation: All the parts of a thing can fit together in such 
a way that the whole they constitute represents some one thing to us.680 For example, 
                                                 
679 Metaphysik, §152. 
680 Cf. Aristotle, Poetics, §8. 
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Wolff explains that a novel attempts to represent a possible world,681 and Baumgarten 
claims that all the parts of a poem should represent a common theme.682 Importantly, in 
these cases the whole is not given as something determinate over and above the parts, 
but rather stands in a reciprocal or dialectical relation with them. As in an organism, 
each in some sense explains the other: one can only account for the parts by referring 
them to whole, while at the same time the whole is constituted by the totality of the 
parts. For example, the representation of a possible world exists only through the parts 
of a novel, but the existence and arrangement of those particular parts is (or ought to be) 
explained by reference to the whole representation. Judging an art work according to 
rationalist principles therefore involves an interpretation of the relations between the 
whole and the parts.683 In this sense, the perfection of a work of art need not involve a 
predetermined concept of its whole. Despite the important role of interpretation, 
however, beauty still pertains to the actual existence of a harmonious relation between 
parts and whole in the object. It is not explained merely through a “free play of 
faculties,” the subjective act of producing various interpretations, as in Kant’s later view. 
 Another crucial difference between beauty and correct functionality has to do 
with the way in which these perfections are characteristically perceived. While correct 
functionality is typically judged with reference to explicit standards and measurements, 
beauty is characteristically perceived and judged (to a significant extent) through sense.  
                                                 
681 Metaphysik, §571; see also §822. 
682 Baumgarten, Reflections on poetry, §66. 
683 Metaphysik, §157. 
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Rationalists theorize sense as perception that is clear but confused, as opposed to 
the clear and distinct perception involved in explicit measurement and discursive 
explanation. This technical terminology is frequently misunderstood, so it is worth 
explaining in some detail. An obscure [obscura, dunkle, obscure] representation is one 
which we cannot distinguish from others, while a clear [clara, klare, claire] 
representation is one which we can distinguish from others. Clear representations are 
either distinct [distinctae, deutlich, distincte] or confused [confusae, undeutlich, verwirrt 
(occasionally), confuse]: distinct if we can clearly represent what the difference consists 
in and thereby explain it, and confused if we cannot. In the Latin, “confusa” connotes 
“fusing together,” expressing the “taking many as one” that is characteristic of sense 
perception. 
 Several further clarifications of these fundamental concepts are in order. First, 
although the categories of cognition apply to both logical concepts and perceptions, they 
do so in slightly different ways. A logical concept is clear if one knows how to apply it to 
individuals or other concepts, and distinct if one is able explain why it is correctly 
applied. Leibniz uses an example of a person who can “just see” the difference between 
real gold and fool’s gold, and the assayer who knows the tests which show the 
difference. The first person’s knowledge of the concept of gold (with respect to fool’s 
gold) is clear but confused, while the latter’s is clear and distinct. Clarity of perception, by 
contrast, has to do with what we are presently able to distinguish in perception. To take 
another of Leibniz’s examples, my perception of green paint is clear but confused: I can 
distinguish it from other colors, but I do not perceive what makes it green (e.g. that it is a 
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mixture of blue and yellow pigments). Even if I know this about the paint, so that my 
concept of this green paint is distinct, my perception of it is not because I do not actually 
separate out the pigments in my perception. Both concepts and perceptions can be 
involved in aesthetic experience – concepts especially in poetry – but it is important to 
keep these distinctions in mind. 
Second, distinct or “intellectual” cognition is not, as is often assumed, the same 
as abstract cognition. Distinct cognition is required for abstract and discursive thought, 
because it identifies a difference which can then be applied to many things, but as Wolff 
and Baumgarten make clear, abstraction involves several other mental processes beyond 
distinct cognition. Distinct cognition can represent a universal difference in concreto, 
while abstract cognition is a derivative mental act that represents that universal in 
abstracto. Nor is distinct thought the same as symbolic or discursive thought, i.e. thought 
which makes use of symbols or words. In Leibniz’s original typology of ideas, the 
distinction between intuitive and symbolic thinking is orthogonal to the distinctions 
among clear, confused, and distinct, and this is made even more explicit in Wolff and 
Baumgarten. For Wolff, cognition is symbolic when we think of a discursive or symbolic 
description of a thing without thinking of the thing itself.684 Baumgarten more helpfully 
explains that in symbolic cognition, the sign is represented more clearly than the 
signified, and in intuitive cognition the signified is represented more clearly than the 
                                                 
684 PE, §289. 
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sign.685 This makes the difference between symbolic and intuitive cognition one of 
degree, notably allowing for intuitive cognition through the medium of poetry. 
Finally, it must be emphasized that clear, confused, and distinct cognition are all 
relative notions which both differ in degree among each other and also admit their own 
degree. As Wolff explains, distinctness is clarity of notes (i.e., clarity about the 
determinations which make up the nature of a thing), while confusion is the lack of a 
further degree of clarity, i.e. an inability to represent the parts or underlying structure of 
a thing clearly.686 Thus clear but confused differs from clear and distinct only in degree. 
If we could distinguish or perceive clearly some of a thing’s structure, we would be able 
to explain at least to some degree what makes it different from other things, and we 
would to that extent have a distinct perception of the whole. The more we distinguish in 
a thing, the more the perception of the whole is distinct; alternatively, the less we 
distinguish in a thing, the more the perception of the whole is confused (and the more 
the perception the parts obscure). In general, cognitions are not “absolutely distinct” or 
“absolutely confused,” but instead both, in certain respects and to certain degrees. Since 
sense perception contains much (like colors and tones) which we can distinguish from 
others but not account for, it is characteristically clear but confused – but it also contains 
some distinct elements, like shapes or chord components for those with a practiced ear. 
As a result, rationalists call cognition that is largely clear but confused sensible, even 
though it generally contains some distinct elements. Cognition that is largely clear and 
                                                 
685 Baumgarten, Metaphysica, §620. 
686 Wolff, Metaphysik, §211 
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distinct is called intellectual, even though all such cognitions also contain something 
confused. 
In his seminal 1735 Reflections on poetry,687 Baumgarten developed an extremely 
important extension to the standard rationalist typology of ideas: a distinction between 
intensive and extensive clarity. Intensive clarity is clarity of underlying determinations, 
and is therefore synonymous with distinctness. Extensive clarity, by contrast, is clarity of 
many determinations at the “surface” level, a clarity of breadth or extent. For example, a 
microscopic examination of the bone structure of a certain bird provides a very 
intensively clear (or distinct) cognition of that bird, while a close-up visual cognition of 
the whole bird under good lighting provides a very extensively clear cognition of it. 
Baumgarten put this distinction to great use in his aesthetics (a term he coined in the 
same work). First, he noticed that there is generally a tradeoff between intensive and 
extensive clarity in a perception: as we focus on the underlying determinations of a 
thing we lose the clarity of its extent, and vice versa. This is simply a plausible 
observation about human cognitive limitations. Second, while cognitions are in general 
to some extent intensively clear and to some extent extensively clear, beauty 
characteristically involves a high degree of extensive clarity – and is in this sense opposed 
to scientific works and discourse, which tend to emphasize intensive clarity. 
Now, Wolff had thought the senses could only make badly, in an error-prone 
fashion, the very same judgments that the intellect could make distinctly – in other 
                                                 
687 Original title:  Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus [Philosophical meditations 
on some things concerning the poem]. 
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words, that they could only estimate what the intellect could measure. But, armed with 
his new distinction, Baumgarten argued that sensible cognition has its own advantage: it 
is capable of greater extensive clarity than intellectual cognition. Since the perception of 
beauty typically involves a much higher degree of extensive clarity (than, say, the 
perception of the correctness of a mathematical proof), sense cognition is actually much 
better suited to grasping beauty than intellectual cognition. This idea gave sense 
cognition a positive role in the apprehension of beauty, at least for beings like us with 
limited cognitive powers. Importantly, Baumgarten did not invoke any kind of new or 
sharp distinction between sense and intellect. As we saw, sensible or “clear but 
confused” cognition differs only in degree from intellectual or “clear and distinct” 
cognition. Sense perception, and the sensible apprehension of beauty in particular is 
simply clearer in certain respects, and more confused in other respects, than more 
intellectual modes of cognition. 
Baumgarten’s aesthetics has been described as a “logic of the individual.”688 This 
is not incorrect, but it is potentially misleading in two respects. First, for Baumgarten the 
individual is not a transcendent or super-rational being. Rather, the individual is ens 
omnimode determinatum, a being determined in every way through the principle of 
sufficient reason.689 Second, aesthetics is not strictly a logic of the individual, but the logic 
of complexes of determinations taken together (and perceived confusedly). The 
individual is of particular interest in aesthetics precisely because it is determined in 
                                                 
688 Baeumler, Das Irrationalitätsproblem, 212, 224. 
689 Baumgarten, Metaphysica, §148. 
 265       
every way, and therefore tends to contain more complex material than abstracta, which 
are in some ways indeterminate. So, aesthetics does not deal solely with individuals – 
but the individual is as it were the kind of object most suited to it. 
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Note on translations 
All translations cited from non-English sources are my own.
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Abbreviations 
 
JubA Moses Mendelssohn, Moses Mendelssohn Gesammelte Schriften 
Jubiläumsausgabe ed. F. Bamberger, L. Strauss, A. Altmann, et al. (Berlin, 
Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann, 1929-1976) 
PE Christian Wolff, Psychologia empirica (hereafter PE), div. 2, vol. 5 of 
Gesammelte Schriften (Hildesheim: Olms, 1968) 
PS Moses Mendelssohn, Philosophische Schriften (Berlin: Christian Friedrich 
Voß, 1761) 
Metaphysik Christian Wolff, Vernünfftige Gedancken Von Gott, Der Welt und der Seele 
des Menschen, Auch allen Dingen überhaupt, Den Liebhabern der Wahrheit 
mitgetheilet (Halle, 1747) 
EG Johann Christoph Gottsched, Erste Gründe der gesammten Weltweisheit 
(Leipzig: Breitkopf, 1762) 
 
Bibliography 
 
Primary Sources 
 
Addison, Joseph and Steele, Richard. Spectator. Ed. George A. Aitken. New York: 
Longmans, Green & Co., 1898. 
Aristotle. Poetics. Translated by S. H. Butcher. Last modified 2009, 
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/poetics.html  
----- Rhetoric. Translated by W. Rhys Roberts. Last modified 2009, 
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/rhetoric.html 
Batteux, Charles. Les Beaux arts reduits a un même principe. Paris: Durand, 1746. 
Baumgarten, Alexander. Aesthetica. Frankfurt an der Oder: Kleyb, 1750. 
----- Metaphysica. Halle: Hemmerde, 1779. 
----- Reflections on poetry. Translated by Karl Aschenbrenner and William Holther. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954. 
Bodmer, Johann Jakob. Kritische Betrachtungen über die poetische Gemälde der Dichter. 
Frankfurt am Main: Athenäum, 1971. 
Bodmer, Johann Jakob and Breitinger, Johann Jakob. Die Discourse der Mahlern. 
Bibliothek älterer Schriftwerke der deutschen Schweiz 2.2. Frauenfeld: J. Hubers, 
1891. 
Boileau-Despréaux, Nicolas. Oeuvres de Boileau. Ed. M. Amar. Paris: Lefèvre, 1824. 
Breitinger, Johann Jakob. Critische Dichtkunst, worinnen die poetische Mahlerei in Absicht auf 
den Ausdruck und die Farben abgehandelt wird. Leipzig: Orell, 1740. 
Burke, Edmund. A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and 
Beautiful. Ed. J. T. Boulton. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958. 
Carroll, Noël. “Art and the Moral Realm” in The Blackwell Guide to Aesthetics. Ed. Peter 
Kivy. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2004. 
 268       
----- “Art, narrative, and moral understanding” in Aesthetics and Ethics. Ed. Jerrold 
Levinson. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
Cooper, Anthony, Ashley, Third Earl of Shaftesbury.  Characteristicks of Men, Manners, 
Opinion, Times. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001. 
Corneille, Pierre Oeuvres des deux Corneille (Pierre et Thomas). Ed. Charles Louandre. 
Paris: Bibliothèque-Charptenier, 1853 
Curtius, M. C. Aristoteles Dichtkunst. Hannover: Johann Christoph Richter, 1753 
Dubos, Jean-Baptiste. Critical Reflections on Poetry, Painting and Music. Translated by 
Thomas Nugent. London: Nourse, 1748. 
Flögel, Carl Friedrich. Einleitung in die Erfindungskunst. Leipzig: Meyer, 1760. 
Gottsched, Johann Christoph. Ausgewählte Werke, eds. Joachim und Brigitte Birke.  Berlin: 
de Gruyter, 1987. 
----- Erste Gründe der gesammten Weltweisheit. Leipzig: Breitkopf, 1762. 
----- “Die Schauspiele und besonders die Tragödien sind aus einer wohlbestellten 
Republik nicht zu verbannen” in Ausführliche Redekunst: nach Anleitung der allen 
Griechen und Romer, wie auch der neuern Ausländer. Leipzig, Bernh. Christoph 
Breitkopf, 1739: 660-668. 
----- “Ob man in theatralischen Gedichten allezeit die Tugend als belohnt, und das 
Laster als bestraft vorstellen müsse?” in Gesammelte Schriften von Johann Christoph 
Gottsched, ed. Reichel. Berlin: Gottsched-Verlag, 1906, 6:265-284. 
----- Versuch einer critischen Dichtkunst. Leipzig: Breitkopf, 1751. 
Hamann, Johann Georg. Hamann’s Schriften. Ed. Friedrich Roth. Berlin: G. Reimer, 1821-
1843. 
Home, Henry. Elements of Criticism. Ed. Rev. James R. Boyd, New York: A. S. Barnes & 
Burr, 1863. 
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of the Power of Judgment. Translated by Paul Guyer and Eric 
Matthews. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
----- Kritik der Urtheilskraft in Kant’s gesammelte Schriften. Ed. Königlich Preußischen 
Akademie der Wissenschaften. Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1908: 185-486. 
Klopstock, Friedrich Gottlieb. Klopstocks sämmtliche Werke. Leipzig: Göschen, 1839. 
de La Mettrie, Julien Offray. L’Homme machine. Leiden: Elie Luzac, 1748. 
Leibniz, G. W. Philosophical Essays tr. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber. Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1989 
Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim. Review 63 in Briefe, die neueste Literatur betreffend. Berlin: F. 
Nicolai, 1759. 
----- Gotth. Ephr. Lessings sämmtliche Werke. Carlsruhe: Büreau der deutschen 
Classiker, 1825. 
----- Werke. Ed. Herbert G. Göpfert. München: Hanser, 1970. 
Longinus (pseudo). Longinus on the sublime. Translated by W. Rhys Roberts. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1899. 
Maupertuis, Pierre Louis. Essai de philosophie morale. Berlin, 1749. 
Mendelssohn, Moses. Äesthetische Schriften. Ed. Anne Pollok. Hamburg: F. Meiner, 2005. 
 269       
----- Moses Mendelssohn’s Gesammelte Schriften. Ed. G. B. Mendelssohn. Leipzig: 
Brockhaus, 1843-1845. 
----- Moses Mendelssohn Gesammelte Schriften Jubiläumsausgabe. Ed. A. Altmann, F. 
Bamberger, H. Borodianski, I. Elbogen, J. Guttmann, E. Mittwoch, S. 
Rawidowicz, B. Strauss, L. Strauss. Berlin, Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann, 1929-
1976. 
----- Philosophische Schriften. Berlin: Christian Friedrich Voß, 1761. 
Nicolai, Friedrich, “Abhandlung vom Trauerspiel” in Bibliothek der schönen 
Wissenschaften und freyen Künste. Leipzig: Dyck, 1757, 1:17-68. 
Plato.  Apology. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Last modified, 2009, 
http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/apology.html 
----- Ion. Translated by Paul Woodruff. In Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper. 
Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997. 
----- Laws. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Last modified 2009, 
http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/laws.html. 
----- Republic. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Last modified 2009, 
http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.html. 
Poppe, Bernhard. Alexander Baumgarten: Seine Bedeutung und Stellung in der Leibniz-
Wolffischen Philosophie und seine Beziehungen zu Kant. Nebst Veröffentlichung einer 
bisher unbekannten Handschrift der Ästhetik Baumgartens. Leipzig: Robert Noske, 
1907. 
de Pouilly, Louis-Jean Lévesque. The Theory of Agreeable Sensations tr. anonymous. 
Edinburgh: J. Dickson, 1766. 
Racine, Jean. Phèdre & Hippolyte. Barbin, 1677. 
Resewitz, Friedrich Gabriel. Versuch über das Genie in Sammlung vermischter Schriften zur 
Beförderung der schönen Wissenschaften und Künste. Berlin: F. Nicolai, 1759-1763. 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men 
in The Discourses and other early political writings, ed. Victor Gourevitch. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2005: 111-188. 
Sulzer, Johann Georg. Kurzer Begriff aller Wissenschaften und anderer Theile der 
Gelehrsamkeit, worinnen jeder nach seinem Inhalt, Nutzen und Vollkommenheit kürzlich 
beschrieben wird. Leipzig: Johann Christian Langenheim, 1759. 
----- Vermischte Philosophische Schriften. Translated by Johann Georg Sulzer and 
Christian Garve. Leipzig: Weidmanns, 1773.  
Trublet, Nicolas Charles Joseph. Essays upon several subjects of literature and morality. 
Translated by anonymous. London: J. Osborn, 1744. 
Wolff, Christian. Horae subsecivae Marburgenses. Div. 2, vol 34.1 of Gesammelte Werke. 
Hildesheim: Olms, 1983. 
----- Ontologia. Div. 2, vol. 3 of Gesammelte Werke. Hildesheim: Olms, 1962. 
----- Psychologia empirica. Div. 2, vol. 5 of Gesammelte Werke. Hildesheim: Olms, 1968. 
----- Vernünfftige Gedancken Von Gott, Der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, Auch allen 
Dingen überhaupt, Den Liebhabern der Wahrheit mitgetheilet. Halle, 1747. 
Young, Edward. Conjectures on original composition. London: A. Millar, 1759. 
 270       
Secondary Sources 
 
Altmann, Alexander. Moses Mendelssohn: A Biographical Study. Portland, Ore.: Vallentine 
Mitchell, 1998. 
----- Moses Mendelssohns Frühschriften zur Metaphysik. Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr, 1969. 
Baeumler, Alfred. Das Irrationalitätsproblem in der Ästhetik und Logik des 18. Jahrhunderts 
bis zur Kritik der Urteilskraft. Halle: Niemeyer, 1923. 
Bamberger, Fritz. Introduction to Moses Mendelssohn Gesammelte Schriften 
Jubiläumsausgabe, vol. 1, by Moses Mendelssohn. Berlin, Stuttgart: Friedrich 
Frommann, 1929-1976. 
Beck, Lewis White. Early German Philosophy: Kant and His Predecessors. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1969. 
Beiser, Frederick. Diotima’s Children: German Aesthetic Rationalism from Leibniz to Lessing. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
Braitmaier, Friedrich. Geschichte der poetischen Theorie und Kritik von den Diskursen der 
Maler bis auf Lessing. Frauenfeld: Huber, 1888-1889. 
Brandis, Ch. A. Introduction to Moses Mendelssohn’s Gesammelte Schriften, by Moses 
Mendelssohn. Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1843-1845. 
Cassirer, Ernst. Freiheit und Form: Studien zur deutschen Geistesgeschichte. Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1975. 
Costazza, Alessandro. Genie und Tragische Kunst: Karl Philipp Moritz und die Ästhetik des 
18. Jahrhunderts. Berlin: Lang, 1999  
Deditius, Annemarie. Theorien über die Verbindung von Poesie und Musik: Moses 
Mendelssohn, Lessing. Liegnitz, 1918. 
Feger, Hans. “Logik ohne Dornen: Zum Zusammenhang von wissenschaftlicher 
Methode und sinnlicher Erkenntnis im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert.” Daphnis 22 
(1993): 197-264. Republished online at http://hans-
feger.de/pdf/publikationen/Logik-ohne-Dornen.pdf. 
Goetschel, Willi. Spinoza’s Modernity: Mendelssohn, Lessing, and Heine. Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2004. 
Goldstein, Ludwig. Moses Mendelssohn und die deutsche Ästhetik. Königsberg: Gräfe und 
Unzer, 1904. 
Guyer, Paul. “18th-century Germany Aesthetics.” Last modified 2007, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aesthetics-18th-german/. 
Hammermeister, Kai, The German Aesthetic Tradition.  Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002. 
Jerusalem, Karl W. Philosophische Schriften. Ed. G. E. Lessing. Braunschweig: Lessing, 
1776. 
Lessing, G. E. Publisher’s addenda to Philosophische Schriften, by Karl W. Jerusalam. 
Braunschweig: Lessing, 1776. 
Ranke, Wolfgang. Theatermoral: moralische Argumentation und dramatische Kommunikation 
in der Tragödie der Aufklärung. Würzbug: Königshausen & Neumann, 2009 
 271       
Rosenthal, B. Der Geniebegriff des Aufklärungszeitalters (Lessing und die Popularphilosophen). 
Germanische Studien Heft 138. Berlin, 1933. Reprint: Kraus, 
Nendeln/Liechtenstein, 1967. 
Segreff, Klaus-Werner. Moses Mendelssohn und die Aufklärungsästhetik im 18. Jahrhundert. 
Bonn: Bouvier, 1984. 
Sommer, Robert. Grundzüge einer Geschichte der deutschen Psychologie und Aesthetik von 
Wolff-Baumgarten bis Kant-Schiller. Würzburg: Stahel, 1892. 
Sorkin, David Jan. The Religious Enlightenment: Protestants, Jews, and Catholics from London 
to Vienna. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008. 
Vogt, Wolfgang. Moses Mendelssohns Beschreibung der Wirklichkeit menschlichen Erkennens. 
Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2005. 
Will, Frederic, Jr. “Cognition through Beauty in Moses Mendelssohn’s Early Aesthetics.” 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 14.1 (1955): 97-105. 
Wolf, Herman. Versuch einer Geschichte des Geniebegriffs in der deutschen Ästhetik des 18. 
Jahrhunderts. Heidelberg: 1923. Reprint: Kraus Reprint, Nendeln/Liechtenstein, 
1973 
Zammito, John H. The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992. 
 272       
Vita 
 
Aaron Martin Koller was born on January 1, 1981 in Minneapolis, Minnesota. He 
graduated from Okemos High School in Okemos, Michigan in 1999, and then from 
Harvard College with an A. B. cum laude in 2003. After working several office jobs for 
two years, he entered the Ph.D. program in philosophy at Syracuse University. Aaron 
currently lives with Susan Ashley in Fayetteville, New York. 
 
